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SUMMARY  
The thesis examines the conditions and limitations of mutual recognition and seeks to 
identify the lacunae in the governance mechanism and the regulatory framework 
applicable to undertakings in collective investment in transferable securities (‘UCITS’). It 
assesses the regulatory and supervisory mechanisms that may be applied to address the 
identified weaknesses. For this purpose, the thesis formulates a theoretical framework for 
effective mutual recognition based on quasi-maximum harmonisation, reflexive 
governance of financial supervision and a mechanism for the strengthening of mutual 
trust between national financial supervisors.  
 
The technique for financial regulation in the field of UCITS should create the right 
balance between implementing a policy designed to attain a high degree of harmonisation 
of investor protection regulation and making exceptions to address national differences. 
The picture that emerges is one where a model based on minimum harmonisation causes 
serious limitations to mutual recognition in the form of inconsistencies in the 
implementation of EU Law and the application of national discretions. Quasi-maximum 
harmonisation becomes the optimal technique for UCITS. However, the limitations of a 
model based on minimum harmonisation of regulation resurface, although to a lesser 
extent, even in a framework based on quasi-maximum harmonisation.  
 
The solution is not one where an even higher degree of harmonisation (the single 
rulebook mechanism) is required, but lies in reflexive governance of financial supervision 
combined with a framework for the strengthening of mutual trust between national 
financial supervisors. This framework can form the basis for overcoming the remaining 
obstacles to the cross-border activity of UCITS, including the barrier to the depositary 
passport which is the last major bastion that stands in the way of a complete internal 
market for UCITS. 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements  
 
i 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ii 
Table of Cases, Legislation and Official Publications 
 
v 
1. INTRODUCTION, HYPOTHESIS, METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER 
OUTLINE 
 
 
 1.1 Introduction and Hypothesis 
 
1 
 1.2 Aim, Methodology and Originality  
 
8 
 1.3 Chapter Outline  
 
10 
2. AN EXAMINATION OF THE THEORIES AND OBJECTIVES OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION POST THE 2007-2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
 
14 
 2.2 Theories of Regulation 
 
16 
 2.3 Objectives of Financial Regulation 
 
24 
 2.3.1 Safeguarding Systemic Stability 
 
25 
 2.3.2 Investor Protection 
 
39 
 2.3.3 Safeguarding the Integrity of Financial Markets 
 
46 
 2.4 Conclusion 
 
52 
3. MINIMUM HARMONISATION OF REGULATION, HOME 
COUNTRY CONTROL AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST TWO DECADES OF THE UCITS 
DIRECTIVE  
 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
 
53 
 3.2 The Origins – The 1985 UCITS Directive 
 
54 
 3.2.1 A Governance Mechanism for the Approximation of 
Regulation 
 
56 
 3.2.2 Minimum Substantive Regulation for Investor Protection 
 
66 
 3.3 The failed UCITS II Initiative  
 
76 
 3.4 The UCITS III Directive – Overcoming the Limitations of the 
Regulatory Framework for Mutual Recognition 
 
85 
 3.4.1 An Evolving Governance Mechanism to Achieve Mutual 
Recognition 
 
87 
 3.4.2 The 2001 UCITS Product Directive 
 
91 
 
 
3.4.3 The 2001 UCITS Management and Prospectus Directive 100 
 3.5 Conclusion 
 
111 
4. FROM MINIMUM HARMONISATION TO THE LAMFALUSSY 
PROCESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANISM FOR A HIGHER 
DEGREE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE FIELD OF UCITS  
 
 
 4.1 Introduction 
 
113 
 4.2 Lamfalussy Process: A Governance Mechanism for a Higher 
Degree of Mutual Recognition 
 
116 
 4.3 Level 1 and 2: Governance Mechanisms for Quasi-Maximum 
Harmonisation  
 
123 
 4.3.1 Transparency at Level 1 – The UCITS IV Directive 
 
125 
 4.3.2 Transparency at Level 2  – The UCITS IV Directive  
 
125 
 4.3.3 The Structure of the Debate at Level 1 
 
126 
 4.3.4 The Structure of the Debate at Level 2 – Pre-Lisbon 
 
129 
 4.3.5 The Structure of the Debate at Level 2 – Post-Lisbon 
 
134 
 4.3.6 The Outcome of the Debate at Level 2 – Pre and Post Lisbon 
 
138 
 4.3.7 Specific Conclusions on Level 1 and 2 
 
142 
 4.4 Level 3: An Open Method of Coordination for Convergence and 
the Governance of European Supervision 
 
143 
 4.5 Level 4: Mechanisms for Enforcement 
 
159 
 4.6 Conclusion 
 
161 
"5. QUASI-MAXIMUM HARMONISATION OF REGULATION AND 
GOVERNANCE OF SUPERVISION: A FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS 
THE REMAINING BARRIERS TO THE CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY 
OF UCITS 
 
 
 5.1 Introduction  
 
165 
 5.2 The 2009 UCITS IV Directive: Quasi-Maximum Harmonisation 
of Regulation for a Higher Degree of Mutual Recognition 
 
167 
 5.2.1 Simplified Notification Procedure  
 
167 
 5.2.2 Key Investor Information Document 
 
173 
 5.2.3 A Mechanism for Mergers  
 
178 
 5.2.4 Master-Feeder Structures  
 
183 
 5.2.5 Management Company Passport  
 
187 
 5.2.6 Fragmented Financial Supervision: The Heart of the Matter 
 
193 
 5.3 Reflexive Governance of Financial Supervision: Addressing the 
Remaining Barriers to Cross-Border Activity of UCITS  
 
201 
 5.3.1 National Marketing Rules  203 
 
 5.3.2 Dealing with the Fragmented Regulatory and Supervisory 
Framework for UCITS  
 
205 
 5.3.3 Addressing the Supervisory Concerns arising from the 
Management Company Passport and the Internal Market for 
Depositaries 
 
208 
 5.4 Strengthening the Governance of Financial Supervision  
 
212 
 5.4.1 Governance Arrangements for the Independence, Autonomy 
and Accountability of Financial Supervisors 
 
215 
 5.4.2 An EU Framework for the Strengthening of Mutual Trust 
between Financial Supervisors 
 
226 
 5.5 Conclusion  
 
232 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
234 
"BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
237 
ANNEX 1 – Interviews: List of Interviewees 
 
257 
ANNEX 2 – Interviews: Introductory E-mail and List of Questions 
 
259 
"
"
! i!
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Malcolm Ross, for his 
support, guidance and for providing constant intellectual challenge 
throughout the course of the thesis. I am grateful to my wife, Bernice, for her 
support and encouragement. I would also like to thank the University of 
Malta for funding my studies and the Malta Financial Services Authority for 
granting me leave from work to complete my thesis.  
! ii!
List of Abbreviations 
 
AIFMD 
 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
AIF Alternative Investment Fund 
 
ALFI 
 
Association of the Luxembourg Fund Industry 
AMF 
 
Autorite Des Marche Financiers – French Financial Markets Authority 
BAFIN 
 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - German Federal Financial 
Regulator 
 
BCBS 
 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervision  
BCCI 
 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
BIS  
 
Bank of International Settlements 
CEBS  
 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
CEIOPS 
 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
 
CEPS 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
CESR 
 
Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CFPB 
 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
CJEU 
 
Court of Justice of the EU 
CONSOB 
 
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa – Italian Securities 
Regulator  
 
CMVM 
 
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários – Portuguese Securities 
Regulator 
 
CNMV 
 
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores – Spanish Securities Regulator 
 
CNVM  
 
Comisia Na!ional" a Valorilor Mobiliare – Romanian Securities Regulator 
  
CRD  
 
Capital Requirements Directive  
CRD IV Fourth Capital Requirements Directive 
 
CSSF 
 
Commission de Surveillance Secteur Financier – Luxembourg Financial 
Regulator  
  
CCP Central Counterparty Party  
 
! iii!
!
EBA  
 
European Banking Authority  
EBF  
 
European Banking Federation 
ECB  
 
European Central Bank  
ECJ  European Court of Justice  
 
EFAMA European Fund and Asset Management Association 
 
EMIR 
 
European Markets Infrastructure Regulation 
EIOPA 
 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority  
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority  
 
ESC 
 
European Securities Committee 
ESRB 
 
European Systemic Risk Board 
ETF 
 
Exchange Traded Fund 
EU European Union 
 
FCA 
 
UK Financial Conduct Authority 
 
FSAP 
 
Financial Services Action Plan 
FSB  
 
Financial Stability Board 
FSOC 
 
Financial Stability Oversight Council  
IMF 
 
International Monetary Fund 
IMF FSAP 
 
Financial Sector Assessment Program 
IAA 1940 
 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
 
ICA 1940 Investment Companies Act of 1940 
 
ICI  
 
Investment Company Institute  
IOSCO  International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
 
KIID 
 
Key Investor Information Document  
LTCM Long Term Capital Management LP 
 
! iv!
!
MAD  
 
Market Abuse Directive  
MiFID Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
  
MiFID II Commission Proposal for a Revision of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive  
 
MMF  Money Market Fund  
 
OTC  Over the Counter 
 
OECD 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PD 
 
Prospectus Directive  
 
SEC  
 
Securities and Exchange Commission  
SSM 
 
Single Supervisory Mechanism 
TD  
 
Transparency Directive 
TEC  Treaty Establishing the European Community  
 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
 
UCITS Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities  
 
US United States of America 
 
 
! v!
Table of Cases, Legislation and Official Publications 
 
 
A) Cases  
 
 
A1) European Union  
 
Case-9/56, Meroni & Co.,Industrie Metallurgische S.p.A V. High Authority [1957 & 1958] ECR 
133. 
 
Case-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG V. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis De Dijon) 
[1979] ECR 649. 
 
Case-240/90, Federal Republic of Germany V. Commission of the European Communities [1992] 
ECR I-5383. 
 
Case-270/12 United Kingdom V. European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
[2014] 
 
 
A2) United States 
 
Mistretta V. United States 488 US 361, 37 2 (1989). 
 
 
B) Legislation 
 
 
B1) European Union  
 
Regulations 
 
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents  
OJ L145/43. 
 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses 
as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and 
dissemination of advertisements OJ L149/1. 
 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards key investor information and conditions 
to be met when providing key investor information or the prospectus in a durable medium other 
than paper or by means of a website OJ L176/1. 
  
Commission Regulation (EU) No 584/2010 of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the form and content of the standard 
notification letter and UCITS attestation, the use of electronic communication between competent 
authorities for the purpose of notification, and procedures for on-the-spot verifications and 
investigations and the exchange of information between competent authorities OJ L176/16. 
 
! vi!
Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing the 
European Systemic Risk Board OJ L331/1. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets 
Authority), amending Decision 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC 
OJ L331/84. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 
2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member 
States of the Commission’s implementing powers OJ L55/13. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 
on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps. OJ L86/1. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories OJ L201/1. 
 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Directive 
2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regards to exemptions, general 
operating conditions, depositaries, leverage, transparency and supervision OJ L83/1. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on 
European Venture Capital Funds OJ L115/1. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on 
European Social Entrepreneurship Funds OJ L115/18. 
 
Council Regulation  (EU) No 1024/2013  of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions OJ L 287/63. 
 
 
Directives  
 
Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable 
securities (UCITS) OJ L375. 
 
Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
and amending Directive 77/780/EEC OJ L386. 
 
Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regards to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data OJ L141. 
 
Directive 2001/107/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 January 2002 
amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment In Transferable 
Securities (UCITS) with a view to regulating the management company and simplified 
prospectus OJ L41/20. 
 
! vii!
Directive 2001/108/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 January 2002 
amending Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment In Transferable 
Securities (UCITS) OJ L41/35.  
 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector OJ L201.  
 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) OJ L96/16. 
 
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the 
prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading  
OJ L345/64. 
 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments OJ L 145/1. 
 
Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on 
the harmonization of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose 
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market OJ L390/38. 
 
Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to 
the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions OJ L177/1. 
 
Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating on the capital 
adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions OJ L177/201. 
 
Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions in transferable securities (UCITS) 
(recast) OJ L302/32. 
 
Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 
2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of 
the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
and the European Securities and Markets Authority OJ L331/120. 
 
Commission Directive 2010/42/EU of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards certain provisions concerning fund mergers, 
master-feeder structures and notification procedure OJ L176/28. 
 
Commission Directive 2010/43/EU of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements, conflicts of 
interest, conduct of business, risk management and content of the agreement between a depositary 
and a management company OJ L176/42.  
 
Directive 2011/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers and amending directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC OJ L174/1. 
 
! viii!
Decisions  
 
Commission Decision 2001/528/EC of 6 June 2001 establishing the European Securities 
Committee OJ L191/45. 
 
Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission OJ L184. 
 
Commission Decision 2001/527/EC of 6 June 2001 establishing the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators OJ L3/32. 
 
 
B2) United States 
 
Securities Act of 1933, as amended through PL 112-106 (2012). 
 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended through Pub.L. 112-158 (2012). 
 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended through Pub.L. 112-90 (2012). 
 
Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended through Pub.L. 112-90 (2012). 
 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-290 (1996). 
 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L.111-203 (2010). 
 
 
 
C) Official Publications 
 
Basel 1988 Capital Accord<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm>accessed 26.01.14 
 
Basel 2004 Capital Accord<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm>accessed 26.01.14 
 
BCBS, ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group’ (BCBS 
March 2010)<http://goo.gl/2hbbp7>accessed 15.03.14.  
  
CESR, ‘Mandate for the Expert Group on Investment Management’ CESR/04-160, June 2004 
<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Preliminary Progress Report: Which Supervisory tools for the EU Securities Markets? 
An Analytical Paper by CESR’, (Ref:04-333f), October 2004<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 
15.03.14. 
 
CESR and ECB, ‘Standards for Securities Clearing and Settlement in the European Union’ 2004 
<http://goo.gl/7Z3KDX>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Guidelines for supervisors regarding the transitional provisions of the amending UCITS 
Directives (2001/107/EC and 2001/108/EC)’, CESR/04-434b, 2005 <http://goo.gl/bvWyNY 
>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘CESR guidelines to simplify the notification procedure of UCITS’, CESR/06-120b, June 
2006<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
 
! ix!
CESR, ‘CESR assesses the extent of equivalence of supervisory powers across Europe under the 
Market Abuse and Prospectus Directive’, Press Release 07-420, 21.06.07<http://goo.gl/ozJfKm> 
accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Advice to the Commission on the UCITS Management Company Passport’, CESR/08-
867, October 2008<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Call for Evidence on Possible Implementing Measures concerning the UCITS Directive’, 
CESR/09-179, 17.02.09<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Consultation Paper: CESR’s technical advice to the European Commission on the level 2 
measures related to the UCITS management company passport’, CESR/09-624, 
08.07.09<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Consultation paper: CESR’s technical advice to the European Commission on level 2 
measures relating to mergers of UCITS, master-feeder UCITS structures and cross-border 
notification of UCITS’, CESR/09-785, 17.09.09<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Consultation Paper: CESR’s technical advice at level 2 on Risk Measurement for the 
purposes of the calculation of UCITS-global exposure’, CESR/09-489, 15.06.09 
<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Press Release: CESR Review the application of guidelines to simplify the notification 
procedures of UCITS across Europe’, CESR/10-016, 29.01.10<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 
15.03.14.  
 
CESR, ‘Guidelines on a Common Definition of European Money Market Funds’ CESR/10/049, 
2010 <http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities in Financial Markets, (July 2010) 
<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Technical Advice to the Commission in the context of the MiFID Review – Investor 
Protection and Intermediaries’ CESR/10-859, 29.07.10<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 
15.03.14. 
 
CESR, ‘Peer Review of the Implementation of CESR’s Guidelines to simplify the notification 
procedure of UCITS’, CESR/09-1034, January 2010<http://goo.gl/bvWyNY>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
CFPB, ‘Building the CFPB: Progress Report’ 18.07.11<http://goo.gl/Q6sqo6>accessed 08.02.14. 
 
Commission, The Development of a European Capital Market – Report by a Group of Experts 
Appointed by the EEC Commission, 1966<http://goo.gl/HnO2K4>accessed 06.11.10. 
 
Commission, ‘Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the European Commission to 
the European Council’ COM(85)310 Final, 14.06.85<http://goo.gl/ZbgVVb>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
Commission, ‘Toward a European Market for the Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities – Commentary on the provisions of Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 
December 1985 (Vandamme Report’)<http://goo.gl/K0iUzv>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 
85/611/EEC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to 
Undertakings for Collective Investment In Transferable Securities (UCITS)’, COM(93)37 Final, 
09.02.93<http://goo.gl/rRSdJO>accessed 15.03.14.  
! x!
 
Commission, ‘Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending 
Directive 85/611/EEC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions 
Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment In Transferable Securities (UCITS)’, 
COM(94)329 Final, 20.07.94<http://goo.gl/cMcOCa>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 
85/611/EEC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to 
Undertakings for Collective Investment In Transferable Securities (UCITS)’, COM(1998)449 
Final, 17.07.98<http://goo.gl/cRUyMP>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Directive 
85/611/EEC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to 
Undertakings for Collective Investment In Transferable Securities (UCITS) with a view to 
regulating the management company and simplified prospectus’, COM(1998)451 Final, 17.07.98. 
<http://goo.gl/tnV5Iz>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
Commission, ‘Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan’, 
COM(1999)232<http://goo.gl/3D18dO>accessed 15.03.14.   
 
Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a Directive amending Directive 85/611/EEC on the 
Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to UCITS, with a 
view to regulating management companies and simplified prospectus’, COM(2000)331, 
30.05.00<http://goo.gl/wgR1Xx>accessed 15.04.14 
 
Commission, ‘Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Upgrading the 
Investment Services Directive (92/33/EEC)’ COM(2000)729 15.11.00 <http://goo.gl/Io9tHZ> 
accessed 15.04.14. 
 
Commission, ‘White Paper on European Governance’, COM(2001)428 Final, 25.07.01. 
<http://goo.gl/Q4Cr7F>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
Commission, ‘Preparing the challenge of the next phase of European capital market integration’, 
02.06.04<http://goo.gl/AE4rmt>accessed 15.03.14.   
 
Commission, ‘Communication to Council and to European Parliament: Regulation of UCITS 
depositaries in the Member States’, Com(2004)207, 30.03.04<http://goo.gl/6gPrAl>accessed 
15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Draft Inter-institutional Agreement on the operating framework for the European 
regulatory agencies’, COM(2005)59 Final, 22.02.05<http://goo.gl/Ewhvfm>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Green Paper on the Enhancement of the EU Framework for Investment Funds’ 
COM(2005)314 Final, 12.07.05<http://goo.gl/IbBdlC>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘White Paper on enhancing the single market Framework for Investment Funds’ 
COM(2006)686 Final, 15.11.06<http://goo.gl/cALb0p>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication From the Commission: Respective powers retained 
by the Home Member State and the Host Member State in the marketing of the UCITS pursuant 
to Section VIII of the UCITS Directive’ COM(2007)112 Final, 19.03.07 <http://goo.gl/sw44xI> 
accessed 15.03.14.  
 
! xi!
Commission, ‘Initial Orientations of Possible Adjustments to UCITS Directive (85/611/EEC)’, 
22.03.07<http://goo.gl/Or902C>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Review of the Lamfalussy Process – Strengthening Convergence’ COM(2007)727 
<http://goo.gl/5RK9Ed>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
Commission, ‘Exposure Draft: Initial orientations for discussion on possible adjustments to the 
UCITS Directive – Management Company’, 22.03.07<http://goo.gl/o0EOA9>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: European Agencies: 
The Way Forward’, COM(2008)135, 11.03.08<http://goo.gl/fFriZ8>accessed 10.02.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Financial services: Commission proposes improved EU framework for investment 
funds’, IP/08/1161, 16.07.08<http://goo.gl/3pmrbf>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Request for assistance on UCITS Management Company Passport’, 
MARKT/G4/PS/D (2008), 16.07.08<http://goo.gl/c5Kou9>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Staff Working Document accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to UCITS: Impact Assessment’, SEC(2008)2263, 2008. 
<http://goo.gl/6KaaFh>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities’, COM(2008)458 Final, 16.07.08. 
<http://goo.gl/VMfhvX>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Summary record of the 67
th
 Meeting of the European Securities Committee’, 
Working Document ESC-14-2009, 16.12.09<http://goo.gl/adS3Qn>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority’ COM(2009)53 Final, 23.09.09 
<http://goo.gl/sudz92>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Impact Assessment: Accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers’, SEC(2009)576, 
30.04.09<http://goo.gl/zTt1ej>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council: Implementation of Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, 
COM(2009)673 Final, 9.12.2009<http://goo.gl/V6dbT7>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
Commission, ‘Consultation Paper on the UCITS Depositary Function and on the UCITS 
Managers’ Remuneration’, Market/G4 D(2010)950800<http://goo.gl/R1iXoZ>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Green Paper: Corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration 
polices’ COM(2010)284 Final, 02.06.10<http://goo.gl/UWbPG3>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Public consultation on a revision of the Market Abuse Directive’ Brussels, 
26.06.10<http://goo.gl/eczNbG>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Public consultation: Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive’, 
08.12.10<http://goo.gl/Z3XmM1>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
! xii!
Commission, ‘Consumer Market Study-Advice within the Area of Retail Investment Services 
(2011)<http://goo.gl/Pr75F3>accessed 31.12.12. 
 
Commission, ‘Implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon - Delegated Acts: Guidelines for the 
Services of the Commission’, Brussels, 2011<http://goo.gl/fREMtO>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Details of a Possible Framework for Recovery and Resolution’, 06.01.11 
<http://goo.gl/bjpd2B>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a European Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms’, COM(2011)0452, 
20.07.11<http://goo.gl/UPPQPL>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Consumer Empowerment in the EU’, SEC(2011)469, 07.04.11 < 
http://goo.gl/zlX7jX>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper, The Impact Assessment, Accompanying the 
document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms’, SEC(2011)950 Final, 20.7.11 < 
http://goo.gl/QtsMNu>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on market 
in financial instruments repealing Directive 2004/39/EC’, COM(2011)656 Final, 20.10.11< 
http://goo.gl/g5rI6k>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2009/65/EC as regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions’, 
COM(2012)350, 03.07.12 <http://goo.gl/bvWJxi>accessed 16.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Consultation: Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Non-bank Financial 
Institutions’ 05.10.12 <http://goo.gl/FKoD3q> accessed 08.02.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Impact Assessment: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to UCITS as regards depositary functions, remuneration 
policies and sanctions, SWD(2012)185, 03.07.12<http://goo.gl/Sqw9np>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘November infringements package: main decisions’ Memo/12/876, 21.11.12 
<http://goo.gl/eeuKm3>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on structural measures improving credit institutions’ 
29.01.14 COM(2014)43<http://goo.gl/aGAUSJ>accessed 01.03.14.   
 
Committee of Wise Men (Lamfalussy Group), ‘Initial Report’, Brussels 09.11.00< 
http://goo.gl/qHT2FV>accessed 15.03.14.   
 
Council, Statement by Finland, Denmark, Czech Republic, Latvia, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Luxembourg and Portugal on Commission Delegated 
Regulation of 19 December 2012 supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU, Inter-institutional 
file:2009/0064(COD), 26.02.13. 
 
ECB, Opinion of the ECB, (CON/98/54), 16.03.99<http://goo.gl/xWu1bJ>accessed 15.04.14 
 
! xiii!
ECB, ‘Large EU Bank’s Exposures to Hedge Funds’ November 2005<http://goo.gl/imNWSJ> 
accessed 31.12.12.  
 
ESMA, ‘Opinion: Practical arrangements for the late transposition of the UCITS IV Directive’ 
ESMA/2011/342, 13.10.11<http://goo.gl/3alI46>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
ESMA, ‘Peer Review – MMF Guidelines’, ESMA/2013/476, 15.04.13<http://goo.gl/lSbWcl> 
accessed 15.03.14. 
 
European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion on the proposal for a Directive amending 
Directive 85/611/EEC with a view to regulating management companies and simplified 
prospectus’, INT016, 24.02.99<http://goo.gl/xWu1bJ>accessed 15.03.14 
 
European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Opinion on the Commission Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments repealing 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Recast)’, 10.02.12< 
http://goo.gl/g8UJRU>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
European Parliament, ‘Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizen’s Rights on the 
1993 UCITS Proposal’, (A5-0268/1993)01.10.93<http://goo.gl/rRSdJO>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
European Parliament Report on the 1998 UCITS Proposal, (A5-0025/2000) 01.02.00 
<http://goo.gl/cRUyMP>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
European Parliament Report on the 1998/2000 UCITS Proposal, (A5-0324/2001) 10.10.01< 
<http://goo.gl/cRUyMP>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
European Parliament, ‘Working Document No3 on financial supervision and regulation – the 
future model’ Special Committee on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis, 02.03.10< 
http://goo.gl/ieUEsz>accessed 16.03.14. 
 
European Parliament and the European Central Bank, ‘Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) 
between European Parliament and ECB on the cooperation on procedures related to the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)’ 2013 <http://goo.gl/e5X8Tq>accessed 04.01.14.   
 
FSB, ‘Report on the Peer Review of Spain’ (Basel, January 2011) <http://goo.gl/2MV8Xd> 
accessed 10.12.12. 
 
FSB, ‘Effective Resolution of Systematically Important Financial Institutions – 
Recommendations’, 19.07.11<http://goo.gl/BcK3aO>accessed 08.02.14. 
 
FSB, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ October 2011 
<http://goo.gl/KyV7Y7 >accessed 08.02.14. 
 
FSB, ‘Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Progress Report’ November 
2012<http://goo.gl/wfhU66>accessed 08.02.14. 
 
FSB, ‘Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: 
Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Regimes’ 16.07.13 <http://goo.gl/AyaXx5> 
accessed 08.02.14. 
 
FSB, ‘Monitoring the effects of agreed reforms on emerging market and developing economies’ 
12.09.13<http://goo.gl/mRXGIU>accessed 01.03.14. 
 
! xiv!
FSB and IOSCO, ‘Consultation: Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-
Insurer Global SIFI’ (08.01.14)<http://goo.gl/aN0mcL>accessed 23.01.14.    
 
IAIS, ‘Globally Systemic Important Insurers: Policy Measures’ 18.07.13 
<http://goo.gl/gia2rw>accessed 08.02.14. 
 
IMF, ‘United States: Publication of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation— 
Detailed Assessment of Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation’, May 2010<http://goo.gl/l6llA2>accessed 03.01.13. 
 
IMF ‘Resolution of Cross-border Banks: A Proposed Framework for Enhanced Cooperation’ 
11.06.10<http://goo.gl/OJ94LJ>accessed 08.02.14 
 
IMF, ‘Luxembourg: Financial System Stability Assessment—Update’, June 2011 
<http://goo.gl/SaJPVx>accessed 16.05.13.!
!
IMF, ‘Sweden FSAP Update - Assessment of Observance on IOSCO Principles and Objectives of 
Securities Regulation’ September 2011<http://goo.gl/SaJPVx>accessed 16.05.13.!
!
IMF, ‘Spain: Basel Principles for Effective Supervision and IOSCO Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation – Detailed Assessment Implementation - June 2012 Reports No12/142  & 
12/143<http://goo.gl/SaJPVx>accessed 16.05.13.!
!
IMF, ‘France: Financial System Stability Assessment’, December 2012<http://goo.gl/SaJPVx> 
accessed 16.05.13.!
 
Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, ‘Final Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process’, 
Brussels, 15.10.07<http://goo.gl/JrYCuG>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
IOSCO, ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’, 2010<http://goo.gl/xMZ7kf> 
accessed 15.03.14. 
 
Malta Financial Services Authority, ‘Annual Report 2010’<www.mfsa.com.mt>accessed 
29.08.11 
 
OECD, ‘Governance Systems for Collective Investment Schemes in OECD Countries’ 
Occasional Paper 19, 2001<http://goo.gl/4u2MdH>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
SEC, ‘Report on the Study of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Investment Trusts and 
Investment Companies pursuant to Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935 (1938-1940)<http://goo.gl/7LP5jq>accessed 15.03.14. 
 
SEC, ‘Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company Regulation’ (1992) SEC  
Division of Investment Management<http://goo.gl/0UYcNs>accessed 17.02.14 
 
SEC, ‘Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940’ Release No IA-
1601 (1996)<http://goo.gl/MbZd9d>accessed 07.03.14.   
 
SEC, ‘A Plan English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents’ (1998)< 
http://goo.gl/4mRmzo>accessed 06.03.14. 
 
SEC, ‘Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds’ (2003)<http://goo.gl/ZLqWUf>accessed 
06.03.14. 
 
! xv!
The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, ‘DeLarosiere Report’, Brussels 
25.02.09 <http://goo.gl/CroZY>accessed 15.03.14.  
 
UK Financial Services Authority, ‘Annual Report 2010’<http://goo.gl/vZZI3I> accessed 
29.08.11. 
 
UK House of Commons, ‘Too Important to Fail – Too Important to Ignore’, Report of the 
Treasury Select Committee, Session 2009-10, HC261-1<http://goo.gl/NPOkuu> accessed 
08.02.14. 
 
US Government Accountability Office, 'Financial Stability: New Council and Research Office 
Should Strengthen the Accountability and Transparency of Their Decisions' GAO-12-886 
13.09.12<http://goo.gl/KBTbVt>accessed 31.01.14.   
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION, HYPOTHESIS, METHODOLOGY AND 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
1.1 Introduction and Hypothesis 
 
Mutual recognition is an essential governance tool for the conduct of international trade 
and has the basic function of giving effect to the regulatory requirements of the home 
jurisdiction in the host jurisdiction. Mutual recognition is contingent on the relations 
between jurisdictions and the trust that these have in the regulatory framework and the 
supervisory capabilities of one another. It is a governance mechanism that has been 
broadly based on the compatibility and acceptance of a counterpart’s regulatory and 
supervisory system. Mutual recognition has been extensively applied for the purpose of 
the construction of an internal market in the field of financial services.  
 
The conditions for mutual recognition have been and are still evolving. The 1985 
Cockfield formula based mutual recognition on a combination of minimum 
harmonisation of regulation, home country control and complementary host country 
supervision. A new formula was prescribed by the 2001 Lamfalussy Process which based 
mutual recognition on the realisation of a higher degree of harmonisation of EU financial 
regulation, in the context of the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities (‘UCITS’) Directive achieving quasi-maximum harmonisation, the consistent 
implementation and application of EU regulation by Member States, and the convergence 
of supervisory practices through cooperation between financial supervisors.  
 
Quasi-maximum harmonisation is a technique which brings together and calibrates 
minimum and maximum harmonisation provisions. While maximum harmonisation is 
applied in those instances where complete homogeneity and consistency are required to 
achieve a high degree of investor protection, minimum harmonisation is applied to those 
areas of regulation where flexibility is required in order to respect the distinct legal 
traditions and cultural differences at national level. 
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In the first instance the application of maximum harmonisation generally suggests that 
mutual recognition would not remain relevant to that specific area of regulation, as this is 
applicable across the EU on the basis of a single regulatory framework. However, when 
considered within the context of the functioning of the internal market in a field of 
regulation where maximum and minimum harmonisation of regulation coexist, instances 
of maximum harmonisation become a mechanism for the strengthening of the overall 
mutual recognition between Member States, as it reinforces mutual trust between these 
States in areas which are exceptionally important for accomplishing the objectives of 
financial regulation.   
 
The financial crisis and the resulting failures of cross-border financial institutions, 
brought to bear the limitations of a system based on Lamfalussy tools for mutual 
recognition. The application of Lamfalussy Directives became synonymous with 
differences in the interpretation and application of the EU regulatory framework that 
resulted in regulatory arbitrage which weakened the integrity and stability of the EU 
financial system. Similarly, in the field of financial supervision the adherence to national 
agendas resulted in lack of cooperation, and inconsistency in financial supervision. 
During the financial crisis, this state of affairs resulted in what Jacque DeLarosiere 
described as chacun pour soi solutions, aimed at safeguarding the national interest. This 
attitude weakened the effectiveness of the internal market mechanisms based on mutual 
recognition as a particular action in one Member State could have a detrimental effect in 
other Member States.  
 
In an attempt to address these concerns, governance mechanisms for regulation and 
supervision of the internal market were proposed by policy-makers, including the 
adoption of a European single rulebook for financial services; the application in certain 
instances of a centralised system for European supervision; the establishment of a 
European handbook for supervision; and the creation of colleges of financial supervisors 
for cross-border financial institutions. Such governance mechanisms have been applied in 
different doses to the main areas of EU financial regulation and supervision.  
 
The UCITS Directive, which regulates and creates an internal market for the European 
collective investment scheme industry that primarily targets retail investors, is one of the 
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remaining pieces of EU law which, to a large extent, still operates on the basis of mutual 
recognition. While other major pieces of EU regulation, such as the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive
1
 (‘MiFID’), Market Abuse Directive
2
 (‘MAD’), and the Capital 
Requirements Directive
3
 (‘CRD’), have been or are in the process of being transformed 
into single/partial single rulebook type legislative frameworks, the governance 
mechanism for regulation and supervision under the UCITS Directive has remained 
largely untouched.  
 
The UCITS Directive was adopted by the Council in 1985.
4
 The main objective of the 
1985 UCITS Directive was that of attaining a minimum degree of harmonisation of EU 
regulation of collective investment schemes that would have allowed mutual recognition 
to operate in this field. It aimed at achieving a homogenous degree of retail investor 
protection within Europe through product regulation such as the application of 
diversification requirements and transparency regulation. Since 1985, various proposals 
for the reform of the substantive requirements applicable to UCITS have been made by 
the Commission. Some of these proposals, such as the application of a passport for 
depositaries of UCITS, proved to be controversial, have continuously been rejected by 
policy-makers and are still the subject of on-going policy debate.  
 
In 1993 the Commission proposed the extension of the scope of the UCITS Directive to a 
wider selection of funds.
5
 The UCITS II proposal also provided for the introduction of 
UCITS master-feeder structures and the creation of an internal market for depositaries. 
These proposals were considered as too ambitious and controversial by the Member 
States and brought negotiations in the Council to a halt.
6
 In 1998, the Commission 
published a new proposal
7
, which was adopted in 2001 in the form of two Directives
8
. 
                                                
1
 Directive 2004/34/EC. 
2
 Directive 2003/3/EC. 
3
 Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 2006/49/EC repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU) No575/2013 
and Directive 2013/36/EU.  
4
 Directive 85/611/EC. 
5
 Commission, Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 85/611/EEC, Com(93)37, 09.02.93 ‘Amended 
proposal for Directive amending Directive 85/611/EEC’, COM(94)329 20.07.94 
<http://goo.gl/cMcOCa>accessed 05.02.11.   
6
 J Benjamin and A Holmes, ‘The Evolving Legal Environment for Fund Management’  (1996) 10 Journal 
of International Banking and Financial Law 480 
7
 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 85/611/EEC’, COM(1998)449, 17.07.98 and 
‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 85/611/EEC’, COM(1998)451, 17.07.98 
<http://goo.gl/tnV5Iz>accessed 05.02.11.   
8
 Directive 2001/107/EC and Directive 2001/108/EC. 
 4 
The 2001 UCITS III Directives widened the scope of the 1985 UCITS Directive to 
include other types of funds within the meaning of UCITS. The amendments also 
provided for a UCITS management company passport, which eventually proved to be 
ineffective. It also established a common framework for the application of a simplified 
prospectus, which in due course was deemed to be a failure.  
 
In 2009, the UCITS Directive was recast and a new Directive was adopted. This is 
generally referred to as the UCITS IV Directive
9
. The recast Directive introduces various 
changes to the UCITS framework, such as the establishment of an effective management 
company passport, which became applicable on the 1
st
 July, 2011. The 2009 UCITS IV 
Directive is now in the process of being amended by the Commission’s 2012 UCITS V 
Proposal.
10
  This is a proposal to regulate the remuneration of managers of UCITS and to 
tighten up the requirements that regulate the activity of depositaries of UCITS.  
 
In 2011 the EU also adopted the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
11
 
(‘AIFMD’), which regulates the management companies of alternative investment funds 
(AIF). This Directive was one of the measures adopted in response to the 2007-2008 
financial crisis.
12
 While both the UCITS Directive and the AIFMD seek to regulate the 
investment management industry and to create an internal market in this field, the 
specific segments of the industry covered by these Directives is different. The definition 
of an AIF is wide and captures all those funds which do not qualify as UCITS under the 
UCITS Directive, these may include hedge funds and private equity funds. The target 
market of AIFs is different from that of UCITS, as AIFs are generally offered as an 
investment to professional investors. Given the target market of AIFs and the wide 
definition given to this category of collective investment scheme, these type of funds are 
not subject to specific product regulation under the AIFMD, such as the specific 
diversification rules that apply to UCITS in terms of the UCITS Directive and which are 
crucial for the protection of retail investors.  
                                                
9
 Directive 2009/65/EC.  
10
 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2009/65/EC as regards, depositary functions, 
remuneration and sanctions’ COM(2012)350<http://goo.gl/bvWJxi>; On 25.02.14 the Greek Presidency 
reached political agreement with the European Parliament on UCITS V Directive 
<http://goo.gl/PH14wW>accessed 28.02.14.  
11
 Directive 2011/61/EC. 
12
 E Ferran, ‘After the crisis: the regulation of hedge funds and private equity in the EU’ (2011) 12(3) 
European Business Organisation Law Review 379-414. 
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The difference between the two regimes also extends to the scope of regulation. While 
the UCITS Directive regulates both the product and the management company, the scope 
of the AIFMD is limited to the management company. The main reason for the EU’s 
focus on the management company with respect to funds which are targeted to 
professional investors, is that the risks associated with these type of funds lie almost 
exclusively at the level of the management company, where all the decisions are made.
13
 
It is noteworthy that the same approach to regulation of the investment management 
industry has, by and large, also been adopted in the US, where the regulation of retail 
type funds extends to both the product in terms of the Investment Company Act 1940, 
and the management company (in the US referred to as the investment adviser) in terms 
of the Investment Advisors Act 1940, while the regulation of professional funds is limited 
to the management company in terms of the latter Act.
14
 
 
Nonetheless, in Europe this difference in approach between the retail and the professional 
segments of the industry is slowly changing, as the EU has in recent years embarked in 
the extension of product regulation to professional type funds such as venture capital 
funds
15
and social funds
16
. Indeed, product regulation in the EU is still a work progress. In 
this regard, as evidenced by the 2012 UCITS VI Consultation
17
, the UCITS internal 
market project is far from being concluded. This document asked for stakeholders’ views 
on the operation of the UCITS with regard to the assets which are eligible as investments 
for UCITS, the lack of an internal market passport for depositaries, and the regulation of 
other aspects of the operation and investment by certain types of UCITS. It also elicited 
opinions on whether the requirements regarding consolidation mechanisms and the 
passporting mechanism for UCITS might require improvement.  
 
In addition, a number of other areas of UCITS raise additional regulatory and supervisory 
concerns. Significantly, the competition between Member States to attract financial 
                                                
13
 Commission, ‘Impact Assessment: Proposal for an Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive’ 
SEC(2009)576, 30.04.09<http://goo.gl/zTt1ej>accessed 28.02.14.  
14
 P Maris, ‘The new architecture for hedge fund regulation: an assessment of the recent US and EU 
initiatives’ (2012) 6(3) Law and Financial Markets Review 208-214; and W Kaal, ‘Hedge Fund Manager 
Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act’ (2013) 50(1) San Diego Law Review.  
15
 Regulation (EU) No 345/2013. 
16
 Regulation (EU) No 346/2013. 
17
 Commission, ‘Consultation: UCITS – Product Rues, Liquidity, Depositary, Money Market Funds, Long-
term Investment’ 26.07.12<http://goo.gl/9a1JYD>accessed   05.02.14 
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institutions to their jurisdiction for eventual cross-border marketing across the EU has, in 
certain instances, generated a race to the bottom.
18
 In the context of UCITS this has inter 
alia resulted in differences between Member States on the type of portfolio composition 
which is acceptable in terms of the UCITS Directive.  
 
Post the financial crisis, EU policy-makers expressed the concern that fragmented 
regulation and supervision was leading to regulatory arbitrage and was providing 
incentives to financial supervisors to compete via lax supervision to avoid putting 
national industry in a less competitive position or out of fear that some institutions would 
shift part of their business to less strict regulatory systems.
19
 As a consequence, the 
emerging governance mechanism for EU financial regulation and supervision promotes a 
higher degree of centralisation at EU level.  
 
Albeit, the regulation of UCITS still remains to a significant degree based on Directives 
which require transposition into national law and which grant Member States the 
opportunity to shape the implementing legislation to their particular circumstances. 
Moreover, the supervision of UCITS stands firmly at national level. A governance 
mechanism for financial regulation which is based on Directives and where financial 
supervision is carried out at national level requires a degree of mutual recognition 
between the Member States. This is particularly relevant given the different 
implementation and interpretation of the UCITS Directive at national level, and the fact 
that financial supervisors still embrace different supervisory philosophies and apply 
diverse practices and methods for monitoring compliance with the requirements 
applicable to UCITS, with minimum supervisory convergence if any. 
 
The thesis argues that while a blend of European and national regulatory and supervisory 
mechanisms has been adequate for building the foundations of a broad internal market for 
UCITS, the incomplete substantive regulation of UCITS, the inconsistent implementation 
and interpretation of the UCITS Directive in order to further the national interest and the 
lack of proper supervisory convergence and cooperation, have resulted in opportunities 
                                                
18
 M Lamandini, ‘Towards a New Architecture for European Banking Supervision’ (2009) 6(1) European 
Company Law 6-13. 
19
 European Parliament, ‘Working Document No3 on financial supervision and regulation – future model’ 
Special Committee on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis, 02.03.10; and ‘To what extent did 
financial regulation and supervision fail in preventing the crisis?’ February 2010< 
http://goo.gl/fy0rMS>accessed 05.09.12.  
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for regulatory arbitrage and for lax supervision. These have brought to light the 
limitations of mutual recognition based on harmonised regulation in achieving EU-wide 
governance in the field of financial services. These limitations generate tensions and 
mutual distrust between Member States and obstruct the further development of cross-
border activity of UCITS within the internal market. The thesis identifies four specific 
regulatory and supervisory weaknesses that hinder the completion of the internal market 
for UCITS, being: [i] the inconsistent implementation and interpretation of the UCITS 
Directive; [ii] the application of national marketing rules; [iii] the lack of a depositary 
passport; and [iv] a failure to achieve supervisory convergence.  
 
The thesis addresses the following key question: What are the governance mechanisms 
that may be applied to overcome the identified limitations of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework for mutual recognition in the field of UCITS?  
 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that quasi-maximum harmonisation, a mixture of 
minimum harmonisation and maximum harmonisation, is the optimal harmonisation 
technique for UCITS, as it provides flexibility where this is necessary in order to respect 
the different legal traditions at national level. However, in view of the identified 
limitations and weakness, mutual recognition based on harmonisation per se, is not the 
best possible tool for removing the remaining regulatory and supervisory barriers to the 
cross-border activity of UCITS. The thesis contends that to overcome these barriers 
quasi-maximum harmonisation of regulation would have to be complemented by 
reflexive governance of financial supervision, that is built upon the mechanisms for 
cooperation and convergence established by EU policy-makers post the financial crisis, 
and combined with a mechanism for the strengthening of mutual trust between national 
financial supervisors.  
 
Reflexive governance is a process that promotes learning from diversity. The over-all 
focus of the process is a continuous search for better approaches to address the 
governance problem. The constructive and valuable feature of a process of reflexivity in 
governance is that the outcome of the learning process bends back on the participants that 
have instigated and participated in the process. For reflexive governance to work, 
participants must be equipped to become active in the decision-making process and must 
be supported through inter alia institutional arrangements for cooperation and debate.  
 8 
 
1.2 Aim, Methodology and Originality  
 
This thesis seeks to identify the lacunae in the governance mechanism and the regulatory 
framework for mutual recognition in the context of the UCITS Directive and to propose 
mechanisms to address these deficiencies. For this purpose the thesis examines how the 
conditions for mutual recognition have evolved through the different stages in the 
development of the EU framework for the regulation and supervision of financial 
services, in particular in the context of the UCITS Directive. The thesis also analyses how 
the different conditions for mutual recognition have contributed to the overcoming of 
identified regulatory and supervisory obstacles to cross-border business of UCITS.  
 
The thesis examines the regulatory and supervisory conditions that have caused, and in 
some instances are still bringing about, certain restrictions to the completion of the 
internal market for UCITS. It analyses the limitations of the governance mechanism and 
regulatory framework for mutual recognition. As part of the overall analysis carried out 
for the purpose of the thesis, the substantive regulations applicable to UCITS are 
considered. Examining the substance of regulation is important to determine the effect of 
legislation and the success of the framework in removing the barriers to cross-border 
activity.  
 
The aims of the thesis have partly been fulfilled through an analytical consideration of 
academic articles, legal and policy documents and other relevant literature, which deal 
with different aspects of financial regulation and supervision in general and UCITS in 
particular. The analysis in the thesis has been written taking a historical approach. 
Analysing the history of the development of the governance mechanism and the 
regulatory framework for mutual recognition in the context of the UCITS Directive is 
relevant to understand the present position. The thesis attempts to place the historical 
material in the context of the current EU regulatory framework. In a number of instances 
the analysis also brings in a comparison between the EU and the US. In the US a 
sophisticated federal system of financial regulation and supervision of securities business 
 9 
has been in place for over eighty years.
20
 In this regard, the comparison is useful to obtain 
a sense of perspective. In particular, the comparison with the US allowed a deeper 
analysis of the evolution of the regulation of collective investment schemes and the future 
of regulation and supervision in the EU.  
 
The analysis of the information obtained through the literature review, was 
complemented with evidence on the topic of the thesis obtained through interviews with 
policy-makers, financial supervisors and industry practitioners. For this purpose, a 
random sample of twenty-two participants was selected. The list of participants and the 
introductory e-mail and list of questions have respectively been included in annex 1 and 
annex 2. The aim of the interviews was that of gathering further evidence on the 
regulatory and supervisory barriers to cross-border activity of UCITS and their service 
providers and to assess the validity of any proposed solutions to overcome these barriers.  
 
The evidence gained from the interviews served to inform the author on the mechanisms 
that may be applied to overcome the remaining limitations of the framework for mutual 
recognition in the field of UCITS and to identify the optimal mechanism in this regard. 
While the discussions held during the interviews are not specifically referenced in the 
thesis, citations of a general nature have been made in specific sections to acknowledge 
the contribution of the discussions held during the interviews to the stance taken in the 
thesis. The carrying out of interviews for the purpose of the dissertation required approval 
from the Ethics Review Committee of the University of Sussex, which was granted in 
November 2012. 
 
The value of the thesis is that it re-examines mutual recognition based on harmonised 
regulation and mutual trust as one of the principal governance mechanisms for the 
construction of the internal market for financial services. It formulates a theoretical 
framework for effective mutual recognition based on quasi-maximum harmonisation, 
reflexive governance of financial supervision and a mechanism for the strengthening of 
mutual trust between national financial supervisors. This is the main contribution of the 
thesis to the existing literature. The theoretical framework is applied as a solution to the 
                                                
20
 The Securities Act which marked the beginning of federal regulation of securities business was adopted 
in 1933. See A Dean ‘Twenty-Five Years of Federal Securities Regulation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’ (1959) 59(5) Columbia Law Review 697-747.    
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limitations of the current regulatory framework for mutual recognition in the field of 
UCITS. Another significant contribution of this thesis is that it places the historical 
material in the context of the current EU regulatory framework and applies the lessons of 
the past to identify the possible solutions for the future.  
 
The thesis also contributes to the academic debate on the future of the UCITS Directive, 
which is one of the pillars of EU securities regulation. While this Directive has been 
given considerable attention from practitioners in the field of financial services, it has not 
been the subject of any sufficient degree of academic consideration and research. The 
UCITS Directive is a unique piece of EU legislation in the field of financial regulation as 
it combines financial product regulation with the regulation of the provision of financial 
services and attempts to create an internal market for both. Furthermore, the UCITS 
internal market framework remains incomplete and further proposals in this regard are 
yet to be made by the Commission.   
 
Different sections of the thesis have been published in the journals entitled ELSA Malta 
Law Review, Law and Financial Markets Review and Journal of Business Law. 
Throughout the process that led to the development of the ideas for the purpose of the 
thesis, other research on financial regulation conducted by the author was published in 
the Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance and The Accountant. These 
publications have been referenced in the bibliography.  
 
1.3 Chapter Outline  
 
The rest of the thesis is organised into five chapters as follows.  
  
Chapter 2 identifies the main theories and primary objectives of financial regulation and 
examines their continued validity in the light of the financial crisis. It analyses the public 
and private interest theories of regulation and concludes by highlighting their validity in 
understanding the rationale behind the policy response to the financial crisis. The chapter 
also evaluates the objectives of financial regulation and argues that the financial crisis has 
strengthened the case for regulation to safeguard systemic stability, protect the investor 
and ensure that financial markets are fair, efficient and transparent. The analysis is 
important for establishing the context within which financial regulation and supervision 
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may be understood and for comprehending the forces that drive mutual recognition based 
on harmonised regulation.  
 
In chapters 3, 4 and 5, the application of the concept of mutual recognition in the context 
of the regulation of UCITS is analysed. The three chapters examine the various 
combinations of governance mechanisms and substantive regulation, which were adopted 
in order to allow mutual recognition between Member States in this field.  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the first two decades of the UCITS Directive. During this period 
mutual recognition was contingent on minimum harmonisation of substantive regulation 
to achieve a uniform degree of protection for investors in UCITS and the application of 
the home country control and complementary host country supervisory principles.  
 
The central argument of chapter 3 is that while the 1985 UCITS Directive was a 
necessary first step in the process for the development of an internal market for UCITS, 
the limitations of the governance mechanism for mutual recognition based on minimum 
harmonisation of regulation, in the form of inconsistent application of the Directive and 
the application of Member State discretions, raised barriers to the internal market for 
UCITS. In addition the first two decades of the 1985 UCITS Directive were also 
characterised by limitations of the regulatory mechanism for mutual recognition in the 
form of tight investment restrictions and the prohibition imposed on the management 
company and on the depositary from providing cross-border services.   
 
Chapter 3 also contends that while the subsequent amendments to the 1985 UCITS 
Directive addressed some of the limitations to the regulatory mechanism for mutual 
recognition they however widened the limitation of the governance mechanism for 
mutual recognition, as different interpretations in the application of the UCITS Directive 
remained a prevalent characteristic of its implementation by Member States and their 
financial supervisors.  
 
Chapter 4 analyses the nature and operation of the governance mechanisms applied under 
the Lamfalussy Process and the effectiveness of this process for the construction of the 
regulatory framework of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive.   
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The central argument of chapter 4 is that the Lamfalussy Process established the tools for 
the strengthening of mutual recognition between Member States and, by so doing, created 
the appropriate setting for the construction of a broader internal market in the field of 
UCITS. It is argued that a high degree of transparency and a wide inclusive debate on the 
proposed EU regulatory framework for UCITS, permitting both political and technical 
consideration to be made, created the right environment for the successful operation of 
the Lamfalussy hard-law making process in achieving quasi-maximum harmonisation in 
the context of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. The chapter makes the point that these 
characteristics of the Lamfalussy Process complement each other and that unless each of 
these elements is allowed to operate effectively, the legislative process will lose on its 
efficiency.  
 
Chapter 4 also examines the application of the open method of coordination under the 
Lamfalussy Process. The chapter makes the point that soft-law mechanisms are an 
effective method to attain a degree of flexibility which is necessary to keep up with 
developments in financial markets. However, the unenforceability of soft-law may create 
legal uncertainty that may put in danger part of the harmonisation process which, in turn, 
weakens mutual recognition between the Member States. Another limitation of the soft-
law mechanism as applied in practice under the Lamfalussy Process is that it mainly 
focused on measures which sought to accomplish regulatory convergence with little or no 
efforts in the field of supervisory convergence. Chapter 4 also examines the ESMA 
framework and how this attempts to address these weaknesses.  
 
Chapter 5 analyses the substantive regime set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive and the 
manner in which this seeks to broaden the internal market for UCITS and the hard-law 
and soft-law tools used for this purpose. It analyses the manner in which the 2009 UCITS 
IV Directive achieves quasi-maximum harmonisation. The chapter also examines the 
governance mechanism for the supervision of UCITS.  
 
The analysis in chapter 5 demonstrates that while quasi-maximum harmonisation of 
regulation has proved to be the optimal mechanism for the development of the 
harmonised regulatory framework for UCITS, the soft-law tools selected for the purpose 
of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive did not achieve the desired degree of regulatory 
convergence which in terms of the Lamfalussy Process is an essential ingredient for the 
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operation of mutual recognition. Moreover, no sufficient degree of supervisory 
cooperation and convergence was achieved as a result of the operation of the Lamfalussy 
Process in practice. 
 
The central argument of the chapter is that in order to overcome the remaining regulatory 
and supervisory barriers to cross-border business in the field of UCITS, mutual 
recognition based on quasi-maximum harmonisation would have to be complemented 
with reflexive governance of financial supervision based on cooperation mechanisms for 
cross-border UCITS structures and mutual monitoring through peer reviews. These 
mechanisms may be applied as vehicles for experimentation and mutual learning and as a 
basis to create a framework for supervisory convergence.  
 
Chapter 5 makes the point that the strengthening of mutual trust between financial 
supervisors is critical for the proper functioning of reflexive governance of financial 
supervision. The chapter examines the high-level governance principles of autonomy of 
financial supervision and accountability. It contends that mutual trust may be 
strengthened if the independence from political and industry influence as well as the 
accountability to democratically elected institutions and to peers are guaranteed through a 
regulatory framework for this purpose at EU level.  
 
Chapter 6 makes some concluding remarks.  
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Chapter 2 
 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE THEORIES AND OBJECTIVES OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION POST THE 2007-2008 FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The main contribution of the thesis is that it formulates a theoretical framework for 
effective mutual recognition based on quasi-maximum harmonisation, reflexive 
governance of financial supervision and a mechanism for the strengthening of mutual 
trust between national financial supervisors. The theoretical framework is applied as a 
solution to the limitations of the current regulatory framework for mutual recognition in 
the field of UCITS. Another significant contribution of the thesis is that its places the 
historical material in the context of the current EU regulatory framework and applies the 
lessons of the past to identify the solutions for the future. 
 
To comprehend the forces that drive mutual recognition based on financial regulation, it 
is essential to analyse the theoretical framework that accounts for the origins of and the 
rationale for regulation. It is also important to critically examine the continued validity 
of the objectives, which in practice the regulation of financial services aims to achieve 
and which are important for effective mutual recognition. Indeed, unless EU substantive 
regulation addresses properly the inefficiency of financial markets through the effective 
attainment of the objectives of financial regulation, regulatory and supervisory barriers 
would generally be raised at national level in order to ensure additional protection of the 
local financial system and investor community. Within this context, the achievement of 
the objectives of financial regulation, within an environment of harmonised regulation 
as well as regulatory and supervisory convergence, becomes a key tool to generate 
mutual trust between Member States and the proper operation of the internal market.   
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The aim of the chapter is to critically examine and comment on the continued validity of 
the theories and objectives of financial regulation in the light of the financial crisis and 
the post-crisis policy response. The main contention of the chapter is that the post-crisis 
policy response may be explained as a combination of factors that surface from the 
theories of regulation and that the causes of the financial crisis and the subsequent 
regulatory measures which have been proposed sustain the continued validity of the 
objectives of financial regulation. It is also argued that regulatory and supervisory 
action to realise a specific objective of financial regulation could, at times, generate 
tensions with and weaken the realisation of other regulatory and economic objectives. 
The chapter also demonstrates the difficulties that could surface in finding the right 
balance between achieving the objectives of financial regulation, while avoiding 
instances of over-regulation by respecting the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity 
and the fundamental rights of members of society. 
 
In the context of the thesis, it is important at this early stage to comment on the 
distinction between regulation and supervision, which in certain instances are used 
interchangeably in literature but which are different and very specific functions. It is 
also important to understand the difference between micro and macro prudential 
supervision, which are two dissimilar but equally important categories of supervision.  
 
Regulation may be defined as the act of making laws and rules including soft law, while 
supervision refers to the day-to-day action of supervisors – who often are also regulators 
- monitoring the implementation and application of the rules in specific cases and 
includes the authorisation, supervision stricto senso, crisis management and the taking 
of enforcement action where specific breaches have been committed.1 In the context of 
financial services both regulation and supervision should seek to achieve the high-level 
objectives of regulation which are examined in this chapter. These two functions are, 
however, distinct in nature and require specific technical skills if they are to be 
implemented correctly.  
 
                                                
1 R Lastra, ‘Central Banking and Banking Regulation’ (FMG London 1996) 108-144; E Wymeersch, 
‘The Future of Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe’, (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 
987-1010; E Wymeersch, ‘Europe’s New Financial Regulatory Bodies’ (11.04.11)< 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1813811>accessed 22.02.14; R Lastra, ‘Defining forward-looking judgment-
based supervision’ (2013) 14(3/4) Journal of Banking Regulation 221-227.  
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The carrying out of supervision may be further categorised into micro and macro 
prudential supervision. Micro-prudential supervision is concerned about the stability of 
individual financial institutions and is largely conducted through the over-sight of the 
governance, compliance, capital structures and risk management of individual financial 
institutions. Macro-prudential supervision is interested in the safety and stability of the 
financial system as a whole and seeks to identify threats to systemic stability by 
analysing the trends and imbalances in the financial system.2 
 
As further analysed in this chapter, micro and macro prudential supervision are 
generally carried out separately. Nonetheless, in the context of achieving the systemic 
stability objectives of regulation these two specific categories of supervision are equally 
fundamental and become mutually dependent on each other.  
 
The rest of the chapter is divided into three other sections. The next section examines 
the public and private interest theories of regulation. The third section evaluates the 
objectives of financial regulation in the light of the causes which brought about the 
financial crisis and the regulatory tools devised by policy-makers in order to create 
order within the financial system. Some additional remarks on this topic are made in the 
concluding section.  
 
2.2 Theories of Regulation 
 
The development of market economies has been conditioned by the ideas of two main 
schools of thought, whose views are reflected in two systems of economic organisation, 
that is the market system and the collectivist system.  
 
The market system, which, to a large extent is based on capitalist ideology, is 
characterised by market freedom, where individuals and in particular the industry, are 
subject to very simple controls and are otherwise uninhibited from pursuing their own 
welfare objectives.3 In a market system, the economy is supported by the legal order, 
particularly through instruments of private law which have a facilitative function by 
                                                
2 A Persaud, ‘Macro-Prudential Regulation’ in I MacNeil and J O’Brien (eds) ‘The Future of Financial 
Regulation’ (Hart 2010) 437-445. 
3 A Ogus, ‘Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory’ (Hart 2004) 1.  
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offering a set of official arrangements through which the relationship between 
individuals is regulated and as a consequence of which they can conduct their activities 
and carry out their business. Consequences of a private law nature relate to, for 
example, the nullity of a contract and a counterparty's right to compensation or 
restitution. Private law is distinct from public law. The latter regulates the relationship 
between the general public and the State. Claims of a private law nature are usually 
brought before the civil courts, whereas public law, in the form of administrative 
regulatory requirements, is enforced by regulatory agencies such as financial 
supervisors.  
 
In a market system private law is the means through which market failures can be 
addressed. State intervention through public law and the supervision of the market by a 
regulatory agency has only a minimal role to play, if any.  
 
According to the collectivist system, private law is not enough to address all instances 
and forms of possible market failure. Therefore, public law and state intervention are 
deemed necessary to rectify the perceived imperfections of the market system in 
achieving the collective public interest. The State intervenes in order to promote 
behaviour that, in the absence of regulatory intervention, is believed not to occur.4 State 
regulation is therefore generally identified with the collectivist system.  
 
Divergent views exists as to the reasons why regulation materialised, which actors 
contributed to its formation, and the patterns of interaction between such actors. Two 
broad categories of theories of regulation can be identified: the ‘public interest’ or 
‘helping hand’ theories of regulation and the ‘private interest’ theories of regulation.5 
 
The public interest theories explain regulation as a result of the public’s demand for the 
rectification of the possible failure of some of the assumptions of the market system.6 
These theories attribute to those who are responsible for the creation and application of 
                                                
4 Ogus (n3) 2. 
!
 M Hantke-Domas, ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?’ 
(2003) 15(2) European Journal of Law and Economics 165-194 and F McChesney, ‘Money for Nothing: 
Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion’, (Harvard 1997), chapter ‘The Economic Theory of 
Regulation’ 7-19.  
6 R Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5(2) The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 335.     
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regulation, an aspiration to engage in communal goals with the purpose of furthering the 
general welfare of the community.7 An implied conclusion of the public interest theories 
is that regulation is mainly intended to defend the interests of the general public and 
thereby attain the common good, that is the socio-economic well-being of society as a 
whole.8 Public interest theorists perceive economic markets as extremely fragile and 
prone to operate very inefficiently (or inequitably) if left alone.9 These theorists account 
for regulation as a means to achieve the best allocation of scarce resources for 
individual and collective benefit.10 Regulation takes the form of an indispensable 
application of communal power through government, with the purpose of overcoming 
possible failures of the assumptions of the market system.  
 
Market failures can take various forms. Monopoly is considered as a fundamental 
market failure since monopolist practices impair competition, which is necessary for 
market efficiency and the proper allocation of scarce resources.11 Moreover, the serious 
failure of the unregulated market to generate optimal information in relation to a 
particular area of decision making leads to uninformed and inefficient consumer 
choices.12 In the field of financial regulation the mitigation of information asymmetries 
is one of the main investor protection objectives. Regulation is instrumental for the 
correction of market failures and a means to maximise general welfare and society’s 
common economic interests. However, the common good is not defined exclusively in 
terms of efficient resource use and allocation. The public interest theories of regulation 
take a broader approach and propose that regulatory intervention by the State is directed 
towards the socially efficient use of scarce resources. Regulation is therefore necessary 
for the protection of the vulnerable members of society who, in the absence of 
regulation, would be subject to social injustice.13  
 
                                                
7 B Morgan and K Yeung, ‘An introduction to law and regulation’ (Cambridge 2007) 17.  
8 C Uche, ‘The theory of regulation: A review article’ (2000) 9(1) Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance 68.  
9 Posner (n6) 336.  
10J Hertog, ‘General Theories of Regulation’ (1999) 225<http://goo.gl/Tx7kMF>accessed 15.08.11.  
11 C Foster, ‘Privatization, Public Ownership, and the Regulation of Natural Monopoly’ (Blackwell 1992) 
and M Levine and J Florence, ‘Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and Public Agenda: Toward 
Synthesis’ (1990) 6 Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation (Special Issue) 167-198.  
12 Ogus (n3) 38.  
13 A Ogus, ‘W(h)ither the economic theory of regulation? What economic theory of regulation?’ in J 
Jordana and D Levi-Faur (eds), ‘The Politics of Regulation’ (Edward Elgar 2004) 35.  
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The public interest theories of regulation have been formulated by academics with the 
aim of proposing what governments and regulatory agencies should do and as a means 
of explaining what they actually do. They have become the cornerstone of the 
regulatory philosophy’s attempt to justify regulation as applied in modern democratic 
states. Certain features of these theories have been the subject of much criticism.  
 
One major criticism is that the theories are based on the assumption that government 
regulation is effective and that it can be implemented without cost. However, regulation 
could, at times, prove to be unsuccessful in reaching its objective because the regulatory 
agencies responsible for supervising compliance with regulation are requested to fulfil 
impossible and sometimes conflicting functions. In attempting to succeed, they distort 
the efficient functioning of financial markets.14 Furthermore, effective regulation is very 
costly and is an area where an increase in output leads to a very sharp increase in the 
cost of production.15 
 
Notwithstanding the criticism, it is reasonable to argue that the rationale behind 
regulation as proposed by the public interest theories of regulation could, even today, 
contribute a valid academic basis for the comprehension of certain objectives which the 
regulation of financial services aims to accomplish in practice. Moreover, one may 
contend that the public interest theories of regulation provoked an examination of 
whether it was viable to explain the ultimate rationale behind regulatory policy 
decisions and have unexpectedly led to the formation of certain private interest theories 
of regulation.    
 
The private interest theories hold that regulation is a reaction to the demands of interest 
groups striving to increase the revenues of their members.16 Private interest theorists are 
generally unconvinced of the so-called public interestedness of policy-makers and 
regulators.17 They contend that regulation could frequently be an instrument which 
benefits particular interest-groups, and not always those members of society it was 
allegedly expected to benefit. They argue that regulation which is designed to achieve 
                                                
14 Posner (n6) 339.  
15 I Ehrlich and R Posner, ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Rule-making’ (1974) 3 Journal of Legal 
Studies 257-286.   
16 Posner (n6) 335. 
17 R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, ‘Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice’ 
(Oxford 2012) 41-49.   
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the common good, in fact serves to protect the interests of the industry.18 These theories 
are based on the assumption that as a consequence of the high-stakes and the interests in 
the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions, interest groups affected by regulation will 
focus their resources and energies to promote the policy outcomes they prefer. As a 
result of the influence of interest groups the positive aims of regulation are weakened 
and regulatory efficiency is compromised, with the advantages of regulatory reform 
ending up being unequally distributed and benefiting those engaged in lobbying the 
legislators at the cost of society at large.19  
 
The private interest theories hold that the financial industry controls the government 
institutions of our society including the regulatory agencies that are responsible for 
supervising the economy.20 Through such control, the industry can influence the 
regulatory and supervisory process in a manner that is exclusively to its own benefit.  
 
The capture theory argues that regulation is initially made to serve the general public 
but that by time, given the effort made, interest groups may capture the influence of 
policy-makers and regulators and gain the decisions which will serve their interests.21 A 
regulatory agency normally experiences a life cycle in reaction to the political 
environment.22 Initially such an agency draws the attention of the general public and as 
a consequence acts with dynamism. Eventually, when the focus is shifted to other 
subjects, public support is reduced and the regulatory agency becomes open to control 
by those licensed and supervised by the same agency. Therefore, regulatory capture as 
explained by political scientists occurs at the stage when the regulatory agency is 
already an established entity and regulation is being implemented, supervised and 
enforced.  
 
Three main levels of regulatory capture may be identified. In the beginning, as a result 
of the pressure made by the regulated, the regulatory agency allows the regulated to 
breach applicable regulatory requirements. At a second stage, the regulatory agency 
assists the regulated to avert the regulatory enforcement after the breach of the law is 
                                                
18 Baldwin et al (n17) 21. 
19 A Estache and D Martimort, ‘Politics, Transaction Costs, and Design of Regulatory Institutions’ 
(World Bank 1999) 10<http://goo.gl/Mt6kJ3>accessed 15.03.14. 
20 Posner (n6) 341. 
21 Hertog (n10) 235. 
22 Ogus (n13) 57. 
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committed. Finally, the capture becomes so deep that the regulatory agency may even 
support and guide the regulated to overcome the regulatory regime before a breach is 
committed. In this context, one may argue that the more a jurisdiction becomes 
dependent on the success and development of its financial system for its overall 
economic growth, the more the policy-makers and regulatory agencies of that 
jurisdiction become prone to regulatory capture by the financial industry.   
 
The capture theory of financial regulation is not sufficiently distinguished from the 
public interest theory of regulation, given that both these theories base themselves on 
the assumption that the public interest is the basis for the initiation of regulation.23 It is 
unclear why and how the regulated are successful in subjecting the regulatory agency to 
their interests but fail to prevent the establishment of such an entity by policy-makers.  
A more remarkable and refined adaptation of the private interest theory of regulation 
originates from economic theorists, and in particular from the Chicago School of Law 
and Economics. This adaptation of the private interest theory is generally referred to as 
the ‘economic theory’ of regulation and is based on the economic assumption that 
members of society press forward their self-interest and do so in a rational manner. 
Regulation is thus explained as the outcome of the forces of demand and supply, while 
the creation and the type of regulation may be expected as a reaction by politicians to 
the requests of interest groups which could profit from the measure.24  
 
The democratic political system where politicians are subject to re-election and which 
depends on various variables, including the pursuing of very costly election campaigns, 
provides the industry with an opportunity to exercise political influence. Politicians who 
aim to be re-elected may be inclined to honour the demands from the industry for 
certain types of regulation in exchange for political support which can come in various 
forms including campaign contributions.25 The central proposition of the economic 
theory of regulation is that, in the main, regulation operates so as to benefit interest 
groups not society, and the political system will function in such a manner to ensure that 
                                                
23 Hertog (n10) 235. 
24 G Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’, (1971) 2(1) The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 3-21.  
25 R Kenagy, T Anderson, and M Fox, ‘Regulation and the impact of political lobbying on the investment 
banking industry’ (2013) 28(5) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 171-180; and A 
Wilmarth, ‘Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving into Wall Street’ (2013) 81(4) 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 1283-1446.  
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this will happen.26 Financial regulation may therefore become a means to curtail 
competition through the introduction of excessive regulatory burdens which may only 
be complied with by big players within the market.27 The economic theory of regulation 
has however been criticised on various counts including the fact that this theory is based 
on the assumptions that interest groups control the result of elections and that policy-
makers stick to the requests of such groups.28 These assumptions are challenged on the 
basis that they simplify the rather complex world of politics and in particular do not 
fully account for the outcome of the motivation, behaviour and interaction between 
other political actors such as individual voters, government workers and agencies. 
 
The theories of regulation considered above, attempt to explain what can be referred to 
as the underlying philosophical rationale for regulation, including the regulation of 
financial services. Both the public and private interest theories have been heavily 
criticised and cannot individually be considered as being a conclusive explanation for 
the regulatory policy response that followed the financial crisis. The public interest 
theories of regulation, which explain regulation as a means to achieve the general 
wellbeing of society, may be considered as excessively naive. On the other hand, the 
private interest theories, which relate the regulatory process totally to individual 
interests, is exceptionally cynical. Positive elements exist in the contribution of industry 
lobbyists to the regulatory process. Their input may be beneficial to this process as 
legislators do not always have complete knowledge and appropriate expertise in the 
sector which is the subject of a proposal and may therefore not fully understand the 
implications of the same.  
 
Industry lobby groups share their expertise in the field with legislators, which should, 
ceteris paribus, allow for a more informed decision to be made. It is considered best 
practice in Western democracies for legislators to formally consult the industry about 
draft regulatory measures, in order to give those who fall within the scope of the 
                                                
26 D Gowland, ‘The Regulation of Financial Markets in the 1990’s’ (Edward Elgar 1991) chapter 
‘Economic theory of regulation’ 21-35 and G Majone, ‘Theories of Regulation’ in G Majone (ed) 
‘Regulating Europe’ (Routledge 1996) 28-46. 
27 J Hendrickson. ‘Regulation and Instability in US Commercial Banking’ (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 
chapter ‘Theories of Bank Regulation’ 10-18.  
28 S Peltzman, ‘Towards a More General Theory of Regulation’ (1976) 19 Journal of Law and Economics 
211-240.   
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planned legislation the opportunity to express their views on the proposal. On the other 
hand, it has been objected that the financial industry lobbyists have extensive privileged 
access to policy-makers and undue influence on the legislative process in Western 
democracies.29 A case in point is the tremendous pressure exerted by the financial 
industry lobby groups on legislators in Brussels with regard to various aspects of the 
regulatory reform which has been proposed to address the causes of failures of the 
financial crisis.30 As evidenced by the recent ‘cash for laws’ scandal, at times, the 
industry lobby may resort to unethical and immoral means to attain its goals. 31 
 
In practice, basing oneself on the policy response post the financial crisis, it is 
reasonable to conclude that financial regulation is the result of a combination of factors 
propounded by the theories of regulation. A regulatory process in the financial field, 
such as that undertaken in the aftermath of the financial crisis, is generally aimed at 
achieving a policy initiative which addresses threats to the well-being of the financial 
system, thus benefiting the interests of society as a whole. However, as the pressure 
exerted on Brussels by the financial industry goes to prove, this process is more often 
than not influenced and possibly, at times, redirected by the financial industry lobby 
groups. By various means such lobbyists aim to satisfy the benefits of the interest 
groups they represent.  
 
In the final analysis, the outcome of a process which gives rise to financial regulation is 
the result of a trade-off between implementing a policy designed to attain the common 
good through substantive law which is strictly aimed at meeting the high-level 
objectives of financial regulation, and making exceptions to address the points of 
interest raised by the industry. The latter are attended to, given the expertise of the 
industry in the field of the proposed regulatory measure, the susceptibility to capture of 
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public institutions by private interests, and the individual utility-maximisation 
behaviour of policy-makers. 
 
 2.3 Objectives of Financial Regulation  
 
The debate on what should be the high-level objectives of financial regulation has 
ranged far and wide. It is generally accepted that financial regulation is an instrument of 
economic policy. As such, the objectives of financial regulation are a function of and 
are determined by economic policy objectives.32 Economic policy is generally aimed at 
achieving economic stability and growth. Financial regulation has been found to have a 
significant influence on the output and productivity growth within an economy.33 On the 
other hand, financial market failures, especially those of a systemic nature, could have 
grave consequences on a country’s economic stability and its potential for growth. 
Financial market failures also have an impact on the confidence which the investing 
public has in a financial system.34  Public confidence in a financial system is 
fundamental for the system to be able to function properly and continue to exist.35 
Therefore, from an economic policy perspective, the main aim of financial regulation 
should be that of safeguarding economic integrity and building public confidence in the 
financial system. Apart from the economic policy aspect, it has been held that financial 
regulation also has a role to play in achieving consumer policy objectives and in curbing 
financial crime. It is widely acknowledged that financial regulation should also 
endeavour to protect the vulnerable users of the financial system from possible market 
misconduct or the fraudulent conduct of business by financial institutions.36  
 
Policy-makers have established three high-level objectives of financial regulation. The 
first objective is that of safeguarding the stability of the financial system, primarily by 
ensuring that financial institutions have adequate capital and that the financial system is 
properly monitored. The second objective is that of providing an optimum level of 
investor protection from exploitation and the hazards caused by market failures, by 
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requiring that financial institutions act in the best interest of their clients. The final 
objective of financial regulation is that of preserving the integrity of financial markets 
from market malpractice, such as market abuse and money laundering.37 These are the 
three core objectives of financial regulation upon which common regulatory and 
supervisory structures and procedures may be set up on an international dimension.38  
 
From a European perspective, financial regulation strives to create an internal market 
for financial services. It is argued that the removal of barriers to cross-border financial 
services enhances economic growth and employment creation, as, inter alia, it widens 
business opportunities for individual financial institutions; it offers financial institutions 
a better possibility to diversify their business risks; and it increases competition within 
the EU’s financial services industry. However, the opening of national borders within 
the EU to cross-border business makes regulatory failure in one Member State more 
prone to generating negative repercussions in other Member States. Regulatory failure 
in one Member State may threaten investor confidence, systemic stability and market 
integrity in the Member States which are on the receiving end. This damages mutual 
recognition and triggers a process of mutual distrust. Indeed, the failures experienced 
during the financial crisis resulted in different segments of the European financial 
system to recede along national lines.39 Within this context, the achievement of the three 
high-level objectives of financial regulation within an environment of harmonised 
regulation and regulatory and supervisory convergence becomes a key tool to generate 
mutual trust between Member States and the proper operation of the internal market. 
 
2.3.1 Safeguarding Systemic Stability 
 
A stable financial system supplies a favourable business environment for the efficient 
allocation of resources and by so doing, supports economic growth. An economy cannot 
function without financial intermediation, as companies would not be able to obtain the 
necessary liquidity to conduct their business. Therefore, the financial system serves the 
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interests of society by transferring extra savings to companies that require capital to 
invest. However, when left to themselves financial systems are prone to short periods of 
volatility and contagion.40 Financial systems suffer from what is generally referred to as 
‘systemic risk’. The history of the development of financial systems is characterised by 
various instances of systemic instability, triggered by an unexpected real or likely 
failure of a systemically relevant financial institution, which eventually results in a fully 
blown financial crisis. The paths of contagion within the financial system are 
multifaceted, with the inter-bank/institution market, payment and settlement systems, 
financial markets, the information channel and the psychological channel being the most 
noticeable.41  
 
Systemic risk may be considered from various angles. From a wide perspective it refers 
to the breakdown of a national or regional or global financial system.42 From a narrower 
point of view, systemic risk may arise due to broad lending mistakes which have an 
impact on the stability of many financial institutions.43 The financial crisis has altered 
the understanding of systemic risk. While in the past systemic risk was associated with 
difficulties in the banking system or some type of financial failure that induces 
instability in the system, an analysis of the causes of the crisis suggests that systemic 
instability may also emerge from securities and derivative markets and the 
interconnectedness within the system.44 The legal definition of systemic risk is: 
 
a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious 
negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy. All types 
of financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may be potentially 
systemically important to some degree.45 
 
The failure of a financial institution may not, per se, necessarily be the cause of a 
financial disaster. In reality, it is the possible dramatic and sudden structural changes in 
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the equilibrium of the whole financial system that could result from such failure that can 
generate systemic instability. Therefore, systemic risk may be defined as the possibility 
that the failure of a financial institution may lead to correlated reactions, which 
ultimately contribute altogether to the breakdown of the entire financial system. 
 
The vulnerability of the financial system as a result of systemic risk is a matter of 
concern to policy-makers and to those responsible for safeguarding the integrity of the 
economy. The financial crisis disrupted economic policy to the detriment of society at 
large. Austerity measures which had to be implemented in order to dedicate funds to the 
rescue of financial institutions had an impact on the available resources for social policy 
programmes such as those dedicated to health and education. In certain instances this 
has led to social unrest. Therefore, financial regulation aimed at achieving systemic 
stability by minimising systemic risk is necessary to try and prevent the consequences 
of a financial crisis on the economy and on society itself. The cost of such consequences 
may be much higher than those which have to be incurred in order to avert it.46  
 
Regulatory measures to mitigate systemic risk  
 
Various regulatory initiatives have been adopted at international, regional, and national 
level to safeguard systemic stability. As a consequence of the negative impact of the 
financial crisis on financial and economic stability, the focus of the majority of post-
crisis regulatory initiatives aim at dealing with systemic risk. This part of the chapter 
considers a selection of such regulatory initiatives, which have been categorised as 
follows: [i] the application of prudential requirements; [ii] the application of macro-
prudential supervision; and [iii] measures to address too-big-to-fail.   
 
Prudential requirements 
 
At the micro-level, requiring financial institutions to comply with prudential capital 
requirements has been the traditional means to ensure that individual members of the 
financial system are resilient and are therefore in a position to confront financial shocks 
and imbalances. At international level, the BCBS has, since its inception in 1974, 
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promoted prudential capital standards applicable to banks, known as the Basel Capital 
Accord, which was adopted in 1988.47 Basel 1 had the purpose of ensuring that a bank’s 
capital would be sufficient to provide for credit risk. The first major reform of the Basel 
Capital Accord took place in 2004 with the adoption of Basel II, which provided for 
calculation of market and operational risks. It established the three pillar model of 
prudential regulation, being: Pillar I setting the minimum prudential capital 
requirements; Pillar II establishing an internal capital adequacy assessment process 
applicable to banks and a supervisory review process for financial supervisors; and 
Pillar III stipulating requirements on disclosure of capital and risks.48 In 2010 another 
major revision of the Basel Capital Accord was adopted to address the risks identified in 
the wake of the financial crisis.49 On a European level, various proposals for reform 
were made in the DeLarosiere Report,50 including proposals for the revision of the 
CRD51 that sets the prudential capital requirements applicable to banks operating in the 
EU.  
 
In terms of CRD IV52, banks will be required to hold better and more capital and to 
manage cash and liquidity in a more effective manner. Banks will also be required to 
hold conservation buffers and countercyclical buffers to cover the impact of a possible 
sudden financial crash and to sustain economic downturns. Banks will be required to 
have more robust governance procedures and internal controls in place. They will also 
be required to significantly reduce their reliance on external credit ratings by adopting a 
wider application of internal risk measurement and management processes and 
functions. Poor governance structures, lack of internal controls, weak risk management 
functions and extensive reliance on credit ratings form part of the list of causes which 
brought about the financial crisis.   
 
The stability of a financial system depends on the financial soundness and robust 
governance of the individual financial institutions. While prudential capital 
requirements seek to ensure the financial stability of a financial institution, the  
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sustainable growth of such an institution largely depends on the way it is governed; the 
way it conducts its business; its awareness of the risks to which it is exposed and the 
healthy management of those risks.53 A healthy financial institution is one which has in 
place sound administrative procedures and internal control mechanisms, including a 
well-documented organisational structure that clearly assigns responsibilities and 
ensures a good flow of information between all parties involved, in particular senior 
management and the board of directors. It may be argued that an effective governance 
structure for a financial institution would in practice ensure that senior management 
understand, control and manage the activities of the institution, while the board of 
directors takes an active monitoring role by challenging policy decisions recommended 
by senior management and checking on their overall conduct of the business. Having 
proper control mechanisms in place is fundamental to maintaining the integrity and 
stability of the financial institution and to keep in check any possible excessive risk 
taking or illicit activity.  
 
An effective risk management function is also of cardinal importance since risk 
management is a fundamental tool to ensure that the financial institution does not 
engage in excessive risk taking which could impact its long term sustainability. So 
fundamental is the application of risk management tools for the proper performance of 
financial activities, that competence in risk management is said to be one of the crucial 
determinants of competitive success for a financial institution.54 The application of 
weak risk management procedures is likely to result in business decisions which could 
impact on the financial soundness of a financial institution.  
 
The prudential requirements set in the proposed CRD IV aim at creating mitigating 
factors that address systemic risk in the banking sector, thereby implementing the G20 
policy commitment to require banks to have more robust capital, governance and 
organisational structure.55 The proposal, however, also applies to investment firms. 
Although banks and investment firms may be subject to similar risks, such as market 
risk and operational risk, certain requirements set in the proposal focus entirely at 
addressing issues emerging from the banking sector and do not seem to make an 
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exception to the business model of investment firms, which at times differs significantly 
from that of banks. This is particularly true with regard to small and medium sized 
investment firms that are generally involved in very basic services such as the provision 
of investment advice and the execution of orders on behalf of clients, who invest 
primarily in non-complex financial instruments and do not actively trade on the market.  
 
The Commission’s impact assessment on this proposal goes to great lengths in 
addressing concerns relating to the banking sector but makes minimal reference to the 
possible impact that the proposal could have on investment firms.56 This suggests that in 
drafting this proposal the Commission’s focus was that of addressing weaknesses in the 
banking sector. It also suggests that not enough attention was therefore paid to the 
particularities of investment firms.57 In the process, however, certain requirements that 
are relevant to address bank related risks that could threaten the stability of a financial 
system have been applied to investment firms, even though these are not relevant to 
these types of firms. By way of example, while the proposed capital buffers were 
devised to ensure that banks can withstand losses during a period of systemic instability, 
these requirements are also being applied to investment firms, even though these type of 
firm are not considered as systemically relevant. 
 
The proposal has been incorporated in a draft Regulation, which by nature is a 
legislative instrument that is directly enforceable and does not require transposition into 
national law, thereby making it impossible for Member States to adapt the requirements 
of CRD IV to the circumstances of their industry.58 A one size fits all approach to 
regulation, coupled with a maximum harmonisation legal measure, raises potential 
issues of proportionality, which is a fundamental principle of EU Law. The Commission 
attempts to justify this approach on the basis that differences in the implementation of 
EU law and in the regulation of banks and investment firms could cause regulatory 
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arbitrage. Moreover, it is also argued that local failures in Member States could have 
European wide repercussions.59  
 
It is reasonable to contend that CRD IV is important to address the weaknesses of the 
banking sector that could form a threat to systemic stability. Albeit, capturing 
investment firms, particularly small and medium sized firms, within the scope of an EU 
Regulation the main purpose of which is to address systemic risk, does not respect the 
differences in the business model of banks and investment firms, is not proportionate 
and may result in over-regulation.60 This may be indicative of an over-zealous approach 
to regulation that was triggered post the financial crisis, whereby a special concern with 
creating the right regulatory environment to prevent the next crisis, may lead to over-
regulation and generate laws that do not fully respect all the high-level principles of EU 
Law.  
 
Macro-prudential supervision 
 
One of the fundamental lessons drawn from the financial crisis is that micro-prudential 
supervision on its own is not enough to safeguard the stability of the financial system. 
Having a dedicated systemic regulator responsible for macro-prudential supervision is 
as fundamental as micro-prudential supervision for the well-being of the financial 
system.61 This was one of the key conclusions of the DeLarosiere Report.62 The 
financial crisis has demonstrated that even where the individual components of the 
financial system seem sound, this does not necessarily mean that the system as a whole 
is sound. Therefore, macro-prudential supervision supplements traditional micro-
prudential supervision of individual financial institutions with specific focus on the 
possible threats to the financial system as a whole. Macro-prudential oversight demands 
the identification of emerging financial risks and structural weaknesses in the financial 
system.  Various monitoring tools and interventionist powers have been granted to 
regional and national financial supervisors in order to ensure that they are in a position 
to monitor the conventional and shadow banking system so as to identify the possible 
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build up of systemic risk and to take the necessary measures to contain it.  
 
At European level a new regulatory agency was established. The European Systemic 
Risk Board (‘ESRB’) has the responsibility for macro-prudential supervision and is 
intended to contribute to the prevention and mitigation of systemic risk.63 In pursuing its 
macro-prudential mandate, the ESRB performs a number of key activities, namely risk 
monitoring, risk assessment and, if deemed appropriate, the adoption of policy 
response.64 As a policy response the ESRB may adopt warnings and 
recommendations.65 Although the ESRB recommendations are soft law mechanisms and 
as such are not legally binding, the addressee is subject to a ‘comply or explain’ 
mechanism, which means that the addressee has to report to the ESRB the manner of 
compliance or otherwise explain why it has chosen not to comply.66 Decisions at the 
ESRB are made by the general board which is made up of thirty seven voting and 
twenty eight non-voting members and is chaired by the President of the ECB. The 
membership is made up of representatives of the European authorities, national central 
banks and financial supervisors. Decisions are made by a majority vote.   
 
Comparable macro-prudential bodies were also established in some Member States at 
national level, as well as outside the EU, with the most prominent example being the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (‘FSOC’) in the US, set up under the Dodd Frank 
Act67. The FSOC is a collaborative institution chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury 
that brings together the federal financial regulators, an insurance expert appointed by 
the President, and state regulators.68 It has the statutory duty to facilitate the sharing of 
data and information among the member agencies, designate non-bank financial 
companies for consolidated supervision and non-banking entities as systemically 
relevant and requiring them to meet prescribed risk management standards.69 While the 
FSOC monitors the financial system and has the power to make regulatory decisions on 
the entities that qualify as systemically relevant financial institutions, in terms of the 
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Dodd Frank Act it is the Federal Reserve System that has the responsibility to supervise 
such institutions, including non-bank financial institutions.70 
 
As in the case of the ESRB for the EU, prior to the FSOC there was no single 
government entity responsible for monitoring the entire financial system in the US. 
Rather, different government regulators were responsible for segmented fractions of the 
financial system, thereby leaving room for regulatory gaps. From a governance 
perspective the FSOC has nine voting members (mainly the federal regulators71) and 
five non-voting members72 and decisions are made by a majority vote.73 This 
governance model differs from that of the ESRB as the FSOC’s balance of power is 
heavily tilted towards federal regulators while that of the ESRB favours the financial 
supervisors at national level. Moreover, given the significantly lower number of voting 
members, in first instance the FSOC’s governance model may be perceived as 
potentially being more effective for the purpose of decision making than that of the 
ESRB. Albeit, the FSOC’s role as coordinator for macro-prudential purposes is still a 
challenging task as voting members represent independent federal agencies with 
overlapping jurisdictions and different responsibilities who may not always be willing 
to cooperate.74 
 
In the EU, the governing body of the ESRB is composed of a large number of 
representatives since participation by the national supervisors seeks to ensure that the 
carrying out of macro-prudential supervision is interwoven with micro prudential 
supervision, which, with the exception of banks in the Eurozone, is still predominantly 
undertaken at national level.75 However, this governance arrangement is now being 
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criticised as too unwieldy, difficult to stir and getting into action and therefore requiring 
some simplification and streamlining.76 In this context, it is relevant to mention that 
given the apparent mismatch between integrated and interconnected European financial 
markets and predominately national supervision at the level of the Member States, the 
EU also established three regulatory authorities: European Securities and Markets 
Authority (‘ESMA’), European Banking Authority (‘EBA’) and European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (‘EIOPA’). These are responsible for micro-
prudential supervision and also have the task of cooperating and assisting the ESRB to 
achieve its macro-prudential statutory objectives. This institutional framework has been 
complemented by various new regulatory initiatives adopted by the European 
Institutions which provide national financial supervisors with additional supervisory 
tasks and powers in order that they may achieve the systemic stability objective. 
 
It is interesting to note that all the new regulatory initiatives in the field of securities 
regulation issued by the EU in the aftermath of the financial crisis refer to the mitigation 
of systemic risk as one of the primary objectives of regulation. By way of example, the 
AIFMD77, which regulates the activity of portfolio managers of alternative investment 
funds, refers to the possible build up of systemic risk which may be generated as a 
consequence of the employment of leverage by these managers.78 In order to ensure that 
financial supervisors are in a position to monitor such activity, the AIFMD requires 
fund managers to report to their financial supervisor information on their leverage 
positions, which information must be shared with other financial supervisors and the 
ESRB.79 The Directive also gives financial supervisors the power to set limits to 
leverage positions of a fund manager where these positions are considered as being 
potentially risky for the stability of the financial system.80 
 
The Directive, which also aims at protecting investors, particularly from losses of 
financial instruments that are held by the depositary on behalf of the AIF, imposes strict 
liability on the depositary for any losses of such instruments, even where the assets are 
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held by a sub-custodian.81 It may be argued that this requirement addresses investor 
protection issues arising from the losses sustained by a number of funds due to the 
Madoff fraud82. It however raises potential competition issues as a higher degree of 
liability may result in being too costly for small depositaries to sustain, thereby reducing 
the feasibility of depositary business for small and medium sized firms.  As a 
consequence, the number of active depositaries could decrease, thereby increasing 
concentration risk in fewer, but larger depositaries, which in turn increases the 
probability of systemic risk in case of failure. This suggests that the importance of 
attaining a fundamental objective of financial regulation could, at times, result in 
regulatory measures that cause tensions with and possibly weaken the realisation of 
other regulatory and economic objectives.  
 
Measures to address too-big-to-fail   
 
The financial crisis reignited the debate on the too-big-to-fail doctrine.83 This doctrine is 
understood to mean  
 
that, if a bank were big enough, it would receive financial assistance to the 
extent necessary to keep it from failing. More specifically, the too-big-to-fail 
doctrine implies that all deposits obligations would be met by some form of 
government guarantee or pledge.84  
 
Originally the too-big-to-fail doctrine was mostly associated with the banking sector 
and the size of individual institutions. The financial crisis has however brought to light a 
new dimension to this doctrine, in that too-big-to-fail may arise in the non-banking 
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sector and that it is not only a function of size but may also arise from institutions that 
are too interconnected to fail.85  
 
In the lead-up to the financial crisis, financial institutions took large risks while 
implicitly relying on the purported guarantee that if something went wrong the 
government would intervene.86 During the crisis governments in the US and a number 
of EU Member States made considerable financial interventions to save financial 
institutions from failing.87 Given the level of interconnectedness in the financial system 
and size of financial institutions, government intervention was considered necessary so 
as to avoid a general financial meltdown. At the time, financial regulation did not 
provide the tools for the orderly resolution of financial institutions, particularly where 
these were of a significant size, highly interconnected and active in providing cross-
border services.88 In such an environment, too-big-to-fail is considered as doubly 
damned.89 On the one hand, given the complexities, difficulties and weakening of 
confidence in the financial system that may result from the failure of a financial 
institution of a significant size, governments could ill afford to let these institutions fail. 
On the other hand, however, government intervention resulted in a greater degree of 
moral hazard, as the implicit guarantee that governments would always save a failing 
bank had been confirmed.  
 
To address the moral hazard which results from too-big-to-fail, at international level the 
BCBS, the Financial Stability Board (‘FSB’), the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (‘IAIS’) and the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’) proposed various 
policy measures to be adopted at regional and national level in order to improve the 
capacity of authorities to resolve systemically relevant financial institutions, including 
in situations where these institutions are undertaking cross-border business, without 
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disruption to the financial system of the jurisdictions where they operate and without 
exposing society to the risk of severe losses.90  
 
In the European context, the European Institutions have adopted a framework for crisis 
management which has the purpose of granting authorities the necessary powers and 
tools to manage the failure of a bank by either restructuring it or ensuring its orderly 
winding down.91 To address the lessons of the financial crisis about the systemic 
relevance of non-banks, the EU is currently contemplating the establishment of a similar 
framework for systemically relevant non-bank financial institutions.92 In the US, similar 
action to address the lessons of the crisis was taken through the adoption of a 
framework entitled the Orderly Liquidation Authority as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which allows the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to resolve a failing non-bank 
systemically relevant financial institution in the same way it would resolve a bank.93  
 
Moreover, there are a number of recent banking structural reform initiatives in Europe 
and in the US that go beyond internationally agreed reforms. These initiatives have the 
purpose of: [i] restricting the financial safety net protection to core financial system 
functions; [ii] reducing the risk of cross-contamination of commercial and investment 
banking and of their respective cultures; and [iii] increasing the resolvability of 
systemically relevant financial institutions.94 In Europe the Commission has proposed a 
regulation that would impose a ban on speculative activity by banks and would 
potentially require them to separate other risky trading activity from their core banking 
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functions.95 The proposal builds on the recommendations made by the Liikanen High-
Level Expert Group and should facilitate bank resolution and recovery which in times 
of stress should translate in lower costs of bank failure.96 In the US action to segregate 
core banking activity from speculative functions have been made through the adoption 
of the “Volcker Rule”97 which prohibits a banking entity from engaging in proprietary 
trading or investing in, sponsoring, or having certain other relationships with hedge 
funds or private equity funds.98 
 
Although, there are some differences in the way the EU and the US have dealt with the 
issues pertaining to systemically relevant financial institutions, the ultimate goal of the 
foregoing regimes on both sides of the Atlantic is that of strengthening the resilience of 
the financial system. In the final analysis the mentioned regulatory regimes demonstrate 
policy-makers’ determination to end the too-big-to-fail moral hazard by establishing the 
mechanisms to ensure that risky business within systemically relevant financial 
institutions, is segregated from economically important aspect of their activity, and that 
such entities may be wound down in ways which would minimise the risks of contagion 
and the negative impact on the continuity of the financial system.99  
 
The effect of the financial crisis on the liquidity and viability of several US and 
European financial institutions confirms the potential systemic instability which could 
be generated by conditions which are likely to result in the failure of systemically 
relevant financial institutions. It proves that, due to the interconnectedness of financial 
institutions, irresponsible practices within one systemically relevant financial institution 
are likely to cause severe systemic instability and can lead to a possible general collapse 
of the system as a whole.100 Although safeguarding systemic stability has long been a 
primary objective of financial regulation, the regulatory framework applicable before 
the financial crisis has been proven inadequate to deal with the failures of systemically 
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relevant financial institutions. Financial supervisors were clearly not prepared and did 
not have adequate powers to deal with a crisis of such proportion. The financial crisis, 
its victims, the negative impact it had on the financial system and the economy 
worldwide brought the regulation of systemic risk high on the Western world’s policy-
makers’ regulatory and supervisory agenda. In the final analysis, one may conclude that 
the widespread regulatory measures which have been or are in the process of being 
adopted to deal with systemic risk, attest to the continuing relevance and importance of 
this primary objective of financial regulation. Undoubtedly, there is today an even 
stronger case for more robust macro and micro prudential financial regulation aimed at 
maintaining systemic stability.  
 
2.3.2 Investor Protection  
 
It is submitted that regulation for the purpose of safeguarding systemic stability is 
however not enough to ensure a sound financial system. Appropriate regulation to 
protect the interests of investors is considered a fundamental element for the healthy 
development of financial markets which form an integral part of the financial system.101 
There is both empirical and theoretical literature that advocates that a country's level of 
investor protection has a significant effect on the value of companies, the development 
of the financial market and economic growth.102 It is indeed reasonable to argue that 
inadequate investor protection restricts the economy’s access to capital, in particular to 
equity capital, as the existence of a financial market depends on the confidence which 
investors have in such market. In turn, public confidence depends on whether investors 
perceive that financial institutions are acting honestly, fairly and in the best interest of 
their clients and the financial market.103 It also depends on the extent to which financial 
institutions are perceived to be financially solvent. Hence, the basic rationale for the 
investor protection objective of financial regulation is that of ensuring investor 
confidence in the financial market by protecting the investor from the possible 
consequences of the information asymmetries that exist between the investor and the 
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financial services provider.104  
 
The provision of financial services is a field of business which is characterised by 
information asymmetries between the financial institution and its clients. This is largely 
the case given that clients are purchasing from the financial institution a professional 
service that is based on expert knowledge. There are two principal forms of information 
asymmetries to which an investor is exposed, being the disparity in the ability of an 
investor to get access to and evaluate financial information and the fact that information 
is generated on a small scale.105 Empirical evidence indicates that investors generally 
fail to get access to adequate financial information and are usually financially 
illiterate.106 The difference in knowledge between the financial institution and the 
investor could have a grave impact on the investor if the said financial institution 
becomes insolvent while holding and controlling the said investor’s assets.107  
 
Investors are not always in a position to assess the safety and soundness of the financial 
institution to which they entrust their assets and therefore it is argued that financial 
regulation has a role to play in ensuring that investors’ assets are properly 
safeguarded.108 There are consequences which could result from the failure of financial 
institutions that differ from the systemic consequences explained earlier on. These 
include the potential insecure economic situation that could hit investors as a 
consequence of the failure of a financial institution which is responsible for holding and 
controlling the said investors’ financial assets. Safeguarding systemic stability is 
therefore not the only reason why financial regulation should aim at reducing the risk of 
failure of financial institutions through the application of prudential regulation. 
 
Due to its very nature, the provision of financial services is inherently prone to 
principal-agent conflicts of interest and to the occurrence of fraud.109 A conflict of 
interest arises when a person who has a duty to act in another party’s interest has to 
decide how to act in the interest of that party while another interest interferes with his 
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ability to decide according to his duty.110 Nearly all financial market transactions 
undertaken by unsophisticated investors are made through, and with the assistance of 
financial institutions that act as intermediaries between the investor and the financial 
market. In their role as agents of investors, financial institutions have, in theory, a duty 
to act in the best interest of such investors. However, in practice, when acting as agents 
of an investor, financial institutions have to balance the interests of various parties, 
including their own interests, the interests of their employers, those of issuers and the 
investors. Given the presumed asymmetric information between the investor and the 
financial institution, the likelihood of opportunistic conduct by the financial institution 
would seem to be considerably high, not least because the performance of an investment 
materialises after the point of sale and not before.111  
 
Various instances of financial product mis-selling came to light in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. Consumer complaints were filed with financial supervisors in view of 
the sharp declines in financial product values or the application of redemption gates due 
to liquidity concerns.112 The practice of selling complex financial products to 
unsophisticated retail investors had been an industry practice over the years.113  
Financial institutions have been found responsible for either having sold financial 
products which turned out to be inadequate given the investors’ profile or to have 
misled or misinformed clients regarding the nature of the product being sold by failing 
to communicate effectively the likely outcomes and risks involved.114 Moreover, 
empirical research has demonstrated that in many cases the advice on financial products 
provided to retail investors was more in the financial institution’s interest than in the 
investor’s interest.115 These attest to the possible negative consequences of the 
information asymmetries between the investor and the financial institution and sustain 
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the validity of investor protection as one of the high-level objectives of financial 
regulation.  
 
Regulatory initiatives to achieve investor protection 
 
Regulation protecting investors attempts to address failures which may occur due to 
asymmetric information, by requiring financial institutions to abide by detailed conduct 
of business rules that have the purpose of regulating the activity of such institutions in a 
way which compels them to act in the best interest of the investor. Investor protection 
regulation is also based on transparency rules that require financial institutions to 
provide proper information to clients in order to allow them to make an informed 
investment decision.  
 
From an institutional perspective the three supranational micro-prudential financial 
supervisors created by the EU post the crisis, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, have inter alia 
been granted the task of fostering consumer protection.116 For this purpose, and with the 
aim of coordinating the performance of this task, a joint committee on consumer 
protection and financial innovation was set up by the three ESAs.117 The joint 
committee ensures the necessary degree of cross-sectoral consistency in the field of 
consumer protection regulation which is important if regulatory arbitrage that could be 
detrimental to the consumer is to be prevented. In the US, a new agency with wide 
powers to achieve consumer protection by regulating abusive practices as well as unfair 
and deceptive ones, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (‘CFPB’), was 
established118 in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Act.119  The purpose of creating the 
CFPB was that of consolidating into one agency the consumer protection powers that 
had existed across several different federal agencies. The CFPB, which is an agency 
housed under the Federal Reserve System, has a wide remit with rulemaking, 
supervision and enforcement powers over nearly all firms involved in consumer 
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financial services, irrespective of their particular legal form.120  
 
From a regulatory perspective, the key piece of regulation for investor protection in the 
EU is the MiFID121 which, inter alia, stipulates detailed organisational, conduct of 
business and transparency requirements applicable to financial institutions which act as 
an intermediary between investors and the financial markets with respect to the buying 
and selling of financial instruments.  
 
However, due to remuneration incentives which seek to induce hard selling of financial 
products and possible failures in the proper application of internal compliance 
procedures, financial institutions sometimes fail to act in the best interest of their 
clients. Investors do not always understand the nature and risks relating to their 
investments, either because the investors do not have the necessary financial knowledge 
and experience and/or the financial institution has failed to provide the client with 
proper explanations on the particular financial product. In certain instances financial 
product documentation is not written in plain language and consequently it is not easily 
understood by investors. One may therefore contend that providing an optimum level of 
investor protection from exploitation by financial institutions through robust conduct of 
business rules and transparency requirements remains an exceptionally valid objective 
of financial regulation. In this regard, post the financial crisis, the Commission initiated 
a review of the MiFID with a view to making structural reforms aimed at achieving a 
higher degree of investor protection.122 The amendments propose the inclusion of 
banking structured products within the framework of MiFID so as to ensure consistent 
cross-sectoral investor protection between banking and securities. 
 
In the context of the debate on the quality of investment advice provided to clients, as 
examined in the light of the product mis-selling scandals, advisors would be required to 
inform the client on whether the investment advice is based on an independent and fair 
analysis of the client’s knowledge and experience, his investment objectives and his 
financial situation. Advisors would also be required to report to the client in writing the 
underlying reasons for the advice provided, including an explanation about how the 
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advice meets the client’s profile. Moreover, the proposed MiFID II would also restrict 
the inducements which may be received by investment firms from issuers and product 
providers.123 It is submitted that these requirements, particularly those that restrict the 
possibility of taking inducements from product providers, are likely to mitigate some of 
the factors that could contribute to abuse by investment firms such as product mis-
selling. 
 
Investment firms are also required to keep records of the business carried out on behalf 
of clients. The Commission is proposing that this requirement should be extended to 
telephone conversations and electronic communications between the advisors and the 
client.124 This information is to be provided to the client upon request.125 It is argued 
that keeping a record of telephone conversations between advisors and the client 
enhances investor protection and is useful for supervisory purposes as it: [i] ensures that 
evidence exists to resolve disputes between an investment firm and its clients over the 
terms of transactions; [ii] assists with supervisory work in relation to conduct of 
business rules; and [iii] helps to deter and detect market abuse and to facilitate 
enforcement in this area.126 
 
Data protection concerns and privacy issues exist with regard to supervisory access to 
the content of telephone records and electronic communications. In this regard, while 
the E-Privacy Directive127 and the Data Protection Directive128 do not prevent the 
recording of telephone conversations and electronic communications, they however 
limit the circumstances in which recordings can be made and set certain safeguards on 
the handling of the recordings.129 In order to address the data protection and privacy 
issues, the Commission has proposed that the access by financial supervisors should be 
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limited to data traffic records and not to the specific content of telephone recordings and 
the records on electronic communications to which they relate.130  
 
Restricting the ability of financial supervisors to obtain information which could be 
relevant for supervisory, investigative and enforcement purposes, could damage their 
capability of fulfilling their duties. 131 In this regard, the tensions that exist between the 
necessity of financial supervisors to have access to information on telephone 
conversations and electronic communications and the necessity of respecting the right 
for privacy and the safeguarding of personal data, attest to the difficulties that could 
surface in striking the right balance between achieving the objectives of financial 
regulation, while at the same time respecting the fundamental rights of society.  
 
The proposed record-keeping requirement also raises possible issues of proportionality, 
as it does not distinguish between small-medium sized firms and large firms. It has been 
determined that the costs of implementing a requirement to keep a record of telephone 
conversations and retain such a record for a number of years may result in a 
considerable expense for small firms.132 However, in view of investor protection issues 
that might arise from telephone conversations between an advisor and his client; the 
importance of ensuring the same level of protection for all investors; and the EU’s 
DeLarosiere policy decision of establishing a single rule book for financial services, it 
was determined that one record keeping requirement should apply across the board to 
all investment firms irrespective of the size of such firms.133 This again demonstrates 
the possible tensions that could arise between achieving the objectives of financial 
regulation on the one hand and creating an equitable and proportionate regime on the 
other. 
 
In addition to requiring financial institutions to act in the best interest of their clients by 
complying with detailed conduct of business and record keeping requirements, trust in a 
particular financial market is also a function of the extent and accuracy of the 
information provided to investors. Ensuring disclosure of information to investors 
which is sufficiently clear, comprehensible and comparable and which therefore assists 
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an investor in making an investment decision is fundamental to mitigate the information 
advantage of financial institutions.134 Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that mandatory 
disclosure requirements which compel the financial institution to issue pertinent 
information that would allow an investor to understand the basis for the investment 
advice and the relevant financial instrument should mitigate information asymmetries. 
This should in turn reduce the risk of market failures which may come about as a 
consequence of product mis-selling, as more informed investors should, ceteris paribus, 
be able to identify financial products which match their investment risk profile.  
 
2.3.3 Safeguarding the Integrity of Financial Markets 
 
Transparency therefore has a cardinal function. It militates towards the preservation of 
the integrity of financial markets by contributing to the fairness and efficiency of such 
markets. Therefore, to achieve financial market integrity one has to go beyond 
transparency and extend regulation to require fair and equitable trading and the 
prohibition of all forms of market abuse. In this regard, supervision of the financial 
markets to identify and take regulatory action against instances of market malpractice 
are critical functions to achieve the integrity of financial markets. 
 
Financial markets play a critical role in economic development and financial stability. 
The crucial purpose of such markets is to serve as a device for the transformation of 
savings generated by the various members of society into financing for the business 
community.135  In view of the important role which financial markets play, it is vital for 
such markets to operate properly and to transmit to all interested parties a sense of 
efficiency, integrity and transparency. Financial markets should consequently be able to 
provide investors with the opportunity of transacting in a fair and informed environment 
where prices reflect full and correct information issued by listed companies and the 
market.136 However, given the potential for gains which may be generated through 
financial markets and the existing risks of asymmetries of information, such markets are 
very often vulnerable to abuse and manipulation. Market malpractice has the capacity of 
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damaging the integrity and reputation of financial markets and as a result undermines 
the confidence that investors have in such markets and the financial industry as a whole. 
This sort of conduct may preclude a financial market from performing its fundamental 
function of bringing together buyers and sellers who are interested in trading financial 
instruments, especially when investors feel that they are not in a position to engage in 
transactions with confidence that they are acting on a level playing field.137  
 
The Transparency Directive (‘TD’), the main purpose of which is the regulation of the 
disclosure of information by issuers of financial instruments, stipulates that:  
 
[t]he disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about 
security issuers builds sustained investor confidence and allows an informed 
assessment of their business performance. This enhances both investor 
protection and market efficiency. … To that end, security issuers should 
ensure appropriate transparency with investors through regular flow of 
information.138 
 
The application of proper transparency standards which require prompt disclosure of 
relevant information by publicly listed companies and the market is indeed fundamental 
to reduce the extent of asymmetric information, thereby reducing the possibility of 
market malpractice and contributing towards the integrity of the market.139 This is one 
of the foundations of EU financial regulation that promotes the integrity of financial 
markets through several directives, such as the MiFID; the MAD;140 the Prospectus 
Directive (‘PD’),141 which regulates the prospectus to be published when securities are 
to be offered to the public or admitted to trading and the TD.  
 
Ensuring that financial markets are transparent does not always correspond well with 
the objective of maintaining the stability of the financial system. The Northern Rock plc 
affair, whereby the announcement that this UK bank had requested for and had been 
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provided with liquidity by the Bank of England, generated a run on the bank.142 In order 
to prevent such situations from occurring, the Governor of the Bank of England had 
indicated a preference for a covert liquidity operation, whereby Northern Rock plc 
would have been provided with the liquidity it required without a public announcement 
being made to the market. Yet, this was not possible given that as a publicly listed 
entity, Northern Rock plc was subject to transparency requirements, which in such 
circumstances required a public announcement to be made.143 The announcement 
therefore had to be made even though there was a probability that this would have had 
possible negative consequences for Northern Rock plc and the UK banking system in 
general. This is indicative of the tensions that regulators and supervisors face in striking 
the right balance between the different objectives of financial regulation. It again 
demonstrates that fulfilling a fundamental objective of financial regulation could, at 
times, result in regulatory measures that weaken the realisation of other regulatory 
objectives. 
 
Transparency on its own, however, is not enough to address all forms of market 
malpractice. Empirical evidence, derived from behavioural economics, demonstrates 
otherwise and reveals that very often the public is unable to properly process even 
simple information because of cognitive biases.144 Therefore doubts still exist on 
whether transparency per se is an effective tool to achieve the objectives of financial 
regulation145. It follows that in order to achieve optimum market integrity and investor 
protection, transparency must be complemented by other mechanisms such as the 
application of financial market intervention tools. Moreover, market abuse, which 
comes in the form of either the prohibited use of inside information or in the form of 
market manipulation, is considered as the primary type of market malpractice which 
threatens the integrity and efficiency of financial markets. This form of abuse cannot be 
effectively dealt with solely through the application of transparency requirements.   
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Company insiders, particularly company directors and senior management are exposed 
to non-public information about their organisation, some of which could be of a price 
sensitive nature; being information which a reasonable investor would be likely to use 
as part of the basis for his investment decision.146 Company insiders can profit from 
such information by buying or selling their shares in the said company prior to the issue 
of the said information to the public. This can only be done at the expense of the 
uninformed investor. They can also pass on such information to other parties who 
would also have the opportunity to profit at the expense of genuine investors. While the 
prohibited use of inside information requires some form of intervention by a company 
insider, market manipulation does not necessitate such involvement and can be 
conducted through the creation of a false impression of trading activity or price 
movement or market information which leads to a distortion of the price formation 
process and in turn a reduction of market efficiency due to the fact that trading decisions 
are not made on financial fundamentals.147  
 
The primary rationale for the regulation of insider dealing and market manipulation is 
connected to market confidence and the perception of investors that the prices quoted on 
the market are fair and not distorted. It is worthwhile to point out that there are a 
number of theories which attempt to explain the rationale for the regulation of the 
prohibited use of inside information and market manipulation.148 The Misappropriation 
Theory is based on the notion of ownership, where information is considered as the 
property of the source of the information (the company to which it relates) and the 
prohibited use of inside information is deemed to be a serious breach of the fiduciary 
relationship between the receiver of the information (a director) and the source of the 
information.149 On the other hand, the Unfair Advantage Theory is based on the idea 
that markets should operate on the basis of complete equality between investors and 
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potential investors.150 Trading should take place between parties who have equal rights 
and possibility of access to information. Lastly, the Market Stability Theory, which has 
certain similarities with the Unfair Advantage Theory, is based on the premise that 
flagrant prohibited use of inside information or market manipulation could seriously 
damage the confidence that investors have in financial markets which is largely based 
on the perception that financial markets are egalitarian, being the confidence that all 
investors have equal access to information on financial instruments traded on the 
market. 151    
 
In a financial market where market abuse prevails, there is a significant potential for 
misallocation of resources, as savings will not always be channelled to the most 
efficient organisations.152 Such abuse could significantly distort the price formation 
process of financial instruments traded on the said market, leading to inaccurate 
valuations of such instruments and the distribution of misleading post-trade information 
to the market. In a financial market where market abuse is rampant, liquidity providers 
such as market makers will protect themselves by increasing their selling price and 
decreasing their buy price which in turn affects the transaction costs on the market.153 
Once the investing public feels the impact of this and other consequences of market 
abuse, their willingness to actively participate in financial markets will decrease. In the 
short term, this lack of participation could undermine the liquidity and efficiency of 
such markets and increase the cost of capital for companies, while in the long run it 
could have serious repercussions on the stability, development and prosperity of the 
entire economy of a country or region as a whole. Therefore, the rationale behind 
relevant legislation such as the MAD, which prohibits market abuse, requires the 
investigation of suspicious transactions and the enforcement of market abuse, is that of 
safeguarding the smooth functioning of the financial market and investor confidence in 
the same. Both are considered as prerequisites for economic growth and wealth 
creation.154 Regulation on its own is not enough to deter market abuse. Enforcement is 
of fundamental importance if this sort of market malpractice is to be discouraged.  
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Prior to the financial crisis there was a general view that market abuse was widely 
practiced by financial market participants and that financial supervisors were not giving 
this area of financial regulation the attention and priority it deserves.155 This reality was 
also acknowledged in the EU’s DeLarosiere Report, which expressed concern regarding 
inadequate supervisory resources coupled with insufficient skills and weak sanctioning 
and enforcement regimes.156 Experience in monitoring trading in shares on a financial 
market suggests that without credible deterrence, market abuse may become a common 
practice within a financial market.157 The lack of coherent monitoring and enforcement 
of market abuse led the Commission to demand tougher action against this 
malpractice158 and the initiation of a legislative process for the development of a 
proposal for the reform of the EU regulatory framework.159  
 
In practice, however, experience in carrying out investigations of suspected market 
abuse suggests that suspicions of this nature are not only difficult to prove but also very 
hard and costly to investigate.160 However, the recent surge in enforcement action with 
regard to market abuse cases in Europe and the US indicates that following the financial 
crisis, addressing these cases has reached the top of the supervisory agenda.161 This is a 
reasonable reaction directed towards enhancing investor confidence in financial markets 
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after the latter had received a serious blow as a consequence of the crisis. In the final 
analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that the policy response in this field and the action 
taken by financial supervisors, sustain the view that safeguarding and maintaining the 
fairness, honesty and integrity of financial markets in order to preserve investor 
confidence and the sustainability of such markets, continues to be one of the 
fundamental high-level objectives of financial regulation.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The financial system was created to serve the needs of society. In effect, the provision 
of financial services constitutes a public good and serves the common good by 
transferring savings to efficient organisations that require capital to invest. A stable 
financial system provides a favourable business environment for the efficient allocation 
of resources and by so doing supports job creation and economic growth. In theory, the 
financial system should be a means to an end and not an end in itself. The financial 
crisis points towards a different reality.  
 
Attaining the high-level objectives of financial regulation is the means to ensure that the 
conduct of business of the financial system is controlled and does not threaten the 
welfare of society and the economy. Public interest is indeed the rationale for 
safeguarding systemic stability, protecting the investor and ensuring that markets are 
fair, efficient and transparent. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the case for more 
effective financial regulation and supervision for the purpose of achieving these high-
level objectives is undeniable. In the final analysis, it is natural to conclude that the 
financial crisis, the identified causes thereof and the policy response, based on a wide 
array of regulatory measures, have proven and sustained the continued validity and 
relevance of the theories and objectives of financial regulation.  
 
Harmonised financial regulation and supervision, which achieve the objectives of 
financial regulation on a cross-border level, are a vital condition for the operation of 
mutual recognition in the field of UCITS.  The analysis in this chapter serves as a 
prologue for the better understanding and the examination of the conditions and 
limitations of the governance mechanisms for mutual recognition and the outcomes of 
policy actions in the field of UCITS, which are analysed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 3 
 
MINIMUM HARMONISATION OF REGULATION, HOME 
COUNTRY CONTROL AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST TWO DECADES OF THE 
UCITS DIRECTIVE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 examines the application of the principle of mutual recognition during the 
first two decades of the UCITS Directive. During this period, mutual recognition was 
contingent on minimum harmonisation of substantive regulation to achieve a uniform 
degree of investor protection for investors in UCITS and the application of the home 
country control and complementary host country supervisory principles. Each of these 
conditions for mutual recognition is examined. Two categories of limitations to mutual 
recognition emerge from the analysis. These are the limitations of the governance 
mechanism and the limitations of the regulatory framework.  
 
The central argument of the chapter is that while the 1985 UCITS Directive was a 
necessary first step in the process for the development of an internal market for UCITS, 
the limitations of the governance mechanism for mutual recognition based on minimum 
harmonisation of regulation, in the form of inconsistent application of the Directive and 
the application of Member State discretions, raised barriers to the internal market for 
UCITS. In addition to the above-mentioned limitations of the governance mechanism, 
the first two decades of the 1985 UCITS Directive were also characterised by 
limitations of the regulatory mechanism for mutual recognition. These took the form of 
tight investment restrictions, and the prohibition on the management company and the 
depositary from providing cross-border services.   
 
The chapter is divided into four additional sections. Section 3.2 critically examines the 
governance mechanism and the substantive regulation that surface from the 1985 
UCITS Directive and identifies the conditions and limitations of mutual recognition 
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during this initial period of the Directive’s existence. Section 3.3 analyses the failed 
UCITS II Proposal and the reasons why, at that stage, broader mutual recognition could 
not be achieved in the new fields proposed by the Commission. Section 3.4 critically 
examines the contribution of the 2001 UCITS III Directive towards widening of mutual 
recognition for collective investment schemes. Concluding remarks are made at the end 
of the chapter.  
 
The analysis in chapter 3 is used to draw specific conclusions on the mechanisms for 
mutual recognition during the first two decades of the UCITS Directive.  For this 
purpose, the evolution of substantive law for investor protection in the EU is also 
examined. In a number of instances reference is made to the US where federal 
regulation for the protection of investors in collective investment schemes was adopted 
forty-five years before the UCITS directive. This analysis is critical to the debate on the 
evolution of the conditions and limitations of mutual recognition and the development 
of the internal market for UCITS. 
 
3.2 The Origins – The 1985 UCITS Directive  
 
The first European proposal for the adoption of a Directive that regulates the activity of 
collective investment schemes and which would have granted these schemes access to 
the internal market, was first presented by the Commission in 1976.
1
 Various factors are 
said to have triggered this development, including the 1966 Group of Experts Report to 
the Commission known as the ‘Segre Report’. This report acknowledged the ability of 
collective investment schemes as saving agents for retail investors and suppliers of 
capital within the economy, both of which are necessary to invigorate the integration of 
the European financial markets.
2
  Integration through the creation of an internal market 
for collective investment schemes would have increased the competition amongst 
operators in this field and, as a consequence, the efficiency of the industry.  
 
At the time when the proposal for a UCITS Directive was made, a highly fragmented 
regulatory framework applied to collective investment schemes established in the EU. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 N Moloney, ‘EC Securities Regulation’ (Oxford University 2008) 245. 
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 Commission, ‘The Development of a European Capital Market – Report by a Group of Experts 
Appointed by the EEC Commission’ (1966)<http://goo.gl/HnO2K4>accessed 06.11.10. 
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Each Member State had its own regulatory framework for collective investment 
schemes, with major differences existing with regards to the on going obligations and 
controls imposed on such schemes in the different Member States.
3
 These differences 
distorted competition among schemes established in different Member States and 
created an uneven investor protection regime in Europe.  
 
One may argue that the call for harmonisation of EU financial regulation was at that 
stage also based on the assumption that legal diversity causes transaction costs and 
lowers the incentive for retail investor to enter into cross-border transactions. Retail 
investors tend to refrain from contracts in foreign legal systems if the costs of 
information and/or the costs of enforcement seem too high or unpredictable.
4
 Against 
this background harmonisation of regulation becomes a tool to reduce individual 
information costs and general uncertainty because the complexity of acting declines. 
More coordination was therefore required if integration in this field was to be achieved.
5
  
 
The objective of creating an integrated and efficient internal market for collective 
investment schemes, which would benefit retail investors and financial markets in 
Europe is clearly spelt out in the 1985 UCITS Directive: 
 
… national laws governing collective investment undertakings should be 
coordinated with a view to approximating the conditions of competition between 
those undertaking at Community level, while at the same time ensuring more 
effective and more uniform protection for unit-holders; … such coordination 
will make it easier for a collective investment undertaking situated in one 
Member State to market its units in other Member States … 
 
… the attainment of these objectives will facilitate the removal of restrictions on 
the free circulation of the units in collective investment undertakings in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Community, and such coordination will help bring about a European capital 
market … 
6
 
 
Therefore, the 1985 UCITS Directive aimed at achieving two broad outcomes: [i] the 
coordination of national regulation of collective investment schemes which would make 
it easier for such schemes to provide cross-border activity within the EU; and [ii] the 
establishment of harmonised substantive requirements which would result in uniform 
investor protection in Europe. This part of chapter 3, examines the mechanisms applied 
for achieving these two separate but interlinked outcomes and the extent to which these 
have contributed towards mutual recognition between Member States in the field of 
UCITS.  
 
3.2.1 A Governance Mechanism for the Approximation of Regulation 
 
Notwithstanding the deemed benefits of a Directive on collective investment schemes, 
reaching a compromise on the Commission’s proposal within the Council turned out to 
be a challenging and protracted task. The negotiation process took nine years to 
complete. The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community required 
unanimity in Council for the adoption of internal market regulation, such as the 1985 
UCITS Directive. Therefore, dogged blocking tactics triggered by narrow national 
interests could have easily obstructed progress in the discussions. As a consequence, 
such negotiations would generally result in a compromise based on the least common 
denominator.
7
 Indeed, to this day the argument against harmonisation is still made on 
the basis that in a world of divided political sovereignty and diverse national 
preferences, the push for harmonisation could end up being a recipe for compromises 
which result in weak and ineffective regulation.
8
 
 
While the debate on the proposed UCITS Directive continued, a major step in the 
governance mechanism for the creation of an internal market for financial services was 
taken with the publication of what is generally referred to as the 1985 Cockfield White 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Paper. This Paper set out for the first time a comprehensive list of what needed to be 
done to overcome the barriers to cross-border business which existed within the EU and 
established 31 December 1992 as the deadline for doing so.9 The aim of the 1985 
Cockfield White Paper was that of dealing with the poor performance of the 
Community in achieving the internal market objective, which was largely due to the 
deficiencies in the governance mechanisms for financial regulation applicable at the 
time and the lack of political will on part of the Member States.
10
 The 1985 Cockfield 
White Paper suggested that in order to achieve an internal market in the field of 
financial services, the EU had to enact twenty pieces of legislation which inter alia had 
to cover the three principal areas of financial services. The list included the adoption of 
a directive to regulate the cross-border marketing of collective investment schemes and 
made direct reference to the Commission’s UCITS proposal.
$$
  
 
The 1985 Cockfield White Paper also recommended the adoption of a governance 
mechanism which would be applied in the structuring of the new regulatory framework 
for financial services.
12
 It suggested that the proposed new European regulatory 
framework should operate on the basis of mutual recognition between Member States 
based on minimum harmonisation of regulation, home country control and 
complementary host country supervision.
13
 The 1985 Cockfield White Paper also 
recorded the importance of achieving supervisory convergence for the purpose of 
effective mutual recognition by stating that: 
 
There would have to be a minimum harmonisation of surveillance standard, 
though the need to reach agreement on this must not be allowed to further delay 
the necessary and overdue decisions.
14
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The above suggests that while supervisory convergence had been identified as a 
condition for mutual recognition, reaching a compromise on a minimum standard for 
supervision at that early stage of the integration process would have proved to be a 
problematic task. Undoubtedly, attempting to achieve a minimum degree of supervisory 
convergence would have delayed the negotiations on the laws proposed in the 1985 
Cockfield White Paper. 
 
With regard to the process that led to the eventual adoption of the UCITS Directive, the 
points raised in the 1985 Cockfield White Paper to the Commission’s UCITS Proposal, 
resulted in a push in the negotiations within the Council, which adopted the Directive on 
the 20
th 
December of the same year.  
 
The choice of a Directive as the legal instrument for the achievement of harmonisation 
in the field of collective investment schemes and the creation of an internal market for 
UCITS supports the view that, at the time, significant differences in the legal framework 
of the Member States in this field must have existed. Therefore, in order to come to a 
compromise on the text of the Directive, Member States could have required a certain 
degree of discretion with regard to implementation. It is generally accepted that the 
disposition of a Directive as binding EU legislation, which however allows for a certain 
degree of flexibility with regard to implementation, makes this legal instrument suitable 
for the approximation of laws throughout the EU.
15
 A Directive grants Member States 
the opportunity to shape the implementing legislation to their particular circumstances 
as long as the implementation fulfils and satisfies the aim of the Directive.
16
 Hence, 
harmonisation of national law through a Directive is compatible with and does not 
require a change to national legal traditions, legal techniques, doctrinal theories of law 
and ideological divergence. 
 
Directives constitute two-phased type legislation. At the first stage the European 
Institutions adopt the Directive. Its provisions are aimed at achieving a particular result 
in all Member States. The second stage follows where each of the Member States 
transposes the content of the Directive into national law. It is the result of the 
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transposition which gives rise to rights and obligations that can be invoked by interested 
parties in case of litigation. The fact that Member States are afforded the choice of 
forms and method of transposition in order to attain the objectives laid down in the 
Directive does not impact its binding character. Where a Member State fails to take the 
necessary measures to transpose and implement a Directive within the stipulated 
deadline, the said Member State would be in breach of its obligations under the Treaty 
and the Directive. This could be a basis for infringement proceedings against the 
Member State at fault.  
 
It is common for Directives to be transposed and implemented differently in Member 
States. In this regard, it has been argued that Directives are not ideal legal instruments 
of harmonisation in terms of predictability of result.
17
 The use of Directives is 
synonymous with the granting to Member States of different options and discretions 
with regard to the application of particular provisions of the Directive. These would 
generally be negotiated during the debate in Council and have the purpose of catering 
for the particularities of the markets and legal traditions of the different Member States. 
As will be submitted in other parts of the thesis, given the flexible nature of a Directive, 
the implementation generally gives rise to different interpretations of its requirements 
by the Member States. This means that Directives are likely to be implemented 
inconsistently at the transposition stage and when they are applied in practical 
situations. This invariably triggers mutual distrust between Member States and the 
consequent raising of national barriers to cross-border activity.  
 
The internal market for UCITS created by the 1985 UCITS Directive, was one of the 
first examples of European Community internal market legislation to come into force.
18
 
It followed the governance model set by 1985 Cockfield White Paper. The principle of 
mutual recognition was applied, whereby a UCITS satisfying the conditions in its home 
Member State became entitled to engage in investment activities in any other Member 
State.
19
 The 1985 UCITS Directive is generally considered as a landmark in the creation 
of an internal market in the field of securities business, as it established, for the first 
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time, a framework for the application of mutual recognition in this field.
20
 Indeed, it 
paved the way for the development of other internal market Directives dealing with 
financial services.
21
  
 
Mutual recognition refers to a state of affairs whereby Member States recognise each 
other’s regulatory framework and trust one another to carry out adequate supervision of 
a UCITS. Following the 1985 Cockfield White Paper doctrine, mutual recognition in 
terms of the UCITS Directive, was contingent on minimum harmonisation of investor 
protection rules, home country control and complementary host country supervision. 
Therefore, the UCITS Directive was adopted on the premise that respecting these three 
conditions for mutual recognition would allow the unhindered cross-border activity by 
UCITS.  
 
Diagram 3.1 – Conditions for Mutual Recognition 
  
!
!
!!
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Minimum harmonisation as a method for achieving integration requires that only the 
rules, that are essential for the functioning of the internal market should be 
harmonised.
22
 In this regard, the expression ‘at least’ is the most frequently used term in 
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Directives to indicate a minimum level of harmonisation to be pursued by the 
implementing authority. In other instances, such as in the case of the 1985 UCITS 
Directive, the nature of the Directive is also explicitly stated in the text by granting 
Member States the discretion of applying within their territory, requirements which are 
stricter than or additional to those set in the Directive.
23
 Therefore, minimum 
harmonisation occurs where EU law lays down a floor of common rules leaving 
Member States free to retain or apply other measures that result in more stringent 
standards.
24
 This freedom is extended to the ceiling set by the provisions of the Treaty.  
!
In the context of 1985 UCITS Directive, the imposition of minimum standards to be 
applied in every Member State had the purpose of providing for a certain degree of 
equivalent investor protection safeguards for consumers of financial services throughout 
Europe
25
, while at the same time allowing a certain degree of flexibility with regard to 
the constitutional framework for the establishment of the UCITS and other national 
regulatory traditions. One may argue that in the context of mutual recognition, 
minimum harmonisation meant that the credibility of the host Member State’s 
regulatory framework to the home Member State, lay in the fact that the host Member 
State regulation contained familiar minimum standards which were also applicable in 
the home Member State. Where the application of the minimum standards by the 
Member States became distorted due to different interpretations of the provisions of the 
Directive, their value for the purpose of mutual recognition diminished.    
 
The 1985 Cockfield White Paper determined that minimum harmonisation per se was 
not going to permit mutual recognition to operate properly. Without a governance 
mechanism which regulates the shared supervision of the passporting UCITS, the cross-
border marketing of UCITS would have continued to entail the application of the 
regulatory frameworks of the home Member State and that of host Member States. 
Therefore, minimum harmonisation had to be complemented by the home country 
control principle. This principle became the primary governance structure for the 
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regulation and supervision of UCITS and sought to remove part of the barrier to cross-
border financial services, by establishing the home Member State as the lead regulator 
for the financial entity, responsible for authorisation and on-going supervision and 
granting the host Member State complementary supervisory powers.
26
  
 
As a result, once a UCITS was authorised by its home Member State, that same 
authorisation was valid for all the other Member States and, subject to the making of a 
passporting notification, the authorised UCITS could be marketed in all the other 
Member States. In terms of process, once a passporting notification was made to the 
host Member State, that State had two months within which to process the notification. 
As a condition for access to the host Member State, a passporting UCITS was required 
to comply with the national marketing rules of that State.
27
 Under these rules the host 
Member State could inter alia regulate marketing techniques, publicity and distribution 
infrastructure. The host Member State was also granted the power to monitor the 
passporting UCITS’s degree of compliance with those rules.
28
 The host Member State 
could for instance object to the marketing by a passporting UCITS, if it considered that 
the arrangements made for marketing in the host Member State did not comply with the 
local regulatory framework.
29
  
 
In certain instances, the application of the procedure for passporting of a UCITS and the 
application of national marketing rules created a regulatory barrier to the cross-border 
activity of UCITS. Certain Members States exercised such discretion to render 
applicable national market rules, as an opportunity to enact registration procedures for 
passporting UCITS. This, in practice, placed real constraints on the benefits of the 
European passport of UCITS.
30
 On different occasions the Commission stated that:  
 
… difficulties have arisen in respect of [the] smooth functioning [of the 
passport]. … the formalities, length and complexity of the notification procedure 
may vary greatly from one Member State to the other. If some of these 
variations can be explained by different administrative practices, many of them 
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also result from diverging interpretations of the Directive.
31
  
 
… Procedures for cross-border marketing are cumbersome, costly and subject to 
undue supervisory interference. Directive deadlines for completing review of 
fund notifications have frequently been exceeded. Difficulties have also taken the 
form of intrusive checks of the UCITS during the notification procedure, 
additional information requirements or requests to modify documentation or 
certain fund features (e.g. name/denomination of fund). These difficulties 
undermine the effectiveness and credibility of the fund passport. …32 
 
Thus the granting of national discretions to the Member States, such as the discretion to 
apply national marketing rules in the host Member State, coupled with inconsistent 
interpretation and implementation of the Directive, distorted the functioning of mutual 
recognition in terms of the 1985 UCITS Directive. In certain instances, the intervention 
of the host Member States went beyond what was allowed by the 1985 UCITS 
Directive. On a number of occasions the host Member States prevented the marketing of 
units of a passporting UCITS because its features were deemed as not being compliant 
with the requirements of the Directive.
33
 Such action was clearly in breach of the 
Directive which only allowed the host Member State to review at notification stage the 
compliance of a UCITS from another Member State with the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions applicable to marketing arrangements falling outside the field 
governed by the Directive.  
 
While national barriers to cross-border activity were generally presented as means of 
ensuring a higher standard of protection for the local investment community, in certain 
instances, these were clearly exercised with the aim of protecting the local industry from 
potential competition originating from other Member States.
34
 Therefore, the manner in 
which national discretions are exercised and the inconsistent implementation and 
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interpretation of the Directive, are three significant limitations of the governance 
mechanism for mutual recognition, based on minimum harmonisation of regulation, 
home country control and complementary host country supervision. As analysed in 
other parts of this thesis, the internal market concerns arising from the granting of 
national discretions to Member States and the inconsistent application of EU regulation 
still exist and continue to sustain the identified limitations of mutual recognition as a 
tool for the completion of the internal market for UCITS. 
 
Diagram 3.2 – Limitations of the Governance Mechanism for Mutual Recognition  
 
!
!
!!
!
In order to support the operation of the home country control principle, the 1985 UCITS 
Directive attempted to create a legal mechanism to facilitate cooperation within the 
internal market for UCITS. The Directive required the home and the host financial 
supervisors to collaborate closely in order to carry out their tasks and for this purpose to 
communicate to each other all relevant information.
35
 This requirement was rather 
broad, vague and provided limited guidance on the situations where supervisory 
cooperation would have been required and the mechanism which should have been 
applied in this regard. Moreover, the host financial supervisors were not always 
prepared to trust the supervision carried out in the home Member State. Nonetheless, 
given that cross-border activity at the stage when the directive was being adopted was 
limited to the marketing of the UCITS, one may argue that the legislator must have 
considered this basic requirement of cooperation as sufficient to trigger collaboration 
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between the financial supervisor of the home Member State and that of the host Member 
State where necessary.  
As a means of ensuring a certain level of integration with regards to the implementation 
of the 1985 UCITS Directive and cooperation between financial supervisors in different 
Member States, the Directive established the UCITS Contact Committee. This was 
eventually replaced by the Committees developed as part of the Lamfalussy process. 
The Contact Committee was given the mandate to facilitate the harmonised 
implementation of the Directive and the cooperation between Member States and to 
advise the Commission on additions or amendments to the Directive.
36
 It is fair to argue 
that the establishment of the Contact Committee was the first European attempt to attain 
enhanced cooperation and convergence in financial supervision and therefore a very 
important first step for the development of the European governance structure for the 
supervision of European securities business. This said, it is also true that throughout the 
years when this Committee was in existence, the internal market for UCITS was 
characterised by inconsistency in the application of the UCITS Directive and lack of 
cooperation between financial supervisors. It follows that the Contact Committee was 
not an effective governance mechanism to achieve the high-level objective of enhancing 
cooperation and convergence with regards to the application of the UCITS Directive.   
 
Apart from developing the governance mechanism for the effective application of the 
conditions for mutual recognition, the main challenge facing the European legislator, 
with regard to the drafting of the 1985 UCITS Directive, was that of making a correct 
decision in respect of the right combination of elements of substantive regulation for 
investor protection that would have allowed mutual recognition between the Member 
States to operate effectively.   
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3.2.2 Minimum Substantive Regulation for Investor Protection 
 
The framework set in the 1985 UCITS Directive was mainly directed towards the 
regulation of the product as opposed to the management company and the depositary of 
the UCITS. The rationale behind this approach was that while the UCITS was granted 
access to the internal market, the 1985 UCITS Directive did not permit the management 
company and the depositary to provide cross-border services in other Member States. In 
terms of the 1985 UCITS Directive these service providers were required to be 
established in the same Member State as that of the UCITS. This meant that the 
management company and the depositary could not provide services to UCITS 
established in other European jurisdictions. This limitation meant that minimal 
harmonisation of the regulation of the organizational and conduct of business 
requirements applicable to the management company and the depositary was required at 
this stage. This made a compromise in Council for the adoption of the Directive more 
achievable.  
 
Diagram 3.3 - Access to the Internal Market.!
!
!
!!
!
The regulation of collective investment schemes is primarily aimed at addressing 
investor protection concerns. These come in the form of conflicts of interest as well as 
the asymmetry in market power and information that might arise due to the various 
principal-agent relationships that exist in a collective investment scheme structure. The 
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simplest form of abuse of the principal-agent relationship occurs where the management 
company makes false representations in respect of the value of the assets in the portfolio 
of the collective investment scheme, with the aim of generating higher fees, in cases 
where fees are calculated as a percentage of the value of the assets of the scheme.
37
 
Regulation would generally attempt to mitigate the various sources of principal-agent 
investor protection concerns through organisational, conduct of business and 
transparency requirements applicable to the various parties that form part of a collective 
investment scheme structure and through the application of prescriptive restrictions 
regarding the asset allocation of such schemes. 
 
At the time when the 1985 UCITS Directive was being drafted and debated the above-
mentioned principal-agent investor protection concerns were not new. These concerns 
had already been addressed at a much earlier stage in the US through the adoption of the 
Investment Companies Act of 1940
&#
 (‘ICA 1940’). The Act has the purpose of 
mitigating as far as possible the conditions that may arise within a collective investment 
scheme that may adversely affect the interest of investors. The ICA 1940 was enacted to 
address the market malpractice at the detriment of investors that occurred within the 
investment fund industry during the late 1920’s and the 1930’s and which were 
identified by the SEC post the crisis of 1929.
&(
 During this period investors in collective 
investment schemes suffered severe losses, a substantial portion of which was a direct 
result of the mismanagement and manipulation within the industry. The public 
dissatisfaction provoked by these losses was exacerbated by a series of failures of 
collective investment schemes, due to fraud and misappropriation by management, and 
by substantial evidence that many schemes were serving as vehicles for practices which, 
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if not actually illegal, were nonetheless disregarding the best interests of investors.
"'
 
 
The public discontent in the US resulted in a mandate to the SEC to investigate the 
industry and report its findings and recommendations to Congress.
"$
 The SEC report, 
published in three parts between 1938-1940, revealed many different forms of principal-
agent malpractices and made the point that these occurred as a result of the very nature 
of collective investment schemes. Specifically, that the same persons were involved in 
all activities of the scheme and thus exercised a significant degree of control over its 
functions and could, as a consequence, easily manipulate its assets.
"%
 Given the serious 
concerns about the activities of collective investment schemes the SEC persisted in its 
desire to bring the activities of such entities under federal control.
"&
 Consequently, the 
ICA 1940 requires collective investment schemes in the US to register with the SEC, 
which is responsible for their regulation and supervision, and also makes such schemes 
subject to diversification, custody and disclosure requirements.
""
  
 
Hence, while the push in the US for federal regulation of collective investment schemes 
was triggered by concerns about market confidence, the European drive for 
supranational regulation of the same field was generated by a desire to liberalise 
markets and, as a result, benefit from efficiency and economic growth. Even so, the 
mechanism applied to achieve these two distinct objectives was the same. Indeed, so 
crucial is the protection of the investor for the proper functioning of the investment 
industry that without such regulation neither the regaining of market confidence in the 
US after the financial debacle of 1929, nor mutual recognition between Member States 
in fields such as UCITS, would have been possible.  
 
Investor protection is however not the only objective that triggers the adoption of 
regulation of the activity of collective investment schemes. Regulation of collective 
investment schemes may, at times, also seek to address the possible systemic risk 
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implications arising from the failure of the collective investment scheme or from the 
conduct of the management company or depositary of the scheme. A collective 
investment scheme may become systemically relevant as a consequence of the nature of 
investment transactions it carries out, the amount and type of counterparties with which 
it performs its business, the extent of liquidity it requires and its overall financial 
position. In the absence of adequate regulation, collective investment schemes have the 
potential of creating instability within the financial system.
45
 However, at the time of 
adoption of the 1985 UCITS Directive, systemic stability objectives of financial 
regulation were largely ignored. In fact, the Directive clearly indicates that the main 
objective of the Directive with regard to the harmonisation of substantive regulation was 
that of achieving a uniform protection of investors.  
 
An examination of the substantive regulation set in the 1985 UCITS Directive, brings to 
light various measures for the protection of investors. For the purpose of this analysis 
these requirements have being classified into three categories: [i] general requirements; 
[ii] restrictions on the management company; and [iii] appointment of an independent 
depositary.  
 
General Requirements  
 
The 1985 UCITS Directive stipulates common minimum substantive requirements on 
the authorisation, supervision, structure and activities of UCITS and the information to 
be provided to their financial supervisors.
46
 A requirement for authorisation is generally 
a means of exerting a certain degree of control over persons who are allowed to 
participate actively in the financial system,
47
 thereby ensuring that only individuals who 
are deemed to be fit and proper, and therefore competent, honest and solvent, get 
involved in the management and administration of financial institutions. A requirement 
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to be authorised also seeks to ensure that the applicant has a business plan and internal 
structure which is commercially sound and viable and that it affords proper protection to 
investors and does not threaten the soundness of the financial system. The regular 
reporting and supervisory requirements aim at guaranteeing that this remains the case on 
an on-going basis. These are all fundamental requirements, which are generally 
established in any regulatory framework applicable to financial services.  
 
With regard to structure of the UCITS, the 1985 UCITS Directive stipulated that the 
UCITS could be constituted as either an investment company or a common fund, being 
a contractual fund or a fund constituted under trust law.
48
 Nonetheless, whichever 
constitutional set up was to be adopted, the UCITS always had to be an open-ended 
scheme, which provides investors with the opportunity to redeem the units purchased.
49
 
An open-ended scheme would generally be open to create new units to satisfy 
subscriptions in the UCITS and to cancel units when redemption requests are made. 
Providing frequent opportunities to dispose or redeem a financial instrument provides 
investors with regular chances to invest and also to obtain liquidity when this is 
required. This is considered critical for retail investor protection purposes, as it would 
generally allow an investor who requires immediate access to his funds an easy route to 
get his money back. This option is generally not available where the scheme is closed-
ended.  
 
Restrictions on the management company 
 
The 1985 UCITS Directive contained very minimal conditions applicable to the 
organisation of the management company appointed to manage the assets of the 
UCITS.
50
 The Directive stipulated that the management of the UCITS had to be carried 
out either by a UCITS management company or by the board of directors of the UCITS 
if this had been organised as a self-managed investment company.
51
 The UCITS 
management company had to have sufficient financial resources to conduct its business 
and was prohibited from undertaking activities other than the management of collective 
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investment schemes.
52
 The rationale behind the latter requirement is believed to have 
been that of providing investors with a high degree of protection by ensuring an 
optimum level of specialisation by the management company and avoiding all possible 
risks of a conflict of interest arising between the specified activity and others.
53
 
 
The 1985 UCITS Directive required that the sole object of the UCITS had to be the 
investment in transferable securities.
54
 These were defined in the preamble as financial 
instruments admitted to official listing on a stock exchange or dealt in on a regulated 
market which operates regularly, is recognized and open to the public. Therefore, 
subject to certain limited exceptions such as the use of derivatives for hedging purposes, 
a management company was only allowed to invest the UCITS in securities, which were 
officially listed on stock exchanges or similar regulated markets.
55
 Requiring the UCITS 
to invest only in transferable securities was a means of ensuring that the assets in which 
the UCITS invested had the degree of liquidity, which would allow the UCITS to meet 
the redemptions at the investors’ request. 
 
The 1985 UCITS Directive also set certain minimum risk spreading investment 
restrictions, which had the purpose of ensuring that the assets of the UCITS were well 
diversified.
56
 This is another standard retail investor protection measure. In financial 
regulation, the setting of risk spreading investment restrictions seeks to guarantee that 
the management company of the UCITS invests the assets of the UCITS in a manner 
which reflects its profile, objectives and policies whilst at the same time achieving a 
certain degree of diversification, which mitigates primarily the risks relating to 
concentration and large exposures.  
 
In the US, one of the main objections to the conduct of many collective investment 
schemes, prior to the enactment of the ICA 1940, was that investors were left in 
complete ignorance on the manner in which the scheme was being managed.
*)
 Units of 
the schemes were sold to the general public by emphasising the diversification and 
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expert management of investments.
*#
 Prompted by such opportunities and enticed by 
names and literature suggesting that collective investment schemes were in a class with 
banks, investors put their savings in such schemes, only to learn later that the expected 
diversification and that the expertise of the managers was false and that their savings 
had been employed for the advantage of insiders.
*(
 The ICA 1940 addressed these 
investor protection concerns by way of specific requirements on diversification, 
conflicts of interest and transparency.
+'
  
 
Diversification is not mandatory in terms of the ICA 1940. However, if a collective 
investment scheme elects to be diversified then in terms of the ICA 1940 the scheme 
would be subject to very detailed and strict diversification rules.
+$
 To address the 
possibility of conflicts of interest the ICA 1940 contains a number of strong and 
detailed prohibitions on transactions between affiliates.
+%
 As for transparency the ICA 
1940 requires the scheme to have a prospectus, describing the fund, its objectives, its 
portfolio, its management, its per share record of investment performance, the sales 
charge and the costs of management.
+&
 Moreover, sales literature itself is regulated as to 
form and content by the SEC.
+"
  
 
It reasonable to suggest that some of the above-mentioned requirements may have 
served as a source of inspiration with regard to the drafting of the 1985 UCITS 
Directive. In this connection, with regard to transparency, the 1985 UCITS Directive 
stipulated substantive requirements on disclosure to investors by the UCITS. This 
entailed the publication of purchase and redemption prices, a prospectus, an annual 
financial report and a half-yearly financial report. Transparency requirements are one of 
the primary tools in financial regulation for the protection of the investor. Transparency 
regulation ensures that the investor is provided with the opportunity to make an 
informed investment decision, thereby seeking to reduce the extent of asymmetric 
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information between investors and the financial institution which is promoting and 
selling the UCITS.  
  
It is reasonable to conclude that: [i] the investment restrictions applicable to UCITS that 
restricted investments to transferable securities and which therefore excluded collective 
investment schemes that invested in other types of assets from the internal market 
framework; and [ii] the limited substantive regulation applicable to management 
companies, which were not allowed access to the internal market; while suitable 
measures to kick start the internal market for collective investment schemes, were 
subsequently recognised as limitations of the regulatory mechanism for mutual 
recognition.  
 
As will be examined in subsequent parts of this thesis, these limitations of the 
regulatory mechanism for mutual recognition were addressed in subsequent changes to 
the Directive, which were made with the purpose of ensuring a more extensive degree 
of mutual recognition between Member States and therefore a smoother operation of the 
internal market for UCITS.  
 
Appointment of an Independent Depositary 
 
The UCITS was required to appoint and entrust all its assets to a depositary
65
, as an 
independent entity from the Scheme and the management company, which is subject to 
prudential regulation. The depositary was also required to monitor the activity of the 
management company. The requirement to appoint a depositary is an investor protection 
type measure. It seeks to address the principal-agent concerns which may arise within a 
collective investment scheme structure, by creating a controlling mechanism which 
should ensure that the assets of the UCITS are not abused by the management company. 
Such requirements came in the wake of the 1960’s Investor Overseas Services Ltd 
scandal, wherein the assets of a collective investment scheme were used by one of this 
company’s controlling parties for his own benefit.
66
 So as to guarantee that the 
depositary carries out his safekeeping and monitoring duties effectively, the 1985 
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UCITS Directive also stipulated that a depositary should be liable in case of losses 
suffered by the UCITS as a result of the unjustifiable failure of the depositary to 
perform its obligations or its improper performance of them.
67
  
 
In the US the investment adviser has, by and large, the same role as that of the 
management company in the EU. It typically organises the establishment of the 
collective investment scheme and is responsible for its overall operations. The adviser 
generally provides the seed capital, officers, employees, and office space, and usually 
selects the initial board of directors. As a result of this extensive involvement, and the 
general absence of shareholder activism, investment advisers typically dominate the 
funds they advise.
+#
 In order to limit the chances for misuse of the assets of a collective 
investment scheme by the investment advisor, the ICA 1940 requires schemes to 
maintain custody of funds assets separate from the assets of the investment advisor.
+(
 In 
addition an investment advisor with custody of client assets is required to take a number 
of steps designed to safeguard those client assets, which include the maintenance of 
such assets with a qualified custodian.
)'
 For this purpose a bank is normally engaged to 
act as custodian.
)$
  
 
The duties of the custodian in terms of the ICA 1940 are limited to safekeeping, 
including the reconciliation of the assets of the scheme
)%
, and do not extend to the 
monitoring of the investment advisor as in the case of the depositary of a UCITS.
 
In first 
instance this may suggest that the UCITS Directive affords a higher degree of protection 
to the investor when compared to the ICA 1940. Nonetheless, an examination of the role 
of independent directors of a fund registered under the ICA 1940 suggests otherwise, as 
these directors are specifically required to act as ‘independent watchdogs’ guarding the 
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interests of investors.
)&
 The directors are required to monitor the overall management of 
the scheme, perform a robust review of, among other things, the nature and quality of 
the services provided by the adviser, and are responsible for policing operational 
conflicts between the interests of the investors and that of the investment adviser.
 )"
 For 
this purpose investment advisers are required to provide the directors with all the 
information they require in order to be in a position to fulfill this role. Therefore, the 
ICA 1940 establishes a system of checks and balances through its reliance on 
independent directors to provide oversight of the investment advisers that manage the 
collective investment schemes. As a result of their specific monitoring role, independent 
directors would seem to offer significant protections to investors from possible abuse by 
the investment adviser. In general these protections would appear to be comparable to 
those afforded by a depositary under the UCITS Directive. 
 
As already indicated, the 1985 UCITS Directive also required the depositary to be 
established in the same Member State of the UCITS.
75
 At the time it was considered 
important for the governance of financial supervision that national financial supervisors, 
which had the responsibility of authorising the fund and the management company, to 
also have competence for the supervision of the depositary.
76
 Proximity of the 
depositary to the fund manager and the scheme was also considered important for the 
proper fulfilment of the depositary’s monitoring duties.
77
 However, the requirement that 
the depositary had to be established in the same Member State of the UCITS was 
interpreted in a variety of ways.
78
 The most onerous interpretation was that of Spain, 
which demanded the depositary to have its registered office and central administrative 
office in Spain. The same requirement was very broadly interpreted in Belgium, to the 
extent that it did not require the depositary to be incorporated in the EC. This is but one 
of a number of areas where the UCITS Directive was interpreted and applied 
inconsistently by Member States and provides yet another example of a limitation to the 
governance mechanism for mutual recognition in terms of the 1985 UCITS Directive.  
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All the conditions of the 1985 UCITS Directive which regulated the activity of a 
depositary have been retained in the recast 2009 UCITS IV Directive. However, as will 
be considered in a subsequent part of this thesis, the financial crisis and the Madoff 
scandal tested the European fragmented approach to the regulation of depositaries and, 
as a consequence, new initiatives were proposed directed towards a harmonised 
regulation of this field of financial services.  
 
In the field of UCITS, the Commission issued the 2012 UCITS V Proposal which 
regulates the depositary role and sets detailed eligibility criteria and requirements on 
liability, delegation and its oversight function.79 Apart from addressing the investor 
protection concerns that emerged from the financial crisis and the Madoff Scandal, 
harmonisation of regulation in this field could be a precursor for a proposal to grant 
depositaries access to the internal market. This point is examined in detail in chapter 5. 
 
3.3 The failed UCITS II Initiative   
 
The first European attempt to remove the barriers to cross-border marketing of 
collective investment schemes through the adoption of the 1985 UCITS Directive only 
managed to achieve a limited level of integration of the European funds industry.
80
 This 
state of affairs may be explained on the basis of the limitations of mutual recognition 
identified in this chapter. 
 
This chapter argues that the inconsistent interpretation and implementation of the 1985 
UCITS Directive by the Member States, coupled with the regulatory burden of a 
passporting notification procedure which allowed discretion to the host Member State in 
the form of national marketing rules, proved to be a substantial limitation to the 
governance mechanism for mutual recognition in the field of UCITS. The 1985 UCITS 
Directive also did not afford the UCITS management company and the depositary with 
a passport to provide cross-border services, thereby creating a regulatory limitation to 
mutual recognition in the field of UCITS. Lastly, the chapter also contends that the tight 
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requirement on the eligibility of assets for investment by a UCITS, that applied in terms 
of the 1985 UCITS Directive, prevented a wider variety of collective investment 
schemes from having access to the internal market and prevented UCITS from 
participating in the development of financial markets. This was another regulatory 
limitation to mutual recognition in this field.  
 
While the 1985 UCITS Directive was a first critical step towards the integration of the 
European fund industry, its contribution in this regard was limited, albeit significant for 
the triggering of a process of integration in this field. The limitations of mutual 
recognition identified so far were not easily resolved.  
 
A first major attempt to reform the 1985 UCITS Directive was made by the 
Commission in February 1993 with the issue of a proposal
81
, having the aim of 
addressing some of the identified weaknesses of the Directive. The 1993 UCITS 
Proposal, suggested the extension of the scope of the UCITS Directive to include money 
market funds and funds of funds. It also proposed the introduction of a depositary 
passport and the application of master-feeder structures.
82
 If adopted by Council, the 
proposal would have overcome some of the limitations of the regulatory framework for 
mutual recognition identified in an earlier section of this chapter.  
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Diagram 3.4 - 1993 UCITS II Proposal !
 
!
!
!!
 
The introduction of money market funds and funds of UCITS was a means of achieving 
a higher degree of integration of European financial markets as this would have 
removed the restrictions on the free circulation of the units of these funds. At the time, 
these type of funds were considered as having operational features and investment 
objectives which may be regarded as very close to UCITS as conceived in terms of the 
1985 UCITS Directive and therefore adequate as an investment for retail investors.  
 
The 1993 UCITS Proposal also recommended the creation of an internal market for 
depositaries of UCITS, thereby overcoming the regulatory limitation to mutual 
recognition with regard to this type of service provider.  Further to the introduction of 
the Second Banking Directive
83
 and the Investment Services Directive
84
 which created 
an internal market for credit institutions and investment firms, it was felt that the 
necessary conditions had been established to allow UCITS the freedom to choose a 
depositary established in another Member State which had been authorised in terms of 
these Directives to provide safekeeping and administration services. On this very 
important proposed development for the internal market in financial services the 
proposal explained:  
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When the Directive was adopted in 1985 the principles of the EC-passport for 
credit institutions and investment firms and of home country supervision had not 
been laid down, and it was therefore natural to require establishment. However, 
after the adoption of the Second Banking Coordination Directive and the 
Investment Services Directive, the logical consequences should be that the 
establishment requirements for EEC-coordinated depositaries should be 
deleted.
85
  
 
In terms of the 1985 UCITS Directive, credit institutions and investment firms which 
provided depositary services were specifically not allowed to take advantage of the 
freedoms to provide services and establishment stipulated in the EC Treaty, the Second 
Banking Directive and the Investment Services Directive. The UCITS Directive was 
thus creating a limitation to mutual recognition in this field. Those Member States 
where the depositary industry was not developed were as a result put at a disadvantage. 
Given the lack of competition from external depositaries this would give rise to 
inefficiencies within the local depositary business which would generate extra costs for 
the UCITS established in these Member States. Such costs would in the end be borne by 
the investor.  
 
One may argue that the creation of a depositary passport was necessary in order to 
generate competition, which would also guarantee an adequate level of efficiency within 
the depositary industry. The passport would have broadened the choice of depositaries 
available to UCITS, which would have been able to pick the best offer suited to their 
needs and would have benefited from a higher degree of competition which generally 
results in a reduction of fees to the UCITS and overall costs to the investor.  
 
As further examined in chapter 5 of the thesis, the need for a depositary passport to 
generate and benefit from competition is even more relevant today following the 
coming into force of the AIFMD
#+
. The AIFMD requirements on depositaries, which 
are also in the process of being applied to UCITS
#)
, while still requiring the depositary 
to be established in the same Member State of the fund, introduce more robust investor 
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protection regulation of the functions, duties and liability of such entities.
##
 The new 
rules on liability require restitution in instances where a financial instrument is lost 
unless this is caused by force majeure.
#(
 The liability will also extend to losses at the 
level of the sub-custodian which means that even failures of unaffiliated depositaries 
will be considered as internal to the depositary.
 ('
  
 
The implementation of the proposed strict liability requirements, together with the 
significant onus put on depositaries with regard to their duties, will most certainly result 
in considerable costs for the depositary industry.
($
 These costs will lead to consolidation 
within the industry. In order to remain a viable business activity and to benefit from 
economies of scale, it is expected that small-medium sized depositaries will have to 
come together or cease to provide depositary services altogether. As a consequence of 
possible consolidation, one may reasonably predict that only a few depositaries will 
remain active in Europe, these being the global custodian banks, which however are not 
present in all Member States. This outcome could lead to monopolistic behaviour and 
consequently an increase in the direct expense of engaging a depositary. Consolidation 
may result in an unfair level playing field for those UCITS established in Member 
States with an undeveloped depositary industry.
(%
 Therefore, the creation of a depositary 
passport remains necessary today to address the competition issues that result from 
existing regulation.  
 
At the time of the 1993 UCITS Proposal, the authorisation procedure for credit 
institutions and investment firms together with the harmonisation of the on-going 
regulatory requirements, which had to be satisfied by these entities respectively in terms 
of the Second Banking Directive and Investment Services Directive, had created a 
number of safeguards to guarantee and to ensure an adequate level of protection for 
investors. Thus, there seemed to be no economic, regulatory or supervisory rationale to 
impede the application of the mutual recognition principle in the field of depositary and 
to operate an EEA passport for depositaries.  
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Within seventeen months the Commission issued an amended proposal. Indeed, further 
to discussions with the industry, and following the issue of a formal opinion on the 1993 
UCITS Proposal by the Economic and Social Committee and the publication of a 
number of amendments to the proposal approved by the European Parliament on the 
27
th
 October 1993, the Commission issued an updated proposal on the 20
th
 July 1994
93
. 
The 1994 UCITS Proposal would have added to the flexibility of the UCITS regime and 
therefore would have made it more suitable and better equipped to participate in the 
development of financial markets. The proposal was also amended in order to apply the 
new governance mechanism for the EU financial regulation, which had changed with 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in November 1993. The Treaty had 
changed the mechanics for the adoption of changes to the UCITS Directive, as the 
Council could now approve the amendments on the basis of qualified majority voting, 
while the European Parliament was granted a right of co-decision with the Council in 
this field.  
 
The 1994 UCITS Proposal widened the scope of the Directive by extending UCITS not 
only to money market funds and funds of UCITS, as had been proposed in the 1993 
UCITS Proposal, but also to cash funds and master-feeder structures.
 94
 The latter is a 
collective investment scheme structure wherein capital that is raised from different 
categories or groups of investors (such as investors coming from different jurisdictions) 
and which is invested in different feeder funds established for each group, is pooled into 
one collective investment scheme referred to as the master fund. Investors invest in the 
feeder funds, which in turn invest their liquidity into the master fund. The master fund is 
responsible for making all the portfolio investments and also carries out the trading 
activity. The origins of master-feeder structures lie in the US where managers have 
implemented such structures in order to attain tax efficiency, enhance the critical mass 
of tradable assets and enhance operational efficiency thereby reducing costs.  
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A major advantage of this structure is that it allows the merging of multiple portfolios of 
liquidity into one. This would reduce the average administrative costs (such as trading 
and operational costs) suffered by the collective investment scheme and the ultimate 
investors. In virtue of the size of the master fund, the master-feeder structure also 
benefits from economies of scale and would therefore be able to obtain better service 
and more favourable terms from its service providers, such as managers, depositories 
and auditors. Master-feeder structures are an excellent means of promoting cross-border 
financial flows, which is fundamental for the integration of EU financial markets. 
 
The updates to the UCITS Directive as detailed in the 1994 UCITS Proposal were 
considered to be too far reaching by Member States. The discussions on the draft in the 
Council revealed considerable divergences in the approach of Member States on various 
aspects of the 1994 UCITS Proposal.
95
 The main points of contention in the Council 
were the extension of the scope of the UCITS Directive to master-feeder structures and 
the proposals relating to depositaries.
96
 With regards to the latter, there was significant 
disagreement even at the level of the European Parliament.  
 
In view of the extended role granted to the European Parliament in the governance of 
European financial regulation, after the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, it is 
worthwhile analysing the regulatory activism of this European Institution by examining 
the issues raised by the Rapporteur of the European Committee on Legal and Citizens’ 
Rights of the European Parliament on the 1994 UCITS Proposal.  
 
MEP Perreau De Pinninck suggested two fundamental reasons why depositaries should 
not be granted a passport in terms of the Directive.
97
 He argued that the Commission’s 
proposal to grant credit institutions and investment firms the possibility to passport 
depositary services on the basis that they were already authorised to provide 
safekeeping of assets and administrative services in terms of the Second Banking 
Directive and the Investment Services Directive as confusing the function of mere 
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safekeeping of assets with the complex role that a depositary must fulfil in relation to 
collective investment schemes. MEP Perreau De Pinninck specifically remarked: 
 
The depositary of a UCITS does not restrict itself to correct safekeeping of 
deposited assets (collection of dividends or interest, presenting securities for 
redemption, acting in cases of capital increases or new issues, etc.); it also does 
the work of high added value, such as supervising the management company and 
its investment policies, calculating the cash value of the fund, etc … Thus, the 
functions of a depositary of an UCITS are not those described in the directives 
and it is extremely simplistic to describe these tasks as being no more than 
safekeeping and administration of securities.
98
  
 
Moreover, he felt that allowing a depositary passport would create a number of legal 
issues, such as which legal system should apply in case of default where the depositary 
may be found negligent and therefore liable to the Scheme, as well as technical 
complications, in the form of a lesser level of coordination and cooperation between the 
management company and the depositary, which would in the end result in lesser 
protection afforded to the retail investor. On the basis of these two fundamental points, 
he recommended that the depositary of a UCITS should not be given an internal market 
passport and should continue to be established in the same Member State as the UCITS.  
 
The position taken by MEP Perreau De Pinninck suggests a possible concern shared by 
policy-makers within the European Parliament that mutual recognition with regard to 
depositaries would not be possible. There existed a lack of sufficient harmonisation with 
regard to the requirements which dictate the duties that should be carried out by a 
depositary for this service provider to properly fulfil its monitoring and safekeeping role 
in the best interest of the UCITS and the retail investors. In addition, the EU proposal 
had not provided for the harmonisation of the criteria which an entity must satisfy 
before it may be eligible and permitted to act as a depositary of a UCITS.  
 
Neither did the proposal provide for a robust harmonised prudential and conduct of 
business regulatory framework focusing on depository duties, which in field of financial 
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regulation is considered as yet another fundamental variable for the proper functioning 
of mutual recognition between financial supervisors and consequently the proper 
application of an internal market passport.  
 
Moreover, basing oneself on the remarks by MEP Perreau De Pinninck regarding 
possible legal issues that could arise as a consequence of the liability of depositaries to 
the Scheme where the depositary is found to have acted negligently, it is logical to 
conclude that mutual recognition in this field and the application of an internal market 
passport would have also required a certain degree of harmonisation with regard to civil 
liability. Specifically in establishing whether a depositary should be subject to an 
obligation of means or an obligation of result with regards to the performance of its 
duties, where significant differences existed between Member States. These were 
considerably ambitious steps for policy-makers at this early stage of the integration of 
EU financial services.  
 
In the end, policy-makers considered that the 1994 UCITS Proposal did not contain 
enough harmonisation of substantive requirements of investor protection type to allow 
mutual recognition with regards to depositary business to operate properly. 
 
The failure of Member States to reach an agreement with the European Parliament on 
the 1994 UCITS Proposal put negotiations into a deadlock. As a consequence, during its 
meeting held in March 1995, the Council asked the Commission to carry out a more 
thorough examination of the technical dimension and the issues surrounding its proposal 
and to make a new proposal.
99
 During the initial stages of the EU’s development of the 
internal market for UCITS, the Council and the European Parliament were still rather 
hesitant to give way to far reaching initiatives for the further opening up of the EU’s 
funds industry. This is indicative of a policy which may have been inclined to protect 
national industries, the characteristics of which still varied significantly from one 
another, and that Member States were not yet prepared to widen mutual recognition in 
this field.   
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In the final analysis, it may be argued that Member States’ inclination to protect 
national industries created a barrier to the development of EU law for wider mutual 
recognition and deeper integration of the internal market for UCITS. As a result it is not 
surprising that the evolution of an internal market for the retail funds industry through 
the UCITS Directive has been and is still characterised by the taking of several prudent 
small steps at a time.  In fact, by reference to the causes of the failure of the UCITS II 
Proposal, in the end Member States managed to find a compromise with regard to the 
introduction of master-feeder UCITS, which was eventually crystallised in the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive, more than sixteen years after the 1993 UCITS Proposal. On the 
other hand, the creation of an internal market for depositary business is still an area 
where, notwithstanding various proposals, the EU institutions still need to come to a 
final agreement.  
 
3.4 The UCITS III Directive – Overcoming the Limitations of the Regulatory 
Framework for Mutual Recognition 
 
As a consequence of the European Parliament’s objections and the differences in 
Council on the 1994 UCITS II proposal, the limitations of the regulatory framework for 
mutual recognition established by the 1985 UCITS Directive persisted. UCITS 
continued being an investment vehicle with restricted investment openings, as the 
investment restrictions set in the 1985 UCITS Directive, which afforded a very limited 
definition of permitted investments, had remained unchanged. Since the adoption of 
1985 UCITS Directive, financial markets had continued to evolve at a fast rate 
rendering the investment restrictions in the Directive inadequate for the further 
development of the internal market for the European funds industry. Moreover, the 1985 
UCITS Directive remained a product directive, which prohibited the management 
company and the depositary from providing cross-border services.  
 
The Commission’s policy establishing that collective investment schemes ought to be 
widely available as saving vehicles for retail investors and for the channelling of such 
savings to European financial markets remained a priority. The adoption of the single 
currency in 1999 added a sense of urgency to the need of updating financial services 
legislation to further widen the integration of European financial markets. This given 
that the full benefits of the single currency would not have been achievable unless a 
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fully integrated internal market for financial services was in place.
100
 The position of the 
Commission on the benefits that could be derived from a broader internal market for 
collective investment schemes was also supported by empirical research carried out 
during this period. Using firm-level data of 11 European countries covering a period 
from 1994 to 2003, it was demonstrated that a 5% reduction in barriers to cross-border 
activity would result in a 2% increase in productivity due to a more competitive 
environment.
101
  
 
In the field of collective investment schemes in particular, empirical research suggested 
that a properly integrated internal market in this field would generate three key benefits: 
[i] an increase in the choice of financial products available to retail investor; [ii] the 
realisation of economies of scale within the funds industry; and [iii] the intensification 
of competition for the benefit of investors.
102
 The internal market objective therefore 
remained at the heart of the reform of EU financial regulation which was being 
proposed by the Commission during this period.  
 
The Commission published a fresh legislative initiative in July 1998 which had the 
purpose of seeking to surmount part of the limitations of the regulatory framework for 
mutual recognition. The Commission’s initiative eventually led to the adoption by the 
Council and the European Parliament in 2001, of two directives that addressed part of 
the limitations of mutual recognition in the field of UCITS. It is noteworthy that while 
the governance mechanism for mutual recognition continued to be based on minimum 
harmonisation, home country control and complementary host country supervision, the 
mechanism for making the proposal was adapted to take into account the lesson learnt 
from the failed UCITS II proposal.  
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3.4.1 An Evolving Governance Mechanism to Achieve Mutual Recognition  
 
The Commission’s 1998 initiative to amend the 1985 UCITS Directive was divided into 
two, a proposal to include other types of collective investment schemes within the 
meaning of UCITS by widening the array of assets in which a UCITS may invest
103
 
(‘the 1998 UCITS Product Proposal’) and a proposal to regulate management 
companies and provide them with access to the internal market and to establish a 
uniform simplified prospectus
104
 (‘the 1998 UCITS Management Company and 
Prospectus Proposal’).  
 
Acting on the experience with the failed UCITS II proposal, the Commission’s adjusted 
the legislative procedure for making a proposal by issuing two legislative initiatives 
instead of a single and all encompassing proposal. The change in the governance 
mechanism was implemented in order to avoid that a disagreement on one of the 
elements being proposed would result in delays to the other aspects of the Directive 
with respect to which a compromise could be reached. In fact, the new rules proposed in 
the 1998 UCITS Management Company and Prospectus Proposal were deemed as more 
complex and controversial than those of the 1998 UCITS Product Proposal.
105
 The 
Commission explained the choice of method as follows: 
 
The separation of topics involving different problems could facilitate the 
negotiating process in the Council. It will not matter if one of the two Directives 
is adopted more rapidly than the other one.
106
  
!!
This change in the mechanism adopted by the Commission for proposing different sets 
of amendments to a Directive in the field of financial services, raised concerns at the 
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level of the European Parliament
107
 and the ECB
108
 both of which argued in favour of 
having the two proposals being considered together and implemented simultaneously. 
The European Parliament’s position was based on the premise that the two proposals 
were complementary as the 1998 Product Proposal aimed at widening the investment 
opportunities for UCITS whilst the 1998 Management Company and Prospectus 
Proposal contained a number of new provisions which strengthened investor protection 
by inter alia enhancing the requirements on transparency with investors.  
 
The ECB raised similar concerns. For the ECB the Commission’s approach could 
possibily have an impact on the clarity, transparency and legal certainty of the outcome 
of these proposals as these were complementary and could not be separated. It, 
however, also raised more fundamental regulatory issues on the governance mechanism 
for mutual recognition in the field of UCITS. In its report the ECB stated the following:   
 
… the UCITS Directive appears to have been interpreted differently by Member 
States. Such different interpretations are undesirable in the context of a single 
money and financial market and may lead to competitive distortions and 
misallocation of funds.
109
  
 
The ECB was concerned that the limitations of the governance mechanism for mutual 
recognition based on minimum harmonisation of regulation, which resulted in different 
interpretations of the Directive by Member States and a distorted application of its 
requirements, were potentially preventing a genuine level playing field among financial 
services operators in this field and were therefore hindering effective investor 
protection. As a consequence, a fragmented approach to the implementation of the 
different proposed changes to the Directive would have possibly exacerbated what 
already was a widely uneven application of the Directive in general.  
 
The ECB’s remarks also suggest a concern about the possible threats to the stability and 
integrity of the internal market of a non-harmonised approach to the application of the 
regulation applicable in the field of financial services.  Given the introduction of the 
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euro there existed a higher possibility of contagion from fragmented regulation and 
supervision.
110
 The euro coupled with more integrated financial markets would have 
raised the risk of cross-border contagion since events in one Member State would now 
have had a substantial impact on financial markets elsewhere.  
 
The interconnectedness of financial markets made financial stability a matter of higher 
concern which in turn justified a move towards more comprehensive harmonisation 
with the need of a lower degree of mutual recognition, as it might be difficult to achieve 
simultaneously an integrated financial market and stability in the financial system, while 
preserving a high degree of nationally based regulation and with only decentralised 
efforts at harmonisation.
111
!Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that for the ECB the push 
for reform of financial regulation was an opportunity to update the existing framework, 
which was inadequate to address financial stability concerns that could arise from cross-
border contagion.  
 
The ECB’s remarks also highlighted the regulatory and supervisory concerns regarding 
the potential negative impact on the financial system that could arise as a result of the 
failure of a collective investment scheme. This concern arose after the collapse of 
LTCM, a trillion dollar fund in the US.
112
 At the time when the UCITS III proposals 
were being considered, US financial institutions were forced to bail out LTCM, as it 
was largely feared that given its extensive counterparty exposures, its failure could 
cause a chain reaction in various financial markets, thus creating catastrophic losses 
throughout the international financial system.
113
  
 
While the traditional rationale for the financial regulation of collective investment 
schemes was that of addressing investor protection concerns, the LTCM incident proved 
beyond doubt the direct correlation between the activity of collective investment 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110
 R Lastra, ‘The Governance Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe’ (2003) 10 
Columbia Journal of European Law 49-68. See also D Schoenmaker and S Oosterloo, ‘Cross-border 
issues in European Financial Supervision’ in D Mayes and G Wood ‘The Structure of Financial 
Supervision’ (Routledge 2007) 264–304. 
111
 N Thygesen, ‘Comments on The Political Economy of Financial Harmonisation in Europe’, in J 
Kremers, D Schoenmaker and P Wierts, ‘Financial Supervision in Europe’, (Elgar,2003). 
112
 ECB, ‘Large EU Bank’s Exposures to Hedge Funds’ November 2005<http://goo.gl/imNWSJ> 
accessed 31.12.12.  
113
 R Lowenstein, ‘When Genius Failed: The Rise of Long-Term Capital Management’ (Harper Collins 
2001). 
!!
90 
schemes, monetary policy and the economy at large.
114
 It established that the activity of 
a collective investment scheme could result in the spreading of financial contagion from 
one market to another and potentially pose significant risks to other regulated 
institutions, financial markets and the financial system as a whole.
115
 It is therefore not 
surprising that in the wake of this background, policy-makers’ attention, including that 
of the ECB, started to focus on the systemic nature of collective investment schemes.
116
 
Uniform systemic risk type regulation, which seeks to ensure the stability of collective 
investment schemes had become part of the formula for a regulatory framework for 
mutual recognition.  
 
The concerns about the limitations of the governance mechanism for mutual 
recognition, however, remained. Indeed, at this stage it became clear to policy-makers 
that minimum harmonisation, which allowed various derogations and national 
discretions, the lack of uniform implementation and application of the Directive, and the 
inexistence of any degree of supervisory convergence could weaken the control of the 
home financial supervisor and lead to obstructive host financial supervisor activism.
117
  
These were the catalyst for the eventual adoption of a new governance mechanism for 
mutual recognition that is known as the Lamfalussy Process and which inter alia 
required a higher degree of harmonisation of regulation and the establishment of three 
European regulatory committees, such as CESR, which had the high-level objective of 
seeking to achieve coordinated practical implementation of European legislation and 
supervisory convergence.  
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3.4.2 The 2001 UCITS Product Directive  
 
The 1998 UCITS Proposals were issued at a time when the introduction of the euro had 
created the impetus for further development of the internal market project for financial 
services.
118
 In recognition of the changing financial landscape and the importance of 
well functioning financial markets, the Cardiff Council, in June 1998, invited the 
Commission to present an action plan to improve the internal market for financial 
services in general. The EU’s policy-makers planned to move a step ahead in the 
construction of the internal market by building a legislative framework, which would 
allow the development of an integrated European financial market focused on the 
eurozone.
119
  
 
The Commission presented the action plan for financial services in 1999, which was 
welcomed by the Lisbon Council in 2000, as part of the overall Lisbon Agenda of 
making Europe the world’s most competitive economy. The FSAP was a blueprint for 
the creation of an internal market in financial services through the implementation of 
forty two legislative proposals intended to further the integration of EU financial 
markets. During this period, it was generally accepted that the internal market for the 
provision of retail financial services was incomplete.
120
 One of the strategic objectives 
of the FSAP was that of creating an internal market that works for retail investors and 
which would allow them to save effectively for their retirement.
121
 On this point it is 
interesting to note the clear position of EU policy-makers:  
 
Demographic trends require a secure and productive complement to statutory 
pension schemes.
122
 … This industry plays a vital macroeconomic role in 
Europe’s economy. It contributes to fostering financial independence during 
working life-time and to sustaining a high quality of life also during retirement 
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for the European citizens. 
123
… Integrated European markets with more flexible 
investment rules, therefore, should improve the risk-return frontier. Higher 
returns could also lower the cost of … schemes, resulting in … an improvement 
in competitiveness. … steps to relax regulatory constraints on the investment 
strategies of … schemes should sustain a greater presence by European funds in 
equity and investment funds business.
124
  
 
The above statements suggest a continuation of the EU’s policy to create a regulatory 
environment, which would sustain the investment fund’s industry fundamental role in 
supporting savings for retirement. It also suggests that the creation of a regulatory 
framework, which would allow the formation of a broader and more efficient internal 
market for investment funds, formed an integral part of the high-level objectives of the 
EU’s reform of the regulation of financial services. It is reasonable to argue that the 
achievement of these retail investor policy objectives would have required a political 
agreement on the changes to the UCITS Directive, which would have broadened the 
regulatory framework for mutual recognition in this field.  
 
With the aim of achieving a broader internal market for collective investment schemes, 
the 1998 UCITS III Product Proposal recommended the removal of the barriers to cross-
border marketing of a wider array of collective investment schemes. It proposed the 
extension of the list of collective investment schemes that qualify as UCITS, to funds of 
funds; money market funds; cash funds; and funds that invest in standardised options 
and future contracts.
125
 It follows that an agreement on the extension of the scope of the 
UCITS Directive to additional types of collective investment schemes mentioned above 
would have addressed one of the identified limitations of the regulatory framework for 
mutual recognition in terms of the 1985 UCITS Directive, as now UCITS would have 
been subject to a more flexible regime regarding eligible assets.  
 
Nevertheless, maintaining investor protection standards while allowing additional types 
of collective investment schemes within scope of the 1985 UCITS Directive would have 
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required the adoption of additional substantive requirements, to mitigate the possible 
risks to retail investor protection, which could materialise from these additional specific 
types of schemes. For this purpose, the 1998 UCITS III Product Proposal proposed the 
adoption of enhanced transparency standards. It also proposed minimum control 
standards for the use of derivatives, the application of which was being extended from 
merely being allowed for the purpose of efficient portfolio management and hedging to 
being allowed also as an investment, which can form part of the investment policy of 
UCITS.
126
  
 
The 1998 UCITS III Product Proposal was therefore a new attempt by the Commission 
to resolve issues, which had been dealt with, in part, in the 1994 UCITS II proposal. 
Indeed, it may be argued that the recommended extension of the meaning of UCITS was 
the Commission’s solution to address the failure of 1985 UCITS Directive to create a 
broad internal market for collective investment schemes.
127
 As explained by the 
Commission, the extension of permissible assets would:  
 
… favour the development of cross-border activity and prompt beneficial effects 
since it will offer more opportunities to the European collective investment 
undertakings industry and a wider choice of investments to investors. The 
broadening of the scope of the UCITS Directive therefore represents a necessary 
step to create a fully integrated Single Market in the area of collective 
investment undertakings.
128
 
 
The discussions within the Council and the European Parliament on the 1998 Product 
Proposal and the opinion issued by the ECB and the European Economic and Social 
Committee, led to various recommendations being made for the clarification of certain 
aspects of the proposal and the extension of the list of assets that may form part of the 
portfolio of a UCITS. In particular, a general view was expressed that the participation 
of UCITS in derivative transactions for investment purposes should not be limited to 
standardised derivatives, which are traded on a regulated market, but should be 
extended to OTC derivatives. The European Parliament was of the view that given that 
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the market for OTC derivatives in Member States had grown very rapidly, it was 
important that regulation of eligible assets is flexible so that UCITS are not restrained 
from participating in these developments.
129
  
 
The Commission amended its 1998 Product Proposal
130
 mainly to extend the investment 
opportunities for UCITS to OTC derivatives. This change, which was largely welcomed 
by EU policy-makers, was eventually adopted by the Council and the European 
Parliament in the 2001 UCITS Product Directive.
 131
 It may be argued that this was one 
of the catalysts for the development of UCITS from a simple and linear unsophisticated 
retail product to an instrument used by the industry to package complex type funds, 
such as hedge funds, into UCITS which can be marketed across the EU to retail 
investors.
 132
 This, together with the adoption of all the other recommended significant 
changes incorporated in the 2001 UCITS Product Directive had finally, after sixteen 
long years of negotiations, amended the 1985 UCITS Directive in a way which made it 
possible for a UCITS to invest in instruments other than transferable securities and, by 
so doing, addressed one of the three regulatory limitations to mutual recognition in this 
field.  
  
The changes adopted through the 2001 UCITS Product Directive, especially the 
introduction of the requirements that UCITS could participate in derivative financial 
instruments for investment purposes, had completely changed the dynamics of UCITS. 
This raised several financial stability and investor protection concerns, as without 
proper regulation and supervision, the widening of the scope of what could constitute a 
UCITS would have significantly increased the risk profile of this retail investor product. 
This particularly in the light of the events surrounding the failure of LTCM. Indeed, the 
active participation of LTCM in the unregulated OTC Derivative market, which allowed 
this fund to build up an extensive leveraged position, had played a dominant role in its 
dramatic failure.
133
 The LTCM failure was attributed to a non-existent regulatory 
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framework applicable to such funds, ineffective risk management processes and 
inadequate disclosure on its business activity to its counterparties and to the market.
134
 It 
is reasonable to suggest that these identified failures had an influence on the direction of 
the legislative process. Indeed, it is noteworthy that each of these identified failures 
were in fact addressed in the 2001 UCITS Product Directive. Albeit, the financial crisis 
suggests that these measures were not enough to mitigate completely the possibility of 
systemic risk. 
 
Against the backdrop of the LTCM debacle, it was clear that without a certain degree of 
uniformity of substantive requirements applicable to investments in derivatives, mutual 
recognition in this field would not have operated effectively. Indeed, while on the one 
hand the European Parliament insisted that UCITS should be allowed to participate in 
an OTC derivative contract for investment purposes, on the other it also emphasised the 
importance that such investment:  
 
… should only be allowed on condition that both quantitative (risk exposure to a 
certain counter-party and total risk exposure) and qualitative criteria are 
introduced to guarantee the protection of investors …
135
 
 
This point was also supported by the Council, which together with the European 
Parliament and the Commission devised substantive requirements applicable to UCITS, 
which invest in derivatives.
136
 The amended 1985 UCITS Directive required the 
application of a risk-management process, which was to be implemented by a UCITS or 
its management company to monitor and measure, at any time, the risk of positions, 
particularly derivatives and their contribution to the overall risk profile of the UCITS’ 
portfolio. The methodology for measuring the relevant risk in this regard was laid down 
in a Commission Recommendation, issued in 2004, which inter alia had the purpose of 
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recommending a uniform understanding of risk methodologies for UCITS.
137
 This is the 
first example of a soft-law mechanism being applied for the purpose of achieving 
regulatory convergence in the application of the Directive. 
 
It may be argued that the implementation of a proper risk management process to allow 
a UCITS or its management company to properly identify, quantify and take remedial 
action to manage and mitigate risks, is a key factor for financial stability purposes and 
the protection of investors from the risks to which the UCITS may be exposed. It 
follows that the uniform regulation of risk management had become one of the fields, 
which would be critical for mutual recognition to operate effectively. Indeed, unless 
proper regulatory convergence of risk management requirements was achieved in this 
field, the European financial system and the retail investor could have become exposed 
to failures of faulty risk management processes and procedures that could emerge from 
inadequate implementation of regulation and the resulting development of regulatory 
arbitrage.  The success of the rules on risk management to achieve proper investor 
protection and therefore contribute to the further integration of the internal market, inter 
alia depended on their uniform implementation and application by Member State 
financial supervisors.  
 
In practice, unfortunately, the requirements on risk management were interpreted and 
applied inconsistently by Member States and their financial supervisors. This led to 
situations of possible lax supervision and as a consequence regulatory arbitrage and 
distrust between national financial supervisors.
138
 This indeed was another situation that 
brought to bear the limitation of the governance mechanism for mutual recognition 
which existed at the time and which was based on minimum harmonisation of 
regulation. To address this situation and foster mutual confidence between national 
financial supervisors and promote a more robust governance structure for the 
monitoring of compliance of risk management requirements, CESR eventually issued a 
set of standards on risk management applicable to UCITS which indicated the manner 
in which the requirements of the Directive and the Commission Recommendation had to 
be applied in practice. This sought to ensure that, to a certain degree, all UCITS became 
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subject to harmonised risk management processes, which provide a uniform level of 
investor protection.  
 
With a view to ensure a higher degree of investor protection, the amended 1985 UCITS 
Directive set monitoring standards and reasonable limits to the investment by UCITS in 
derivative instruments. The amended Directive required the UCITS to ensure that its 
global exposure relating to derivatives does not exceed hundred percent of net assets
139
 
and set specific limits to the individual exposures to which a UCITS may be exposed 
when investing in a derivative.
140
 As an additional safeguard, the amended 1985 UCITS 
Directive also required that the counterparty to an OTC derivative transaction had to be 
an institution which was subject to prudential regulation. Such counterparty also had to 
belong to a category of institutions which were recognised by the financial supervisor of 
the UCITS’ home Member State. Furthermore, the OTC derivative had to be capable of 
being easily valued and liquidated at fair value on the initiative of the UCITS.
141
 Since 
OTC derivatives are generally illiquid and not easy to value, as these financial 
instruments are not traded on a regulated market, the latter requirement was paramount 
in order to ensure that a UCITS could continue to satisfy its primary obligation of being 
a liquid investment to the extent that it would be in a position to redeem the units 
belonging to an investor upon his/her request.   
 
The Directive also required UCITS or its management company to report on a regular 
basis to the home financial supervisor of the UCITS, details about the derivative 
instruments which form part of the UCITS portfolio.
142
 In practice, regulatory standards 
would prove worthless in the absence of proper supervision and enforcement. On this 
basis, the Directive did not merely require the application of a degree of prudence with 
regard to investment in derivatives but also demanded a certain element of monitoring 
by financial supervisors. The foregoing requirement gave such supervisors the 
opportunity to monitor compliance by the UCITS with the limits set with regard to 
investment in derivatives. Practical experience in financial supervision suggests that 
monitoring a management company of a collective investment scheme to ascertain that 
it complies with the investment objectives, policies and restrictions set in the scheme’s 
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prospectus and in the case of UCITS, that it also complies with the requirements of the 
UCITS Directive, is generally one of the basic functions of any respectable and well 
functioning financial supervisor.
143
  
 
Given the importance of ensuring that a collective investment scheme does not fail in 
this respect, the depositary of the scheme is also normally vested with the role of 
monitoring compliance with applicable investment restrictions. Practical experience in 
financial supervision also suggests that while a financial supervisor would normally 
monitor compliance with the scheme’s investment restrictions at regular intervals 
through off-site compliance supervision by reviewing the financial statements of the 
scheme and during on-site inspections at the offices of the management company and 
that of the scheme, a depositary would normally monitor compliance with the said 
investment restrictions on an on-going basis and report to the financial supervisor in 
case of identified failures.
144
  
 
With regard to the investment in derivatives by UCITS, in order to further enhance 
investor protection, EU policy-makers also applied the principle of caveat emptor by 
requiring UCITS to include additional disclosure in their prospectus about the types of 
strategies applied by the particular UCITS and the consequential risks that might arise 
as a result of their application.
145
 As emphasised in different parts of the thesis, 
transparency is a fundamental investor protection and empowerment tool applied in the 
field of securities regulation.  
 
While the changes brought about by the 2001 UCITS Product Directive, were necessary 
in order to extend the scope of investments for UCITS funds and to allow this product 
to develop, they generated uncertainty regarding the intended scope of these wider 
investment powers.
146
 This became evident during implementation stage as Member 
States applied different interpretations to the new provisions laid down in the 2001 
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UCITS Product Directive.
147
 While some Member States allowed large flexibility on the 
choice of financial instruments, which were eligible for investment by UCITS, others 
took a more risk-averse approach with a strict adherence to the investor protection 
standards of the Directive.
148
 This meant that a particular asset could be considered 
eligible as an investment for a UCITS in one Member State but not in another. This 
position was acknowledged in the Commission’s 2005 Green Paper on UCITS, which 
suggested that the amended 1985 UCITS Directive left room for different views on 
whether certain categories of financial instruments could be acquired by a UCITS.
149
 In 
time it became clear that minimum harmonisation was not an effective governance 
mechanism for mutual recognition as it left too much room for interpretation, which in 
turn caused regulatory arbitrage and mutual distrust between Member States. A new 
formula for mutual recognition had to be applied. Effective mutual recognition required 
a higher degree of harmonisation of regulation, which had to be combined with 
regulatory and supervisory convergence.
150
  
 
The fragmented approach to the implementation and application of the 1985 UCITS 
Directive as amended by the 2001 UCITS III Directives, triggered further initiatives at 
EU Level in this area. The Lamfalussy Process, which had been developed by EU 
policy-makers in 2001 as the new governance mechanism for mutual recognition in the 
field of financial services, was extended to the field of investment management and as a 
consequence to the legal framework governing UCITS. As part of this process, Europe’s 
governance structure for the regulation of the funds industry took a step further towards 
integration with CESR’s appointment as the Lamfalussy committee responsible for 
investment management having inter alia the responsibility of promoting harmonised 
practical implementation of the UCITS Directive and supervisory convergence. An 
additional legislative initiative was adopted by the Commission, which was sustained by 
CESR guidance in order to further clarify which assets were eligible for investment by 
UCITS. These measures sought to guarantee a certain degree of consistency in the 
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application of the requirements of the UCITS Directive and in this way partially 
addressed the limitation to the governance mechanism for mutual recognition based on 
minimum harmonisation.  In practice, however, as the 2012 UCITS VI consultation 
suggests, a fragmented approach to the application of the eligible assets framework 
applicable to UCITS remains.    
 
The above-mentioned developments deserve to be analysed in their own right. From a 
historical perspective, it is however more consistent and logical to examine the 2001 
UCITS Management and Prospectus Directive first. This Directive, which was adopted 
by the Council and the European Parliament at the same time as the 2001 UCITS 
Product Directive, enhanced the 1985 UCITS Directive’s substantive provisions for the 
regulation of the management company and introduced the concept and application of a 
simplified prospectus which had the purpose of enhancing transparency for retail 
investors and consequently strengthening the protection of this category of participants 
in financial markets. The ultimate purpose being that of creating a more integrated and 
wide reaching internal market for Europe’s funds industry.  
 
3.4.3 The 2001 UCITS Management and Prospectus Directive 
 
The 1985 UCITS Directive focused on the regulation of the financial product of the 
UCITS and did not contain any detailed substantive provisions for the regulation of the 
management company and the depositary. In this case, the approach to the creation of 
an internal market for financial services was different from that which had been adopted 
in respect of other sectors of European financial regulation, where essentially EU law 
focused on the regulation of the entity responsible for providing the service rather than 
the financial product. Moreover, the 1985 UCITS Directive prevented management 
companies from providing services other than collective portfolio management, being 
the management of collective investment schemes. It also failed to detail which services 
could be provided as part of the activity of collective portfolio management. 
Furthermore, the 1985 UCITS Directive did not provide service providers with a 
passport, which would have given access to the internal market. This was a limitation of 
the regulatory mechanism for mutual recognition in the field of UCITS.  
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The 1998 UCITS Management and Prospectus Proposal
151
 attempted to address these 
issues from a management company perspective. With regard to the possibility of a 
depositary passport, EU policy-makers had already expressed their clear dissent for 
mutual recognition in this field. This would appear to have been the reason for the 
Commission’s decision to leave depositaries out of this initiative.  One may argue that 
the main objective of these changes was that of creating a more harmonised regulatory 
framework for the more consistent supervision of management companies with a view 
to establishing an internal market in this field. The Proposal also recommended the 
creation of a framework, which would facilitate the understanding of the financial 
product by retail investors through the application of a simplified prospectus that would 
provide investors with clear, simple and essential information.  
 
The 1985 UCITS Directive prevented management companies from providing services 
other than collective portfolio management, being the management of a portfolio on 
behalf of various investors which had pooled their assets in a collective investment 
scheme. The rationale behind the application of the principle of exclusivity had been the 
achievement of a high degree of investor protection by ensuring proper specialisation 
and the avoidance of possible conflicts of interest. However, in time it became clear that 
this policy was putting UCITS management companies at a disadvantage with other 
services providers. The exclusivity principle had been criticised on several occasions by 
the Member States and the industry as preventing important economies of scale and 
creating an irrational segmentation between collective and individual portfolio 
management
152
, i.e. the management of a portfolio on a client-by-client basis.  
 
Furthermore, the 1985 UCITS Directive did not clearly define the sort of activities, 
which a management company could have performed as part of the service of collective 
portfolio management. This led to different approaches being adopted by Member 
States. Such differences had to be catered for if mutual recognition and the management 
company passport were to operate properly. The 1998 UCITS Management and 
Prospectus Proposal attempted to address these issues, by proposing the revision of the 
restriction that prevented management companies from engaging in services other than 
collective portfolio management. Indeed, the proposal suggested that management 
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companies should be allowed to provide individual portfolio management and certain 
ancillary services which were at the time already provided for under the Investment 
Services Directive and which therefore fell within the list of services that could have 
been provided by investment firms and credit institutions.
153
  
 
In order to ensure consistency of regulation with investment firms and proper investor 
protection, the Commission suggested that the extension of the services that could be 
provided by management companies should be subject to the same conduct of business 
rules under the Investment Services Directive and capital requirements under the 
Capital Adequacy Directive
154
 that are applicable to investment firms which were 
authorised to provide individual portfolio management.
155
 This suggests that the 
Commission’s aim was that of trying to avoid any possible regulatory inconsistencies 
between what applied to investment firms and what was to be made applicable to 
management companies with regard to the provision of investment and ancillary 
services. The Commission also made a proposal to resolve the lack of a linear approach 
by Member States with regard to the activities that could be performed by a 
management company in terms of its collective portfolio management authorisation. In 
this regard, the 1998 UCITS Management and Prospectus Proposal suggested that the 
Directive should contain a list of activities that could be provided by a management 
company and that subject to approval by its home financial supervisor the management 
company should be allowed to delegate part of its activities for the more rational 
organisation of its business
156
, meaning that the delegation would optimize the 
management company’s business function and processes.  
 
Delegation by a management company was one of the subjects which caused much 
debate at European level.
157
 Given the different legal traditions which at the time 
applied in Member States in this area, the 1998 UCITS Management and Prospectus 
Proposal recommended the application of minimum harmonisation requirements which 
the home financial supervisor would be required to verify before approving a mandate 
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given by a management company to a third party.
158
 The possible impact of these 
proposed minimum requirements on delegation given the differences in the regulatory 
framework of Member States was one of the points with respect to which the European 
Economic and Social Committee had its most serious concern, which it expressed:  
 
Practice in Europe varies considerably. In some countries the investment 
management company is bound by law to undertake the activity of asset 
management and/or fund accounting, while in others these functions may be 
delegated to third parties, including delegation to the parent company of the fund 
management company. … These different structures work well and provide 
effective investor protection. … The Committee is, therefore, of the opinion that 
there is no reason for a Directive to interfere with these arrangements.
159
   
 
The European Parliament came to a similar conclusion. It was also pointed out that 
requiring the management company to obtain the financial supervisor’s approval before 
proceeding with the delegation was too bureaucratic. This led the Commission to amend 
its proposal to replace the requirement for prior approval of all mandates for delegation 
with a rule which stipulates that the management company should provide proper 
information to the financial supervisor regarding the delegation in order to allow the 
regulator to fulfil its supervisory duties.
160
 This position was maintained in the final text 
of the 2001 UCITS Management and Prospectus Directive.  
 
The 1998 UCITS Management and Prospectus Proposal suggested the application of an 
authorisation procedure for management companies similar to that applied to other 
financial services providers in terms of other EU Directives such as the Investment 
Services Directive and the Second Banking Directive. It is a fundamental principle of 
financial regulation, that a regulatory framework should be built upon a requirement for 
authorisation and that the authorised entity is allowed to retain such authorisation, as 
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long as it remains fit and proper in terms of law and conducts its business in compliance 
with all the applicable requirements set in the particular regulatory regime.  
 
In the US a management company requires a registration from the SEC as an investment 
adviser
$+$
 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
$+%
 (‘IAA 1940’). The IAA 1940 is 
the last in a series of federal statutes intended to address the malpractices in the 
securities industry that contributed to the crisis of 1929 and the depression of the 1930’s 
and was designed to prevent fraud and deceit by persons engaged to provide advise to 
investors on investments in securities.
 $+&
 The Act also came about as a consequence of 
the 1938-1940 SEC report on malpractices in the investment fund industry that stressed 
the prejudice by advisers in favour of their own financial interests.
$+"
 To address these 
weaknesses, in terms of the IAA 1940 investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty toward 
their clients and are subject to detailed conduct of business rules, including the 
requirement to disclose the nature of their interests in transactions carried out for their 
clients.
$+*
 As a fiduciary the adviser is required to avoid conflicts of interest with the 
collective investment scheme and is prohibited from overreaching or taking advantage 
of clients’ trust.
166
 Registration with the SEC in terms of the IAA 1940 allows the 
investment advisor to provide services across the US.  
 
Within the European context, an authorisation issued by a financial supervisor in terms 
of a European Directive would also serve as a basis for the application of an internal 
market passport. The 1998 UCITS Management and Prospectus Proposal envisaged that 
an authorisation issued in terms of the UCITS Directive would have allowed 
management companies to provide their services across the EU under the freedom to 
provide services provisions or to establish a branch in other Member States. In the field 
of securities business such an internal market passport was already in operation for 
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investment firms under Investment Services Directive, since July 1995. This along with 
the experience gained through the operation of other internal market Directives in field 
of financial services were used as a basis for the Commission’s proposed framework for 
the creation and operation of an internal market passport for management companies.
167
  
 
One of the challenges for the Commission with regard to the setting up of an internal 
market passport for management companies was that of limiting the possible resulting 
phenomenon of ‘jurisdiction shopping’ whereby an entity intending to be authorised as 
a management company to provide services in a particular Member State, but for some 
reason wanting to avoid the regulatory regime of that particular Member State, would 
apply for authorisation in another Member State and passport its activity in the former. 
In order to address this concern, the 1998 UCITS Management and Prospectus Proposal 
recommended that the European passport could only be granted by the Member State in 
which the management company carries out effectively the main part of its activity.
168
 
To ensure proper mutual recognition and enhance investor protection, the 1998 UCITS 
Management and Prospectus Proposal also contemplated the application of minimum 
requirements regarding the infrastructure of management companies, including specific 
conduct of business rules as well as capital requirements. Such requirements would help 
in closing the gap which existed between the UCITS Directive and the Investment 
Services Directive.
169
  
 
The proposed internal market passport would have applied to all the activities of 
management companies other than the management of a UCITS, which are established 
as a common fund. With regards to common funds the proposal still created a limitation 
to the passport by requiring the management company to be established in the same 
Member State where the contract or the unit trust was made and for the approval of the 
fund rules to remain within the competence of the supervisory authorities of the 
management company’s home Member State financial supervisor. This position was 
criticised by the European Economic and Social Committee as creating a possible unfair 
distinction between those Member States where it was common practice to establish 
UCITS as common funds and those Member States where the investment company 
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structure for UCITS was more widespread. Therefore, on this matter the European 
Economic and Social Committee concluded that the 1998 UCITS Management and 
Prospectus Proposal could distort the possible positive impact, which the changes could 
have on the internal market for financial services.
170
 The same point was also made in 
the European Parliament Report on the proposal.
171
 
 
As part of its commentary on passporting the European Economic and Social 
Committee also raised the issue of the depositary passport. This had formed part of the 
Commission’s 1993 UCITS II proposal and was one of the points in respect of which 
there was no consensus in the Council and the European Parliament and which had 
brought to a close the negotiations on that proposal. For this reason the depositary 
passport had not formed part of the Commission’s UCITS III proposal. The European 
Economic and Social Committee, however, still made the point that the depositary 
passport was fundamental for the completion of the internal market for the funds 
industry and therefore invited the Commission to examine ways in which passporting 
rights could be extended to depositaries while ensuring adequate supervisory regulation 
for investor protection.
172
  
 
There may have been policy reasons for requiring the depositary to be established in the 
same Member State of the UCITS in the initial stages of the development of the UCITS 
Directive, relating to the proper supervision of the UCITS product. However, as 
financial markets developed, the lack of an internal market passport for depositaries was 
increasingly becoming an anomaly. Indeed, the lack of competition in depositary 
business and the fragmentation in this area, were possibly responsible for inefficiencies 
and high costs, which in the end were being born by the investor. The European 
Economic and Social Committee’s position seems to have reached the Council as on the 
adoption of the common position on the future 2001 UCITS Product Directive and the 
2001 UCITS Management and Prospectus Directive, the Council also requested the 
Commission to submit a report on the regulation of depositaries.
173
 The Commission’s 
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work in this area is still on going and its latest initiative in this regard will be examined 
in the chapter 5.  
 
Not all stakeholders were in favour of the management company passport for the 
purpose of providing collective portfolio management. Indeed, certain members of the 
funds industry had pointed out that allowing management companies to be located in a 
Member State which was different from that of the UCITS would have added legal, 
fiscal and regulatory uncertainty and risk, which in turn would have outweighed the 
benefits that could be derived from the application of a management company passport. 
This issue was also raised within CESR at the time when this supervisory committee 
was working on the formation of transitional arrangements from the original 1985 
UCITS Directive to the UCITS III Directive. Securities regulators took the position that 
the legislator’s did not intend to allow management companies to provide collective 
portfolio management on a cross border basis and therefore CESR members would only 
have allowed a UCITS to designate a management company in the same EU 
jurisdiction.
174
  
 
This suggests that notwithstanding the objective of the 2001 UCITS Management and 
Prospectus Directive to open the internal market to management companies completely, 
financial supervisors were not yet ready to accept mutual recognition with regards to the 
provision of collective portfolio management. Therefore, whilst a limitation of the 
regulatory mechanism for mutual recognition had been corrected, a parallel limitation of 
the supervisory mechanism for mutual recognition had been created. This state of affairs 
is indicative of how national interest and protectionism may disrupt and put limitations 
to the European integration process.
175
  Indeed, the maxim that ‘no-one regulates as well 
as we do’ had thus prevailed.  
 
This position, which partially frustrated the prospect of cross-border administrative 
rationalisation and the consequent efficiency gains, was eventually reversed with the 
adoption of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. The said Directive sustains mutual 
recognition with regard to the supervision of collective portfolio management through 
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the application of quasi-maximum harmonisation organisational and conduct of 
business rules. This fresh initiative to achieve a management company passport will be 
examined in detail in a subsequent chapter of the thesis.  
 
The 1998 UCITS Management and Prospectus Proposal also attempted to harmonise the 
requirements on the publication of a simplified prospectus. The transparency 
requirements in the 1985 UCITS Directive were based on the principle that investors 
should be provided with a substantial amount of detailed information, in order to allow 
them to make an informed investment decision. The primary aim of a prospectus is to 
provide investors with information about a particular financial instrument with the 
purpose of giving them the opportunity to assess whether or not the overall 
characteristics of the financial instrument fits the investor's investment objectives and 
risk profile. However, it was observed that the technical information included in the 
prospectus rendered such a document not easily understandable by the average retail 
investor. The prospectus was therefore not serving its purpose as it was being avoided 
by investors. On this basis, it was considered that the framework for investor 
information, provided in the 1985 UCITS Directive, was unsatisfactory from an investor 
protection perspective and had to be amended to allow the provision of clear, simple 
and essential information to retail investors. In the Commission’s 1998 UCITS 
Management and Prospectus Proposal this information was to be provided through a 
simplified prospectus, a document conceived as an information document suitable for 
the average retail investor.
176
  
 
During the same period similar investor protection concerns arising from complex 
disclosure in the prospectus of collective investment schemes were also being discussed 
in the US.
177
 Empirical research on the readability of prospectuses in the US 
demonstrated that investors had to have a four-year college education or higher to read 
and understand a prospectus.
178
 Unsurprisingly, the simplification of disclosure in 
prospectuses was a top priority on the SEC’s agenda.
179
 To address these concerns the 
SEC amended the rules on disclosure in a prospectus to require that the language used is 
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in plain English and therefore readable by investors. Collective investment schemes are 
also required to make available to investors a summary disclosure document which 
includes a concise narrative discussion of the scheme’s risks and a bar chart showing the 
scheme’s returns.
180
 The ultimate purpose being that of making sure that less well-
educated investors would be able to read and understand at least the basic information 
required in terms of the ICA 1940 about their investment options. 
 
In Europe the funds industry had been actively promoting the application of a simplified 
prospectus as an investor protection tool.
181
 Certain Member States at national level 
were already requiring the preparation and distribution of a simplified prospectus.
182
 
Harmonising the requirements with regards to the application of a simplified prospectus 
would have reduced costs for the industry as it would have prevented Member States 
from obstructing the free marketing of units in their jurisdiction by imposing additional 
onerous non-harmonised documentation requirements. This point was highlighted by 
the European Economic and Social Committee
183
 and the European Parliament.
184
 
These institutions welcomed the proposed introduction of the simplified prospectus as 
an opportunity to simplify the marketing of funds on a cross-border basis. Such 
marketing had been hampered by non-standardised requirements on the provision of 
information to investors. It was therefore recommended that the requirements of the 
simplified prospectus should be exhaustive and that therefore Member States should not 
be allowed to require additional disclosure. To address this recommendation, in its 
updated 1998 UCITS Management and Prospectus Proposal the Commission clearly 
stated that Member States were not to be permitted to ask for further documentation.
185
  
 
While the concept of a simplified prospectus was innovative and should have enhanced 
investor protection, the implementation of this new provision of the UCITS Directive 
was fraught with difficulties, including differences of opinion regarding the manner in 
which such requirements had to be applied in practice when preparing the simplified 
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prospectus.
186
 The inconsistent manner in which the requirements on the simplified 
prospectus were implemented is yet another example of how a measure which was 
introduced to establish harmonisation and consistency with the final aim of achieving 
integration was changed into a means of protecting the national industry, by applying 
such requirement in a way which distorts cross-border business. This led the 
Commission to issue further clarification regarding the content and presentation of 
certain elements of information which had to be included in the simplified 
prospectus.
187
 The objective was to ensure a common reading of what the simplified 
prospectus ought to contain and ensure a harmonised approach in this regard. Still, 
Member States did not adopt a consistent approach to the implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations. In time, it became clear that the simplified prospectus 
had failed to deliver its objective of being an investor friendly document.
188
 Indeed, 
what was intended to be a short document, which provides clear information on the 
essentials that an investor should be aware of before investing in a UCITS, became in 
practice a long, legally worded document prepared in a non-standardised format and too 
complex to be understood by investors.  
 
This state of affairs led to another initiative in this area and the eventual replacement of 
the simplified prospectus with the key investor information document as crystalised in 
the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. The requirements of the key investor information 
document and the changes to the governance mechanism for mutual recognition which 
were implemented as part of the process which led to its adoption are analysed in 
chapter 5.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the development of the governance mechanism and the regulatory 
framework for mutual recognition during the first two decades of the UCITS Directive. 
It examined the three conditions for the functioning of mutual recognition during this 
period being: minimum harmonisation of regulation; home country control; and 
complementary host country supervision. It also identified and examined the limitations 
of the governance mechanism and the regulatory framework for mutual recognition.  
 
In conclusion, it is reasonable to state that the early stages of the internal market for 
UCITS were characterised by a slow law-making process for the regulation of financial 
services, detailed negotiations and compromises between Member States. These 
resulted in the adoption of ambiguous and suboptimal requirements, which granted 
discretions to Member States leading to uneven implementation and the inconsistent 
interpretation of the provisions of UCITS Directive.  
 
It is also reasonable to conclude that during this period Member States were more 
inclined to protect national industries rather than sharing their regulatory and 
supervisory sovereignty in the interest of a broader and more robust internal market. In 
this regard, Member States applied opportunistic interpretations of ambiguous 
requirements in order to gold-plate and by so doing protect national practices and 
institutions. National agendas distort the integration of European financial markets and 
create barriers to the development of the internal market.  
 
Moreover, the lengthy period of time, which had to elapse before a compromise could 
be reached with regard to the revamp of the 1985 UCITS Directive, is indicative of the 
limitations of the EU legislative process applicable at the time in this field, which in 
itself worked as yet another central barrier to the creation of a true internal market for 
financial services. Indeed, after sixteen long years of stagnation, the 2001 UCITS 
Directives were a crucial step for unblocking the road towards further integration of the 
European funds industry.  
 
The adoption of the 2001 UCITS Directives and the consequent widening of the array of 
financial instruments in which a UCITS could invest, the introduction of a passport for 
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management companies and the application of a harmonised simplified prospectus were 
in principle a positive step in the creation of an internal market for the European funds 
industry. However, as examined in this chapter, the unharmonised implementation of 
the provisions of the Directive by the Member States created new operational and 
regulatory barriers to the cross-border activity by UCITS, which greatly reduced the 
effectiveness of mutual recognition in this field. 
 
In the final analysis, while the 1985 UCITS Directive and subsequent amendments were 
a necessary first step in the process for the development of an internal market for 
UCITS, the limitations of the governance mechanism for mutual recognition, in the 
form of inconsistent application of the Directive and the application of Member State 
discretions, raised barriers to the internal market for UCITS. This state of affairs, 
together with a general acceptance of the failures of the legislative process in achieving 
updated regulation which could keep the pace with the fast developments in financial 
markets, led to the establishment of a new governance mechanism for mutual 
recognition in field of financial services. !
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Chapter 4 
 
FROM MINIMUM HARMONISATION TO THE LAMFALUSSY 
PROCESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANISM FOR A HIGHER 
DEGREE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE FIELD OF UCITS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 examines the Lamfalussy Process" and the manner in which this was applied 
in the context of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive#. The resulting governance mechanism 
for a higher degree of mutual recognition in the field of UCITS is also considered.  
 
The Lamfalussy Process was developed by a Committee of Wise Men, which was 
established by the EU Institutions at the start of this century, with the purpose of 
making recommendations for a more effective governance mechanism in the field of 
financial regulation and supervision. The Committee recommended a substantial change 
in the conditions for mutual recognition, from minimum harmonisation to a higher 
degree of harmonisation, quasi-maximum harmonisation, complemented by regulatory 
and supervisory convergence. Quasi-maximum harmonisation is a technique composed 
of a mixture of minimum and maximum harmonisation provisions. The development of 
the Lamfalussy Process formed part of a wider project for more efficient and transparent 
governance, constructed by the EU at the beginning of this century, which included the 
structure for an open method of co-ordination.3  
 
In 2009, the 1985 UCITS Directive was recast into a Lamfalussy Directive. The 
Directive established a regulatory framework for a more efficient passport for UCITS 
while stipulating the tools for the consolidation of funds of sub-optimal size.  
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The chapter analyses the nature and operation of the governance mechanisms applied 
under the Lamfalussy Process and examines the effectiveness of this process in the 
construction of the regulatory framework of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. The 
conditions and limitations of the Lamfalussy Process in the context of mutual 
recognition are also identified and analysed.  
 
The central argument of the chapter is that the Lamfalussy Process established the tools 
for the strengthening of mutual recognition between Member States and, by so doing, 
created the right environment for the creation of a broader internal market in the field of 
UCITS. It is argued that the success of the Lamfalussy hard-law making process in 
achieving quasi-maximum harmonisation as applied in the context of the 2009 UCITS 
IV Directive, was due to the fact that it was transparent and promoted a wide inclusive 
debate which allowed for both technical and political considerations to be made. The 
chapter emphasises the point that the different elements of the Lamfalussy Process, 
complement each other and that unless all of them are allowed to operate effectively, 
the legislative process will lose on its efficiency.  
 
The Lamfalussy Process has been in operation for more then a decade. Therefore, it may 
be relevant and useful to consider the distinguishing characteristics of such mechanisms 
as existed before the Treaty of Lisbon and those which were created and introduced 
later. Although the major academic debate on this topic has revolved around the 
institutional balance of power within the context of the hard-law making process%, it is 
not within the scope of the thesis to contribute to this debate. However, new elements 
that transpired following inter-institutional tensions over the structure of the control 
mechanisms for the law-making process are highlighted, since they are relevant to the 
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overall discussion on the effectiveness of the Lamfalussy Process as a governance 
mechanism for mutual recognition.  
 
The chapter also examines the soft-law mechanisms established by the Lamfalussy 
Process and points out that while soft-law mechanisms are an effective method in 
attaining flexibility, which is critical to keep up with developments in financial markets, 
the unenforceability of soft-law may create legal uncertainty that may put into danger 
part of the harmonisation process. This, in turn, damages the mutual recognition process 
between the Member States. Another limitation of the soft-law mechanism under the 
Lamfalussy Process is that it mainly focused on measures intended to achieve regulatory 
convergence, with little or no effort in the field of supervisory convergence.  
 
Centralisation of financial supervision is an alternative model to convergence.  In this 
connection, the chapter examines the role of ESMA and the limitations to its 
discretionary powers as a result of the Meroni doctrine. Given the dynamic nature of the 
financial system, financial supervision must be in a position to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Therefore, supervision is an activity that requires a high level of 
discretion. After the Court of Justice of the EU (‘CJEU’) ruling in UK v Council and 
European Parliament [C-270/12] the time may be ripe for a reconsideration of the 
discretionary powers granted to ESMA together with the overall European governance 
structure for regulation and supervision and more specifically, the division of tasks 
between ESMA and national financial supervisors. For this purpose the tools provided 
by the economics of federalism as encapsulated in the principle of subsidiarity are 
applied. The chapter proposes a governance model for European supervision of 
securities regulation whereby large cross-border operators would be supervised by 
ESMA, while other operators would continue being supervised at national level. The 
analysis and the resulting proposal are important for a better understanding of the 
mechanisms for European supervision in general and of UCITS in particular. As an 
integral part of the analysis a comparison with the US has been carried out and some 
important lessons have been drawn from the experience across the Atlantic.  
 
Chapter 4 is divided into five additional sections. Section 4.2 provides a brief 
introduction to the Lamfalussy Process. Section 4.3 examines the governance 
mechanisms for a quasi-maximum harmonisation of regulation. Section 4.4 analyses the 
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mechanisms for regulatory and supervisory convergence. Section 4.5 examines the 
mechanisms for enforcement. Concluding remarks are made at the end of the chapter.  
 
The analysis in chapter 4 aims at drawing specific conclusions on the operation of the 
Lamfalussy Process as it was applied to the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. The analysis is 
critical to the debate on the evolution of the conditions and limitations of the 
governance mechanism for mutual recognition.  
  
4.2 Lamfalussy Process: A Governance Mechanism For A Higher Degree of 
Mutual Recognition  
 
By the mid-1990’s, it became apparent that the governance mechanism for EU financial 
regulation devised by the 1985 Cockfield White Paper was inadequate to keep up with 
the developments in global financial markets.& Furthermore, the legislative programme, 
which emerged from the 1985 initiative, had not proved to be sufficiently effective in 
terms of internal market integration in financial services.' The limitations of the 
governance mechanism for EU financial regulation had to be addressed if the regulatory 
framework was to keep pace with potential developments, such as the introduction of 
the euro, which would in future contribute to the development of the internal market. ( 
These considerations triggered a debate on the future of financial regulation.  
 
The resulting deliberations concluded that the governance mechanism for EU financial 
regulation was too slow. The standard amount of time engaged for a co-decision 
procedure, from the Commission’s proposal to final agreement, took on average over 
four years.) The transposition of Directives into national law was taking overall five 
years to complete.* It was also realised that the legislative framework was too rigid with 
every change, however small or technical, requiring a full-blown Commission proposal 
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to be negotiated by co-decision."+ Furthermore, the resulting EU financial regulation 
allowed several national discretions, which created ambiguity and resulted in an uneven 
implementation by the Member States."" This undesired outcome was also due to the 
lack of a common interpretation of EU financial regulation and an absence of proper 
coordination between national financial supervisors.  
 
These limitations weakened the governance mechanism for mutual recognition between 
the Member States and as a result created additional barriers to the development of the 
internal market. The uneven implementation and the different interpretations and 
manners of application of EU financial regulation, continued to surface as the basis for 
Member States to lift the obligation for mutual recognition. At the time, it was not rare 
for a host financial supervisor not to accept a passported financial institution, as it 
regarded the home Member State’s regulatory framework as having incorrectly applied 
EU regulation."# The key question remained: Why should a Member State allow a 
financial institution from another jurisdiction to access its market, when it does not trust 
the extent of investor protection afforded in that jurisdiction?  
 
A Committee of Wise Men was set up by the Council in July 2000, to establish and 
examine the weaknesses in the governance mechanism for financial regulation. The 
Committee analysed the conditions for implementation of financial regulation by the 
Member States, the EU’s regulatory capacity to cope with developments in financial 
markets and the scenarios for adapting the governance mechanism for financial 
regulation with a view to creating a more uniform regulatory framework and ensuring  
greater convergence and cooperation in day-to-day implementation."$Their findings 
confirmed the criticism of the existing governance mechanism. The Committee 
concluded:   
 
… the European Union’s current regulatory framework is too slow, too rigid, 
complex and ill-adapted to the pace of global financial market change.  Moreover, 
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… existing rules and regulations are implemented differently and that therefore 
inconsistencies occur in the treatment of the same type of business, which 
threatens to violate the pre-requisite of the competitive neutrality of supervision. 
… The problem is the system itself. …"% 
 
The Committee’s view, points towards a concern that the governance mechanism for 
financial regulation had become a conduit for regulatory arbitrage and had given 
Member States the opportunity to pursue national agendas that favoured lax supervision 
to protect the national industry. The Committee made proposals to address these 
weaknesses through a restructuring of the mechanism, by replacing the policy favouring 
minimum harmonisation with a policy that promotes quasi-maximum harmonisaton 
combined with regulatory and supervisory convergence.  
 
Diagram 4.1 - Conditions for Mutual Recognition under the Lamfalussy Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The primary objective of the Lamfalussy Process was that of achieving more 
harmonised financial regulation at a rapid pace."& The process rested on a governance 
mechanism for financial regulation that works on the basis of the principles of 
transparency and consultation with stakeholders; inclusive technical and political 
debate; and inter-institutional cooperation. The quality of transparency, consultation, 
debate and cooperation between all relevant parties being the key elements for a more 
effective law-making process, which generates better and faster financial regulation that 
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instills a higher degree of mutual trust between the Member States. These principles 
were at the heart of the new governance roadmap, which the EU was implementing in 
the aftermath of the legitimacy crisis, that had been caused by the sacking of the Santer 
Commission by the European Parliament in the late 1990’s"' and the concerns on the 
democratic processes raised by the Irish ‘No’ to the Nice Treaty.17  
 
The Lamfalussy Process sought to ensure that:  
 
The barriers – unnecessary bureaucracy, lack of trust, and sometimes downright 
protectionism – will become things of the past.") 
 
It is debatable whether the Lamfalussy Process managed to deal effectively with all the 
underlying causes of the limitations of the governance mechanism for EU financial 
regulation. Nonetheless, to achieve the desired outcome, the process was structured into 
a four level governance mechanism based on a rethink of the form which financial 
regulation should take and the manner in which it should be adopted and eventually 
implemented."* The governance mechanism for financial regulation was subdivided 
into:  
 
• Level 1 financial regulation setting out general principles, adopted by the 
Council and European Parliament using the co-decision procedure. In general, it 
was intended that Level 1 should only include basic political choices that can be 
articulated as broad, but sufficiently precise, framework rules;  
 
• Level 2 implementing measures to underpin the Level 1 framework rules, to be 
adopted by the Commission through the application of the comitology 
procedure. The scope of Level 2 is determined at Level 1 that specifies the 
nature and the extent of the implementing measures that may be adopted and the 
limits within which the resulting provisions can be adapted and updated at that 
level without requiring a change to Level 1;  
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• Level 3 regulatory and supervisory convergence of financial regulation, through 
strengthened cooperation between financial supervisors; and  
 
• Level 4 strengthened enforcement of financial regulation by the Commission.#+ 
 
The four levels of the governance mechanism for financial regulation sought to establish 
the conditions for mutual recognition by way of more extensive harmonisation of 
Regulation at Level 1 and 2, complemented by regulatory and supervisory convergence 
at Level 3 and enforcement at Level 4. The Lamfalussy Process required the 
establishment of two Committees to assist the Commission in its legislative initiatives, 
the ESC and CESR. These were created in 2001.#"   
 
The ESC, which is composed of Member State representatives, acts as an advisory and 
regulatory committee under the comitology procedure and is chaired by the 
Commission.## The comitology procedure is the Member States’ control mechanism 
over the Commission’s legislative powers.#$ The theories on the transfer of legislative 
powers to the executive, suggest that when the legislator has reason to believe that the 
executive will make decisions that it would disagree with, the legislator will not grant 
autonomous legislative discretion to the executive.#% The comitology procedure applies 
where legislative powers are granted to the Commission. It is a governance mechanism, 
which was set up in response to the duplicate need to achieve more efficient EU 
decision-making, while at the same time allowing the Member States a certain degree of 
control over the legislative process.  
 
The application of the comitology procedure within the Lamfalussy Process was 
therefore a practical solution for the Member States’ concern about conferring 
legislative powers to the Commission without losing control. The ESC, which is a 
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committee that allows a certain degree of political debate to take place at level 2, 
functions as a miniature Council and has the right to vote on Level 2 measures before 
the proposed rules may be adopted by the Commission.#& The political debate at Level 2 
is a key element of the Lamfalussy formula, which allowed the law-making process at 
Level 2 to operate effectively.  Nonetheless, the role of the ESC diminished after the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
The technical debate on legislative proposals, which was another key element of the 
formula for an effective law-making process at Level 2, took place within CESR. This 
Committee brought together under one roof the financial supervisors of the Member 
States to discuss and resolve matters in the field of financial regulation and supervision 
thereby seeking to strengthen mutual trust between Member States. The nature of the 
Committees such as CESR, may be explained on the basis of the theoretical framework 
on governance networks.26 Governance networks are collective arrangements which 
bring together officials from like agencies coming from across borders, with the purpose 
of discussing and responding to international issues, seeking to close gaps through co-
ordination and in so doing, establishing a new sort of power, authority and legitimacy. 
These governance networks promote the accomplishment of co-ordination on an 
international level and establish a new mechanism for the development of coherent 
standards.  
 
CESR had the general function of advising the Commission in the field of financial 
markets and was consulted by the Commission on such issues, in particular in the 
preparation of draft implementing measures at Level 2. CESR was chosen as the 
principal advisor to the Commission, because national financial supervisors are 
responsible, at law, for the day-to-day application of the provisions which the 
Commission proposes to adopt.#( Therefore, a national financial supervisor would only 
recommend the adoption of rules that can be implemented in practice, making the 
outcome of the legislative process more efficient.  
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At Level 3, CESR functioned as a new governance type open method of co-ordination 
mechanism, along side the traditional Community Method for the adoption of binding 
EU legislative, administrative and judicial rules. 28 It had the fundamental role of 
deepening the co-operation arrangements between national financial supervisors to 
enhance the supervisory relationship between authorities and improve convergence of 
supervisory approaches and decisions.#* Convergence of supervisory practices and 
supervisory cooperation were considered as critical for strengthening mutual 
recognition between Member States, as they militated towards the achievement of 
competitive neutrality of supervision. The Lamfalussy report expressed the concern 
that:  
 
Today, there are about 40 public bodies in the European Union dealing with 
securities markets regulation and supervision. Competences are mixed.  
Responsibilities are different.  The result at European level is fragmentation and 
often confusion. More convergent regulatory and supervisory structures are vital 
to ensure that the [internal market] can function effectively.$+  
 
The setting up of CESR was also an effort to address this concern, as CESR sought to 
create a governance mechanism for the promotion of an environment of discussion and 
cooperation between national financial supervisors, which reinforces mutual trust and 
the proper operation of the internal market.$" The significance of CESR was that it acted 
as a mechanism for the pooling of knowledge between supervisors for the resolution of 
common difficulties that may be encountered in day-to-day supervision. Thereby, 
another line of multilevel governance in the EU was created, characterised by the 
relationship between EU institutions and institutions in Member States, which offers a 
mode of decision-making that aims at avoiding the rigidities of the traditional hard-law 
form of financial regulation.  
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The following two sub-sections examine the effectiveness of the four level governance 
mechanism set by the Lamfalussy Process to achieve quasi-maximum harmonisation. 
The analysis will seek to examine the factual application of the principles set by the 
Lamfalussy Process, and the extent to which: [i] transparency and consultation with 
stakeholders; [ii] inclusive technical and political debate; and [iii] inter-institutional 
cooperation, have been effectively put into effect.  
 
As part of this process the conditions and limitations of the Lamfalussy formula for 
mutual recognition are examined.    
 
4.3  Level 1 and 2: Governance Mechanisms for Quasi-Maximum Harmonisation 
 
At Level 1 and 2, the Lamfalussy Process was devised to operate a transparent and 
upward directed approach. The importance of transparency in the law-making process 
stems from its relevance in the accomplishment of other essential principles of 
regulation, such as ease of access, clarity, logic, consistency, honesty and precision, as 
well as openness.32 These features along with transparency create a legitimising effect 
and strengthen mutual trust between Member States. It was therefore logical to require 
that the process at Level 1 and 2 should be initiated by way of a consultation and the 
holding of specific meetings with stakeholders with a view to debating the main issues 
that might concern the legislative initiative. Consultation of stakeholders would ensure 
that the governance mechanism for financial regulation is more democratic and that the 
outcome of the process should therefore be more acceptable to the industry. Albeit, as 
the capture theory of financial regulation warns, regulators should never get too close to 
the industry.  
 
While remaining open to listen to what the industry has to say, in order to realise the 
objective of achieving the common good, a regulator should always remain and be 
perceived as being aloof. At the end of a consultation process the regulator should 
exercise independent judgement, particularly when determining the objectives, scope 
and extent of financial regulation. On the other hand, the term stakeholder in the context 
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of the Lamfalussy Process does not solely refer to the industry but includes all 
participants in the financial system including investors. Indeed, stakeholder activity 
under the Lamfalussy Process may be understood on the basis of the theoretical 
framework termed the multi-stakeholder approach, which recommends the application 
of a more cooperative attitude towards the inclusion of non-governmental organisations 
and interest groups in the rule-making process.33 As the experience derived from the 
process which led to the adoption of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive suggests, the active 
involvement of stakeholders and the transparency of the process contribute to the 
widening of the debate on financial regulation, which, in turn, benefits the effectiveness 
of the overall law-making process.  
 
Transparency of documentation relating to a legislative process is required in terms of 
EU legislation on procedure and is not a matter that is exclusive to the Lamfalussy 
Process.$% Transparency of the process at Level 1 and 2, is inter alia achieved through 
the internet web-page of the EU institutions and the European and national authorities. 
An examination of the content of the relevant internet web-pages reveals the manner of 
operation of this mechanism and the extent of transparency achieved in practice. 
Empirical evidence from this exercise, particularly in the context of the 2009 UCITS IV 
Directive, demonstrates that at every stage of the legislative process and irrespective of 
the EU institutions involved, documentation providing information on the status of the 
process and the development of proposed legislation was made public and available to 
stakeholders.$& This level of transparency demonstrates an overall effort to allow 
stakeholders the opportunity to follow the development of the legislative process, 
thereby strengthening the legitimacy and acceptability of the outcome of such process.  
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4.3.1 Transparency at Level 1 – The UCITS IV Directive 
 
At Level 1, before making the proposal for a UCITS IV Directive which was published 
in 2008$', the Commission sought the views of all stakeholders through a long process 
of consultation in various stages, which took approximately four years to complete.$( As 
part of this process the Commission: appointed expert groups on investment 
management to report on the level of integration and the future of the regulation of 
investment management in the EU$); issued a Green Paper$* and a White Paper%+ on the 
enhancement of the framework for investment funds in Europe; and organised bilateral 
meetings with stakeholders, open hearings%" and a number of workshops.%# The process 
brought together all the different stakeholders, including policy-makers, the national 
financial supervisors, the industry and the investors. It stimulated a debate on priorities 
and the extent of future financial regulation in the field of UCITS, thus helping to shape 
the direction of the future proposal for a UCITS IV Directive. 
 
4.3.2 Transparency at Level 2  – The UCITS IV Directive  
 
At Level 2, a significant effort was again put into generating debate through 
consultation and transparency in the process for the adoption of the implementing 
measures under the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. As part of the process, CESR published 
an initial call for evidence%$ and three consultation documents.%% It also organised two 
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open hearings.%& Again, a review of the documentation generated as part of the process 
brings to bear a high level of debate between the relevant parties, particularly on the 
possible costs and benefits of CESR’s proposals. The outcome of this debate and the 
Commission’s adherence to CESR’s advice on the Level 2 measures under the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive, validate the importance of a wide and inclusive debate on the 
technical details which give shape to a legislative proposal at Level 2.  
 
4.3.3 The Structure of the Debate at Level 1  
 
In terms of the structure of the debate at institutional level, the benefit of limiting Level 
1 to framework rules is that of restricting the difficult and sometimes lengthy political 
co-decision negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament, thus 
focusing only on the essential issues and not on technical details.%' Through this 
mechanism, the Lamfalussy Process sought to achieve speedier negotiations at Level 1 
and a more efficient governance mechanism for financial regulation. The Level 1 
mechanism for law-making is explained in the following diagram.  
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Diagram 4.2 - The Level 1 Law-Making Mechanism  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A review of the details contained in the Directives adopted at Level 1 during the FSAP 
phase of the Lamfalussy Process reveals a rather different story. In practice, more often 
than not, the discussion at Level 1 was extended to technical issues and resulted in the 
drafting of legal texts, which, in part, could have been addressed at Level 2.%( This is 
also the case of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive, which contains an annex that prescribes 
the information to be included in a prospectus of UCITS, that could have been 
considered at Level 2. The content of the annex may easily qualify as substantive 
regulation that falls within the category of measures, designed to amend non-essential 
elements of the Directive. Similar substantive regulation applicable to issuers of 
financial instruments, regulated in terms of the PD48, was adopted in the form of an 
implementing regulation issued at Level 2.%* This therefore is a factual example of an 
area of regulation applicable to UCITS that was incorporated in the Level 1 text, but 
which could have been incorporated in the measures considered at Level 2. It also 
reveals a certain degree of inconsistency between the approach to substantive regulation 
adopted in different circumstances.   
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The additional layer of regulation at Level 1 goes against what had been highlighted and 
recommended by EU inter-institutional review of the Lamfalussy Process, which 
pointed out that: 
 
Excessive detail, though, has not been fully avoided … in Level 1 legislation … 
The Group believes that the European co-legislators should avoid to the greatest 
extent possible the inclusion of technical rules in framework legislation.50  
 
The reluctance may suggest that implementing measures are also likely to raise political 
considerations, over which the Council and the European Parliament would want to 
retain full control and which are unlikely to be left at the discretion of the Commission. 
It reveals the tensions that exist and which have actually escalated since the adoption of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, between the EU institutions, particularly with regard to the 
conferring of legislative powers to the Commission, a delicate matter which is also at 
the heart of the discussions regarding competence between the EU on the one hand and 
the Member States on the other.  
 
This point also raises the critical question regarding how, from a technical point of 
view, one should distinguish between substantive regulation which may fall under the 
category of basic framework principles on the one hand, and regulations which may be 
categorised as implementing measures on the other. The technical answer lies within the 
Treaty, which restricts the transferring of legislative powers to the Commission to non-
essential rules. It stipulates that:  
 
… the essential elements of an area [of regulation] shall be reserved for the 
legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject of a delegation of power.&"  
 
The European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) defined ‘essential elements’ as those which:  
 
… must be reserved for provisions which are intended to give concrete shape to 
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the fundamental guidelines of Community policy.&# 
 
Therefore, the essential elements of a piece of EU legislation, which the legislature 
cannot confer to the Commission, are the material, geographical or temporal scope of 
such legislation. The material scope of the legislation is the subject matter of the 
regulation. In the context of financial services, it refers to the major dimensions of the 
financial activity to which the provisions of the specific piece of law apply. The 
temporal scope of a piece of legislation relates to the date of entry into force and its 
duration if this has been determined. The geographical scope of a piece of legislation 
identifies those Member States that are required to abide by it.  
 
4.3.4 The Structure of the Debate at Level 2 – Pre-Lisbon  
 
At level 2 the Commission adopts Directives or Regulations spelling out implementing 
measures that have the purpose of supplementing or implementing the essential 
elements of a piece of legislation set in Level 1 legislation. The Level 1 provisions 
stipulate the nature and extent of measures permissible at Level 2.&$ Limiting the 
conferred powers to the Commission through specific provisions at Level 1, is another 
fundamental democratic safeguard which balances the Commission’s legislative 
powers. Matters that should be referred to the Level 2 procedure would, in every case, 
be agreed to through the co-decision procedure at Level 1. The following diagram 
explains the structure of the Level 2 debate under the Lamfalussy Process. 
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Diagram 4.3 - The Level 2 mechanism (Pre-Lisbon) and which was applied for the 
purpose of the Level 2 measures under the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The structure and degree of institutional coordination and debate at Level 2 is a key 
element of the Lamfalussy formula. It allowed the law-making process at this level to 
operate effectively. It is therefore relevant to consider the operation of the governance 
mechanism at Level 2. This includes an examination of the pre-comitology stage, during 
which the Commission obtained advice from CESR, and the comitology procedure 
which resulted in the adoption or rejection of the proposed implementing measure.  
 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, all Level 2 measures, including those enacted under the 
2009 UCITS IV Directive, were adopted under the comitology procedure in terms of 
article 202 of the TEC&% as supplemented by the 1999 Council Decision on 
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Comitology&&, and the legislative measures which were adopted to bring the Lamfalussy 
Process into effect, being the 2001 Commission Decision on ESC56 and the 2001 
Commission Decision on CESR.&( On the basis of the powers granted to the 
Commission at Level 1, a mandate would be issued to CESR to draft the technical 
details of the implementing measures at Level 2. The involvement of CESR, in 
connection with the exercise of the implementing powers conferred on the Commission, 
did not form part of the comitology procedure itself. It was purely limited to an advisory 
function prior to the comitology procedure. The Commission could well have decided to 
take a completely different course of action from that recommended in CESR’s advice. 
In such instances, one notices a difference in approach adopted by the Commission 
during the process before and after the Treaty of Lisbon. When explaining the rationale 
for the difference between CESR’s advice and the Commission’s approach, the 
Commission acted with full transparency and coordination in the case of the former, but 
has so far failed to give enough space for political debate in the case of the latter.   
 
Practical experience with the workings of the governance mechanism of the Lamfalussy 
Process at Level 2, points towards a high degree of cooperation between the 
Commission and CESR at this Level.58 To ensure the success of the process, the 
Commission and CESR established both formal and informal governance mechanisms 
for cooperation and coordination of the work at Level 2. CESR, in particular, 
established a number of technical expert groups made up of officials from the national 
financial supervisors of all Member States, who would be responsible for drafting the 
Level 2 advice to the Commission. In the field of UCITS in particular, CESR 
established the investment management expert group.&* 
 
During the preparation of the advice to the Commission, representatives from the 
Commission would attend the relevant expert group meetings and would express a view 
during the discussion. The Commission’s presence at the CESR meetings was required 
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in terms of the 2001 Commission Decision on CESR. Moreover, through bilateral 
meetings and exchanges of letters, CESR would seek to ensure that the position of the 
Commission would be taken into account and that the advice would be legally sound.  
 
Following the submission of the advice, the Commission would invite CESR for 
bilateral meetings and discussions in the preparation of the legal text to be proposed as a 
Level 2 measure, before referral to the ESC. It is submitted that the formal and informal 
governance mechanisms applied for the purpose of the Level 2 process were equally 
important in ensuring proper coordination and reveal the importance of flexible 
governance for the purpose of ensuring an effective legislative process.  
 
The extent of collaboration between the Commission and CESR was formally 
acknowledged by way of strong public announcements made by both institutions during 
the ESC meeting held on the 16 December 2009. '+ The collaboration at Level 2 was a 
key element of the Lamfalussy formula for an effective law-making process and a 
ground-breaking development in the governance mechanism for EU regulation as it 
guaranteed that the process would benefit from the interaction of the European elite in 
regulation. This debate proved to be critical for the overall success of the entire process 
and for strengthening mutual trust between the Member States.   
 
Nonetheless, the specific requirement in the 2001 Commission Decision on CESR, 
requiring an official of the Commission to be present at CESR meetings and to 
participate in all its debates seems to point towards an attempt by the Commission to 
monitor, control or even perhaps limit CESR’s influence in the Level 2 process. One 
may argue that while it was critical for the effective operation of the Level 2 process 
that a high degree of cooperation between the Commission and CESR should be 
instituted, this specific requirement in the 2001 Commission Decision on CESR 
suggests that ab initio the Commission was not entirely confident about CESR’s ability 
to deliver its function without guidance and supervision from the former. Possibly, it 
also points to the Commission’s apprehension that CESR would have grown into an 
institution with considerable and unrestrained powers over the regulatory process and 
the operation of European financial markets. 
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Once the advice on the implementing measures was delivered, the Commission would 
consider the proposed technical details and draft a legislative proposal for the ESC’s 
consideration. The role of the ESC and the European Institutions would be determined 
depending on the type of comitology procedure to be applied, which would be decided 
at Level 1. Before the entry into force of the new Level 2 procedure after Lisbon and the 
Simple Control Mechanism Procedure for delegated acts, in the case of financial 
services the comitology procedure would have generally involved either the Simple 
Regulatory Procedure'" or the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny by the European 
Parliament and the Council'#. These are the procedures applied for the purpose of the 
implementing measures adopted in terms of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. The Simple 
Regulatory Procedure is applied to implementing measures, which stipulate standard 
forms and procedures that implement the requirements of the Directive. The Regulatory 
Procedure with Scrutiny is used in adopting implementing measures which amend or 
supplement the Level 1 act with non-essential elements. 
 
The smooth operation of the above-mentioned mechanisms in the context of the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive points towards the significance of a sound democratic process 
based on transparency, cooperation and inclusive debate which guaranteed the 
legitimacy of a legislative process. It follows that the role of the Member States, the 
Council and the European Parliament at Level 2, apart from being a control mechanism 
over the legislative powers of the Commission, was also a means of giving democratic 
legitimacy to the legislation adopted by the Commission.   
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4.3.5 The Structure of the Debate at Level 2 – Post-Lisbon  
 
At the insistence of the European Parliament, which wanted more institutional balance 
of power with regard to the monitoring of the delegation of legislative powers to the 
Commission, the Treaty of Lisbon changed the legal mechanisms for Level 2.'$   
 
After the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on the 1st December 2009, the 
legislative mechanism for Level 2 became subject to articles 290 and 291 of the TFEU, 
which distinguish between delegated and implementing acts. The said articles of the 
Treaty distinguish between Level 2 type quasi-legislative acts which would be adopted 
in the form of delegated acts, and those acts that could be regarded as purely Level 2 
type executive implementing acts.'% These two types of measures are subject to very 
different sets of governance processes. Implementing acts remained subject to the 
comitology procedure, while delegated acts were made subject to what may be referred 
to as the Simple Control Mechanism Procedure of supervision by the European 
Parliament and Council, thus excluding comitology committees such as ESC.'&  
 
An examination of the requirements stipulated in the TFEU, the EU inter-institutional 
communication setting a common understanding on the Simple Control Mechanism 
Procedure '', the post-Lisbon 2011 Regulation on Comitology'(, and the literature on 
the application of implementing acts and delegated acts'), has allowed the preparation 
of the following table which analysis the features of these two legislative measures.  
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Table 4.1 – Features of Implementing Acts and Delegated Acts  
 
Type of 
Legislative 
Instrument!
 
Delegated Act!
 
Implementing Act 
!
TFEU! Article 290! Article 291!
The Council and 
the European 
Parliament at 
Level 1!
Must make a choice concerning the 
objectives, content, scope and 
duration of the delegation of power as 
well as the conditions to which the 
delegation is subject i.e. the extent to 
which delegation will be subject to 
the Simple Control Mechanism 
Procedure.  
!
Must define the implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission, by 
spelling out the: [a] purpose of these 
powers; [b] the reasons why the 
Commission’s intervention is 
necessary; [c] whether the 
comitology procedure will apply and 
in the affirmative the specific type of 
procedure. 
!
Legislative 
Measure Type!
Acts that amend or supplement 
certain non-essential elements of the 
legislative act.!
Rules establishing uniform conditions 
for implementing basic acts. !
Scope ! Only measures of general application, 
being measures that delete, replace or 
add non-essential elements or new 
non-essential rules, which expand the 
legislative framework of the basic 
act. 
!
Measures intended solely to give 
effect to existing rules in the basic 
act, without adding new elements to 
the act, or to implement aspects 
already clearly defined by the 
legislature. 
!
Conditions to the 
Legislative 
Procedure  
!
Council and European Parliament 
may impose any one of the following:  
 
• Right to revoke the delegation;  
 
• Right to express objections to the 
delegated act within the period set 
by the legislative act. 
 
The legislative process is subject to 
the Simple Control Mechanism 
Procedure as per the EU Inter-
institutional common understanding. !
New Comitology Procedure 
 
Council and European Parliament 
may impose controls on the basis of 
the new comitology procedures 
(advisory and examination). 
!
 
The above analysis brings out the key distinction between a delegated act and an 
implementing act. The distinction mainly relates as to whether the legislative measure 
intended to be adopted at Level 2, was during the debate at Level 1 considered as 
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amending or supplementing the rules in the Level 1 act or simply giving effect to 
existing rules without actually adding any additional elements to those rules.'* That is:   
 
… whether there is simply a need to adopt the acts to give effect to the rules set 
by the legislator or whether it is necessary that the Commission has the power to 
change (amend) or add (supplement) some of the rules of the legislation that are 
of a non-essential nature.(+  
 
The Commission argues that the articles are mutually exclusive and do not overlap.(" 
This notwithstanding, in certain instances, a measure may easily fall within the 
parameters of any one of the two different types of acts. Situations may arise where 
there might be scant reasons why the supplementation of the legislative act in the one 
instance should be regarded as a new non-essential element such that a delegated act is 
required, while in a similar circumstance this might not be so, and therefore an 
implementing act is sufficient.(# It is ultimately at the discretion of the legislator to 
decide on what is essential or not. There are limitations to this. Yet it is ultimately a 
political decision to determine whether aspects of the financial regulation are essential 
or otherwise. The distinction is however crucial as it determines the type of governance 
mechanism to be applied for the purpose of adopting the specific Level 2 measure and 
the extent of political debate on the proposed measures that should be allowed in this 
connection.  
 
The EU inter-institutional common understanding, which is a non-legally binding soft-
law mechanism, sets the conditions for the application of the Simple Control 
Mechanism Procedure, by stipulating the procedure to be applied by the institutions for 
the adoption of delegated acts.  This lays down an agreed maximum period of two 
months (extendable by another two months) for objection by the European Parliament 
and Council to a proposed delegated act. It also details the standard clauses, which 
should be included in legislative acts when delegating to the Commission the right to 
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issue delegated acts.  
 
The Simple Control Mechanism Procedure does not cater for the formal debate within a 
comitology committee such as the ESC. This significantly diminishes the opportunities 
of a political type debate on the Level 2 measures. Such a debate is an important 
element of the Lamfalussy formula for an effective law-making mechanism. A qualified 
majority in Council or an absolute majority in the European Parliament against the 
delegated act is required to bring the process to a halt. If the delegated act is drawn to a 
halt the whole process relating to the delegated act would have to restart ab initio. This 
could create difficulties as, more often than not, the delegated acts are required for the 
Level 1 to become operative and workable. Such a process renders a possible vote 
against the delegated act in Council highly improbable, although not impossible. This in 
fact significantly strengthens the power of the Commission. 
 
The post-Lisbon 2011 Regulation on Comitology sets the mechanism for the adoption 
of implementing acts. One may argue that the Regulation, like the 1999 Decision on 
Comitology, creates a supra-legislative governance mechanism as the European 
Parliament and the Council are subjected to the mechanism set in the Regulation when 
exercising their legislative powers at Level 1. Consequently, only those governance 
mechanisms for control that are established by the Regulation may be applied by the 
legislature when delegating powers to the Commission.  
 
The post-Lisbon 2011 Regulation on Comitology explains the concept of 
implementation for the purposes of Article 291 of the TFEU as comprising both the 
drawing up of implementing rules in the form of acts of general scope and the 
application of rules to specific cases by means of acts of individual application. In the 
context of the Lamfalussy Process, an example of an implementing power that a Level 1 
Act may confer on the Commission in terms of article 291 of the TFEU, is that of 
defining the format or content of a report or a notification, which the industry is 
required to submit in terms of Level 1. At Level 2 of the Lamfalussy Process, the role of 
the ESC as comitology committee has been retained .($  
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The significance of the post-Lisbon Level 2 mechanism of the Lamfalussy Process 
within the context of UCITS is the amendment to the 2009 UCITS IV Directive by the 
2010 Omnibus Directive.74 The latter Directive inter alia had the purpose of making the 
changes to the 2009 UCITS IV Directive for the purpose of giving effect to the 
framework provided in the TFEU and to establish the powers of ESMA to issue binding 
technical standards. It replaced the implementing powers designed under article 202 of 
the EC Treaty with the appropriate provisions of articles 290 and 291 TFEU. The 
changes to the 2009 UCITS IV Directive considerably relate to the introduction of 
powers to issue delegated acts. More delegated acts will also be required once the 2012 
UCITS V Proposal75 is adopted. 
 
For the purpose of the analysis it is relevant to compare the operation of the Level 2 
process in practice before and after the post-Lisbon changes to the 2009 UCITS IV 
Directive. As all the implementing measures under the 2009 UCITS IV Directive were 
adopted before the post-Lisbon changes to the Directive, it is relevant, for comparative 
purposes, to refer to the experience relating to the preparation and debate on the 
Commission’s AIFMD Delegated Act(', which was adopted earlier on this year.  
 
4.3.6 The Outcome of the Debate at Level 2 – Pre and Post Lisbon 
 
Practical experience regarding the functioning of the Level 2 governance mechanism 
suggests that while the preparation of the advice by CESR, and now ESMA, is generally 
an exercise of deliberation by technical experts in which good arguments matter more 
than economic interest and formal voting rules77, the ESC is an arena for political 
debate and intergovernmental bargaining designed by Member States to control the 
Commission.()  
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The ESC is made up of officials from the Ministries of Finance of the Member States, 
who are guided and monitored by their financial attachés in Brussels. The same 
approach used in Council is adopted for the purpose of ESC meetings. The different 
levels of debate within CESR, and now ESMA, and at the level of the ESC, are critical 
for the strengthening of mutual trust between the Member States as it allows the 
opportunity to raise both technical and political considerations which emerge from 
specific measures, that have an impact on the conduct of business by the industry. A 
case in point is the Level 2 process as applied to the 2009 UCITS IV Directive.  
 
In the context of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive, the Commission’s draft implementing 
measures, which were presented to the ESC, reproduced to a large extent CESR’s 
advice, which was the outcome of extensive debate and consultation with stakeholders. 
Adjustments made by the Commission to CESR’s advice in the draft implementing 
measures were reflected in a transparent manner through comparative tables, which the 
Commission provided to the Member States and the European Parliament.(* These 
tables bear out the Commission’s efforts to realise an efficient process at Level 2.  
 
The ESC process on the Level 2 measures commenced on the 16 December 2009. The 
minutes of the ESC meeting held on this date, and those of the subsequent ESC 
meetings held on the 5 February 2010, 8 March 2010 and 12 April 2010)+ put on record 
a high degree of discussion and cooperation between the Commission, the Member 
States and the European Parliament, aimed at achieving a high degree of efficiency. It is 
interesting to note that CESR also participated in this process.  
 
The minutes of the ESC meetings specify that draft implementing measures were 
discussed at length during the meetings, informally with individual Member States and 
the European Parliament and also by way of various written comments. This process 
allowed the Commission to gather detailed information on the various considerations on 
its draft implementing measures and eventually to make the necessary changes, which 
would allow a positive outcome at ESC. In the end, this permitted a fast and smooth 
process with final approval of the proposed implementing measures at ESC level 
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subsequent to significant political debate that took place over a period of less than four 
months.  
 
The efficiency of the Level 2 process as it was operated in the context of the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive, confirms the significance of both the technical and political aspect 
of the debate on proposed financial regulation and the importance of cooperation and 
proper transparency in the process. This contrasts with the way in which the process at 
Level 2 operated with regards to the adoption of the AIFMD delegated regulation)" 
where the political level of one of these two distinct levels of debate was not formalised. 
Practical experience in the operation of the Simple Control Mechanism Procedure has 
shown that where Member States are not given the opportunity to formally discuss their 
concerns about the proposed measures, the governance mechanism for law-making 
turns into an environment of unstructured and tense inter-institutional dialogue.82 In the 
end, this could have an impact on the quality of the substantive regulation which is 
finally adopted. 
 
During the legislative process of the AIFMD Delegated Act, the Commission deviated 
from the ESMA’s advice without proper explanations. As the proposal was for the issue 
of a delegated act and therefore subject to the Simple Control Mechanism Procedure, no 
formal discussion on the political considerations that emerge from the content of the 
delegated regulation took place during the legislative process. Furthermore, no formal 
transparency mechanism was applied by the Commission, with different versions of the 
proposal being leaked to stakeholders83, causing uncertainty about the rationale for the 
Commission’s change in position. This state of affairs generated a process of vague 
inter-institutional dialogue and heavy industry lobbying84, which resulted in a formal 
complaint by 12 Member States to the Commission, regarding the functioning of the 
Simple Control Mechanism Procedure.  
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The complaint emphasised the following two weaknesses: 
 
Firstly, the Commission's draft Delegated Act for the AIFMD Regulation 
departs from ESMA's advice in a number of areas, without explanation. ESMA 
advice is compiled through a transparent and thorough consultation process, and 
provides expert understanding from Europe's supervisory authorities. 
 
Secondly, while we recognise the Commission is not obliged to follow ESMA 
advice, the credibility of the process of producing delegated acts must be 
ensured. One avenue forward would be to openly consult the Member States. 
We therefore urge the Commission to adopt a more open and consultative 
approach in future, when drawing up delegated acts.85 
 
The Member States’ formal complaint was a warning shot to the Commission, that the 
governance mechanism for Level 2 delegated acts was resulting to be ineffective and 
had to be changed. The outcome of the legislative process highlighted the inherent 
weaknesses of the Simple Control Mechanism Procedure mentioned in the Member 
States’ formal complaint. Certain aspects of the Commission’s AIFMD Delegated Act, 
such as the requirements which prohibit management companies from being set up as 
letter box entities, are vague and leave much room for interpretation by Member States.  
 
One may argue that the Commission itself was not comfortable with the outcome of the 
process as it included a provision which encouraged ESMA to issue Level 3 Guidance 
for the consistent implementation of the requirements on letter box entities.86 It also 
included a clause which requires the Commission to review the operation of the 
requirements in practice within two years from the date of the coming into force of the 
Commission AIFMD Regulation. The short period of time within which the 
Commission is required to carry out the review, is in itself indicative of the extent to 
which the Commission was not convinced about the resulting legislation.  
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4.3.7 Specific Conclusions on Level 1 and 2 
 
The analysis supports the validity of the Lamfalussy formula for financial regulation 
based on the following elements: transparency and consultation with stakeholders; 
inclusive technical and political debate; and inter-institutional cooperation. These 
elements complement each other and are cardinal pillars of the whole structure. The 
analysis suggests that unless all the elements are allowed to operate effectively, the 
legislative process will lose on its efficiency, particularly because these elements have a 
role in strengthening mutual trust between Member States, which is a critical condition 
for effective mutual recognition.  
 
The extent of debate at all stages of Level 1 and 2 of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive 
contributed to the realisation of quasi-maximum harmonisation more rapidly. From the 
date of publication of the Commission’s proposal for a UCITS IV Directive on the 16 
July 2008, it took the Council and the European Parliament less than 6 months to 
approve, in identical terms, a compromise text of the proposal for a UCITS IV 
Directive, with the final version of the Directive being adopted by co-decision within 
less than a year, on the 22 June 2009.)( This is exceptional speed when compared with 
the way the legislative process operated before the adoption of the Lamfalussy Process. 
 
The momentum was also kept with regards to the Level 2 process with the ESC voting 
in favour of the implementing measures on the 12 April 2010, which is less than six 
months from the date of the submission of CESR’s advice to the Commission. It 
compares favourably with the twelve odd months which the Commission took to adopt 
the AIFMD Delegated Act. In terms of the degree of harmonisation of financial 
regulation, at the end of the process the UCITS Directive had been transformed into a 
Directive which harmonises the financial regulation of more fields of activity in the area 
of investment management and which was supplemented by two implementing 
Directives)) and two implementing Regulations)*. 
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The success of the Lamfalussy Process at Level 1 and 2 as applied to the 2009 UCITS 
IV Directive, was due to the fact that it was transparent and promoted a wide inclusive 
debate that allowed for both technical and political concerns to be made at all levels. 
The reaction of Member States to the outcome of the legislative process which led to the 
adoption of the Commission AIFMD Delegated Act, has shown in no uncertain terms 
that inter-institutional tensions could result and have a bearing on the effectiveness of 
the legislative process, when one or several elements of the Lamfalussy formula is not 
allowed to operate properly. On this basis one may venture to recommend that the 
procedure for delegated acts should be reconsidered if the Level 2 of the Lamfalussy 
Process is to remain efficient.  
 
4.4 Level 3: An Open Method of Coordination for Convergence and the 
Governance of European Supervision 
 
It is reasonable to suggest that a commitment to a uniform approach to the 
implementation and/or interpretation of financial regulation is the ultimate test for the 
internal market. Uneven implementation and/or different interpretation, frustrate 
harmonisation effort, which is a necessary condition for effective mutual recognition. 
The open method of coordination at Level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process sought to 
achieve a certain degree of consistency in the implementation and interpretation of 
European financial regulation by national financial supervisors.  
 
To fulfil the objectives at Level 3, the CESR standing committees, in addition to being 
involved in the preparation of Level 2 advice to the Commission, also had the role of 
producing standards, guidelines and recommendations (henceforth referred together as 
‘Level 3 Guidance’) which deal with the implementation of Level 1 and 2 financial 
regulation. Level 3 Guidance had to be compatible with Level 1 and 2. However, at 
Level 3 CESR played a role that was independent from the EU Institutions and extended 
to the issue of guidance that set common standards regarding matters that were not 
covered by EU legislation and where a certain degree of uniformity was deemed 
necessary.  
 
The use of the open method of coordination within the framework of the Lamfalussy 
Process aimed at achieving speed and flexibility, which was critical if the legislative 
! 144 
process was to keep up with developments in financial markets. It also offered a focal 
point for convergence.*+ In financial markets, even more than in other fields of law, 
regulation has to be in a position to adapt and respond to market developments in order 
to mitigate uncertainty and restore market confidence.91 Level 3 promoted 
harmonisation without the political compromises at Level 1 and possibly also at Level 
2. Concurrently, however, it allowed the national financial supervisors to take political 
considerations into account during the implementation stage of the specific Level 3 
Guidance.  
 
The application of the open method of coordination at Level 3 of the Lamfalussy 
Process was an acknowledgement that the rapidity of innovation and technological 
development in financial markets could undermine financial regulation which was 
difficult to change. Consequently, it was realised that part of the regulatory tools for EU 
financial regulation itself had to be flexible enough to be easily adaptable in the light of 
changing financial market conditions. CESR made extensive use of Level 3 Guidance 
for this purpose.*#  
 
In theory, it has been argued that CESR Level 3 Guidance had a binding effect beyond 
their de facto normative character, since a presumption of correctness prevailed unless 
proper justifications for non-compliance were presented.*$ In practice, however, under 
the CESR regulatory framework no such requisite existed. Level 3 Guidance was 
implemented strictly on a voluntary basis, with CESR Members exercising peer 
pressure on each other to apply it. However, at Level 3, CESR was unable to ensure that 
guidance was adopted in a harmonised way in all Member States. As a consequence, 
this legislative method has in certain instances failed to achieve a sufficient degree of 
harmonisation.*% Such situations are harmful to mutual recognition.  
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CESR’s competence fell short of being in a position to adopt binding rules or else 
impose binding decision on national financial supervisors.95 The fact that CESR’s Level 
3 Guidance was not formally binding meant that the guidance was visibly weak in 
comparison to hard-law enacted through Level 1 and Level 2 legislation. However, this 
very weakness allowed CESR to intervene in areas, such as clearing and settlement, 
which were not formalised in EU law as, at the time, a political consensus seemed to be 
practically impossible.*' While, prior to the financial crisis, Member States were not 
willing to legislate in this area, national financial supervisors were willing to co-
ordinate their policies. In the aftermath of the crisis, this co-ordination reaped its most 
significant benefit as it formed the basis for a Level 1 and 2 regulatory initiative in this 
field. One can point towards this development as one of the concrete benefits which 
were derived out of the open method of coordination which resulted in CESR Level 3 
Guidance.  
 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that in general national financial supervisors did not 
implement Level 3 Guidance properly. By way of example, when CESR assessed the 
extent of implementation by national financial supervisors of its ‘Guidelines to Simplify 
the Notification Procedure of UCITS’!", which had the purpose of overcoming the 
uncertainties which exited with regards to the passporting under the 1985 UCITS 
Directive, only five out of twenty-nine national financial supervisors were found to be 
fully compliant with these guidelines, while only another four were found to be partially 
compliant.*) The poor level of compliance by national financial supervisors with the 
Level 3 Guidance on passporting of UCITS is indicative of a process which might not 
have been all-inclusive and where national financial supervisors might have felt that 
they did not own the solution proposed by CESR for further integration. It also meant 
that the benefits that could have been derived from the application of a simplified 
notification procedure based on soft-law were limited as an additional layer of 
regulatory fragmentation within the EU had been created. While Level 3 Guidance was 
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easy to adopt, it was clearly difficult to enforce.  
 
As part of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive, CESR produced eight sets of Level 3 
Guidance, promoting regulatory convergence in different areas, which are regulated by 
the Directive. This process included a regulatory framework for money market funds, 
the failures of which during the financial crisis became a regulatory concern for policy-
makers. MMFs have been in the spotlight since the September 2008 collapse of the 
$62.5 billion Reserve Primary Fund in the US. Given the damage, which the failure of 
the Reserve Primary Fund had on the financial system, CESR decided to improve the 
coordination of regulation through Level 3 Guidance, by setting standards on the 
definition of MMF and the methods for the calculation of the prices of MMFs.**  
 
Yet again, not all national financial supervisors implemented the Level 3 Guidance on 
MMFs. A review carried out by ESMA for the purpose of determining the level of 
compliance with the Level 3 Guidance on MMFs, noted that ten national financial 
supervisors had not taken the necessary measures to implement this Level 3 measure."++ 
Moreover, this created incentives for the national financial supervisor of a Member 
State, which had implemented the Level 3 MMF Guidance, to challenge the passporting 
of a UCITS that is designated as MMF in a Member State where the national financial 
supervisor had failed to implement the Level 3 Guidance, as evidently such UCITS 
would afford a lower degree of investor protection. This is yet another example of the 
fragmentation resulting from the adoption of non-binding measures by CESR at Level 
3.  
 
Therefore, while soft-law gives a certain degree of flexibility, it may lead to legal 
uncertainty that may endanger part of the harmonisation process. This, in turn, damages 
the mutual recognition between the Member States. The lack of compliance by national 
financial supervisors with CESR’s Level 3 Guidance points towards the need for a 
somewhat harder legal approach. It follows that unless soft-law mechanisms, such as 
Level 3 Guidance, are complemented by mechanisms for enforcement, such as a comply 
or explain framework, it is doubtful whether soft-law mechanisms may operate 
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effectively to strengthen mutual recognition between Member States. Indeed, they may 
have the opposite effect, as they may be the cause of an additional layer of 
fragmentation.  
 
Under the taxonomy set for the purpose of this thesis, the lack of enforceability of the 
Level 3 Guidance for regulatory convergence under the CESR framework may be 
classified as a limitation of the governance mechanism for mutual recognition. This 
limitation was recognised by the Commission in 2007 when it expressed concern that 
Level 3 Guidance had not been applied consistently by national financial supervisors.101 
Another limitation relates to the fact that CESR’s efforts at this level were mainly 
focused on measures to achieve regulatory convergence with little or no efforts in the 
field of supervisory convergence. Throughout the existence of CESR, financial 
supervision in the EU remained largely fragmented with different models applied in the 
different Member States. 
 
Nonetheless, the pooling of knowledge between national financial supervisors within 
CESR was beneficial for cooperation, particularly for those national financial 
supervisors established in Member States which have unsophisticated or undeveloped 
financial markets. Practical experience in financial supervision suggests that such 
national financial supervisors, at times, proved not to have the resources or technical 
expertise to resolve technical difficulties in day-to-day supervision properly, without the 
guidance that could be afforded by other more sophisticated authorities.102 In this sense, 
CESR was a mechanism for reflexive governance as it provided the venue that sought to 
create an environment of debate, mutual learning, the sharing of knowledge and 
cooperation in supervisory matters.  
 
To resolve part of the internal market concerns that emerged from the financial crisis, 
the DeLarosiere Report inter alia proposed the establishment of a European System of 
Financial Supervisors, including the creation of ESMA which would replace CESR.103 
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ESMA, which under the EU institutional framework has the status of an agency104, has 
various objectives which it is bound to achieve. These include improvement in the 
functioning of the internal market, the protection of public values such as the integrity 
and stability of the financial system, the transparency of markets and financial products 
and the protection of investors.105 ESMA has also been given the tasks of preventing 
regulatory arbitrage, guaranteeing a level playing field and promoting supervisory 
convergence.106  
 
From a Lamfalussy Process point of view, ESMA’s role is of more significance than 
that of CESR. In addition to its role as advisor to the Commission at Level 2, ESMA107 
has the higher role of being a de facto European Authority with quasi-regulatory powers 
in the field of securities business. It has the authority to establish binding technical 
standards108, and has supervisory powers limited to the monitoring of credit ratings 
agencies and trade repositories. It also has the ability to prohibit or restrict financial 
activities that threaten the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets.109  
 
Technical standards, which create another layer of Level 2 type financial regulation, are 
drafted by ESMA but must be endorsed by the Commission to become law and take the 
form of either delegated acts or implementing acts. ""+ There is a general ruling in EU 
Law that prohibits the delegation to agencies, such as ESMA, of general regulatory 
powers that the Treaty confers on the EU Institutions. The ruling was set by the 
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European Court of Justice in the 1958 Meroni case.""" In the course of that judgment, 
the Court laid down what have become well-established principles on delegation of 
regulatory powers to regulatory agencies, which have been the subject of considerable 
academic and policy debate.""#  
 
In Meroni the ECJ distinguished between delegation of clearly defined executive 
powers the application of which can be subject to review on the basis of objective 
criteria decided by the delegating authority, and delegation of discretionary powers.""$ 
In terms of Meroni the latter is not permitted, as the delegation of discretionary powers 
would make the balance of powers that is a fundamental guarantee granted by the 
Treaty unproductive, since such delegation would substitute the choices of the delegator 
with those of the delegate and cause a shift of responsibility.""% For that reason, such 
restriction in the possibilities to delegate powers may be explained in the light of the 
principle of balance of powers, which Meroni recognized for the first time in the 
Community legal order.""& Hence, Meroni means that an agency may not be delegated 
tasks under conditions that would deprive the institutions of the Union of the 
competences vested upon them by the EU Treaties, since this would be contrary to the 
principles of institutional balance and of conferral of powers to the institutions, as 
enshrined in the Treaties.  
 
Consequently, agencies may only be assigned powers that are limited to the taking of 
individual decisions in specific areas where defined technical expertise is required, 
under clearly and precisely defined conditions and without genuine discretionary 
power.116 In this regard, an agency may be granted the powers to adopt legally binding 
measures as long as its powers are not discretionary in that the implementation of those 
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powers must result from the application of an existing set of legal rules to a particular 
factual situation. In line with Meroni ESMA cannot be entrusted with powers which 
may affect the responsibilities that the Treaty has explicitly conferred on the 
Commission.""( In practice this means that ESMA may only prepare technical standards 
where this is specifically prescribed in primary Acts and such standards become law 
only when endorsed by the Commission.118 This position is not comparable to the rule-
making powers of the SEC in the US, where the SEC is the one that adopts the rules.119 
 
Technical standards take the legislative form of either Regulations or Decisions. This 
means that they would be directly applicable to Member States, national financial 
supervisors and financial institutions. The scope of technical standards is limited to 
technical issues that contribute significantly and effectively to the achievement of the 
objectives of the relevant legislation but cannot involve the taking of policy decisions 
that fall within the competence of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission in accordance with the applicable procedure."#+  The various safeguards 
made on the adoption of technical standards by ESMA, seem an attempt at reconciling 
the essential flows from representative democracy and constitutionalism with the need 
to engage with expert knowledge in the highly technical world of financial markets. 
 
Nonetheless, in a dynamic financial system dominated by cross-border financial 
institutions of a significant size, restricting the discretion of a financial supervisor is not 
compatible with the needs of regulation and supervision which must be capable of quick 
adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances. In this connection, doubts have been 
expressed on whether the principle of institutional balance really excludes the setting up 
of agencies provided with powers involving a real margin of discretion."#" Indeed, it is 
questionable whether the requirement that the general balance of the institutions 
established by the Treaty should not be altered, actually implies that European agencies 
must be granted non-discretionary powers."## Furthermore, the view has been put 
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forward that to understand the reasoning of the Court in Meroni it is relevant to consider 
the meaning of balance of powers at the time of the Meroni ruling itself.  
 
The point has been made that the principle of balance of power was originally 
formulated as a replacement for Montesquieu’s philosophy on separation of powers, the 
aim of which was to protect members of society from the abuse of power.123 In 
conformity with this view, by referring to the balance of powers the Court did not 
express a concern about the effect on inter-institutional relations, but a concern 
regarding the Treaty’s system of judicial protection. It has been argued that given the 
original meaning of the principle of balance of powers it would appear more suitable to 
stress the importance of a system of effective judicial protection when referring to the 
Meroni judgement, than it is to emphasize the institutional balance.124  
 
Furthermore, it has been opined that Meroni should not be treated as an unmovable 
signpost and should be viewed within the context of the development of EU 
constitutional law and Treaty guarantees."#& Before Lisbon there was no reference in the 
Treaty to the possibility to grant agencies with specific tasks and powers. The Treaty of 
Lisbon altered this as articles 263 and 277 TFEU provide that the CJEU can review the 
legality of acts of agencies such as ESMA. Therefore, the fact that the Treaty foresees 
legal redress against acts of such agencies would appear to recognize that the agencies 
may be granted decision-making powers and militates towards a less strict interpretation 
of Meroni.  
 
A recent opinion by Jääskinen AG on the powers granted to ESMA in terms of the 
Short Selling Regulation"#', and the decision of the CJEU on the same case (‘ESMA 
Ruling’), expressed the view that the Treaty of Lisbon has addressed the pivotal 
concerns with which the Court had to deal in Meroni; namely the absence of Treaty 
based criteria for the conferral and delegation of powers so as to ensure respect for 
institutional balance and the vacuum in terms of judicial review of legal binding acts of 
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agencies."#( Therefore, it is reasonable to argue in favour of a less strict interpretation of 
the Meroni priniciples and for agencies such as ESMA to be granted greater scope of 
manoeuvring. It follows that where delegation is restrained by the legal guarantees 
provided in the existing Treaty, no unsafe transfer of responsibility would arise."#) This 
is a critical development in the understanding of Meroni if the powers of ESMA are to 
be reinforced.  
 
While the regulatory and supervisory powers granted to ESMA are considerable when 
compared to CESR, however one may still argue that more discretion is required if 
ESMA is to be in a position to fulfill more completely its objective of improving the 
functioning of the internal market. Discretionary powers to regulate and supervise are 
ultimately important and justified on the basis that the financial system and the 
problems that may develop within such a system are increasingly sophisticated and 
require wide scope for manoeuvring if they are to be addressed properly. On this basis 
more centralisation may be an adequate alternative to convergence of national 
supervision. This is the solution applied with regard to the supervision of banks in the 
Euro-Zone, which fall under the responsibility of the ECB within the framework of a 
single supervisory mechanism.129 Albeit, the possible centralization of one function 
does not imply nor require the centralization of all supervisory functions.130 Indeed, the 
US experience in securities regulation suggests that Federal and State supervision may 
co-exist and that a flexible application of the delegation doctrine does not conflict with 
the institutional balance between the branches of government, but can strengthen such 
balance by permitting these branches to focus on their core area of regulation."$"  
 
In the US the delegation doctrine, according to which some legislative powers can be 
entrusted to agencies, has not generally been taken as a threat to the balance of powers 
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between the branches of Government."$# On the contrary the US Supreme Court 
declared that:  
 
‘our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our 
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical 
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power 
under broad general directives.’"$$  
 
On the other hand, in the EU the limitations on delegation which have so far been 
imposed by a strict interpretation of the Meroni doctrine are one of the reasons 
mentioned for the pursuance of a decentralised approach to the supervision of securities 
business, which mainly relies on national financial supervisors, instead of the 
application of a US type approach where centralised supervision by the SEC co-exists 
with that conducted by the State regulators."$%  
 
In the US the allocation of regulatory and supervisory powers between Federal and 
State regulators has generally been based on the approach suggested by the economics 
of federalism, whereby cross-border externality-raising issues are addressed by federal 
agencies while local matters are considered by State regulators."$& By way of example, 
in 1996 the National Securities Markets Improvement Act was adopted which inter alia 
reallocated federal and state responsibilities for the regulation of investment advisors 
which at the time were registered with the SEC."$' The Act created a division of 
responsibility that concentrated SEC supervision on those advisers who are associated 
with collective investment schemes or who have more than $25 million under 
management.137 The reallocation of regulatory responsibility was triggered by 
Congress’ concern that the SEC’s resources were insufficient to supervise the increasing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"$#
 Geradin (n131). 
"$$
 Mistretta V. United States 488US361,372 (1989). 
"$%
 Geradin (n131).  
"$&
 On economics of federalism, see amongst others: C Esty and D Geradin (eds), ‘Regulatory competition 
and economic integration: Comparative Perspective’ (Oxford 2001).  
"$'
! J Cox, R Hillman, D Langevoort, ‘Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials’ (Wolters Kluwer 
2013), Chapter 19 ‘The Investment Advisers and Investment Company Acts of 1940’ 107*.!
"$(
 Cox et al (n136) 1079.  
! 154 
number of advisers, many of which were small and operating only on a State level."$) 
Congress was also concerned with the cost imposed on investment advisors that 
operated in a number of States and which were subject to overlapping Federal and State 
regulation.  
 
Congress came to the conclusion that if the then overlapping regulatory responsibilities 
of the SEC and the States were divided by making the States responsible for small 
investment advisors and the SEC responsible for large firms, the regulatory resources of 
the SEC and the States could be put to better and more efficient use.139  Therefore, the 
clear division of power between SEC and the state regulators was also justified on the 
basis that costs of diverse rules and supervision outweighed the benefits.!The Dodd-
Frank Act has further strengthened this separation of powers by broadening the 
competence of State regulators to investment advisers who have more than $100 million 
under management.140 Within the context of the “unfinished agenda”141 of the 
governance model for the supervision of securities regulation in Europe, certain benefits 
could be derived from a system such as the one described above.  
 
The recent CJEU ESMA ruling which militates towards a more flexible interpretation of 
Meroni, suggests that the time may be ripe for a reconsideration of the discretionary 
powers granted to ESMA in the field of regulation and the division of tasks between 
ESMA and national financial supervisors by applying the tools provided by the 
economics of federalism."%# However, a review of the division of tasks between ESMA 
and national financial supervisors would have to be kept within the confines permitted 
by the principle of subsidiarity, which restricts community action to what is strictly 
necessary for the European needs."%$ Subsidiarity is a two-way principle, while it 
appears to favour decentralisation, centralisation can be justified by reason of exactly 
the same principle on account of scale and cross-border externalities arguments."%%  
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Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the questions of whether the present system of 
decentralised supervision should in part be replaced by centralisation depends on 
whether cross-border activity of financial entities have gained such a great significance 
in terms of European stability that centralised supervision is justified as it would be 
better equipped to prevent financial debacles. It follows that in EU securities regulation 
an argument in favor of centralisation can be made on the basis that decentralised shared 
supervision of a large cross-border financial entity could be highly inefficient, 
ineffective and, as a consequence of fragmentation, may not be adequate to achieve the 
systemic stability objectives of regulation. Moreover, because of a home bias in 
enforcement by financial supervisors, actions are normally directed at entities with a 
strong presence in the home jurisdiction, as opposed to subjects who operate 
extraterritorially.145 As a consequence, supervision is unlikely to be applied efficiently 
in cases where the impact of failure is diffusely multinational, which, in turn, further 
strengthens the argument for centralised supervision of large cross-border financial 
entities.  
 
On this account, one may argue in favour of a ‘Champions League’ model of European 
supervision of securities regulation whereby large cross-border operators in the field of 
securities business would be supervised by ESMA, while other operators would 
continue being supervised at national level.146 This would increase the efficiency of 
supervision of large cross-border operators and is also said to be beneficial as it allows a 
certain degree of competition between the supranational (federal) and the national 
financial supervisors, which when combined with mechanisms for cooperation, may 
enhance supervisory efficacy and efficiency more than inter-jurisdictional horizontal 
competition which currently exists at EU level.147 Nonetheless, the proposed model for 
supervision would need to take into account the characteristics of the market where the 
financial entity is undertaking its activity, including the degree of homogeneity and 
integration within such market, and the extent to which the protection of investors 
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requires proximity of supervision."%)!  
 
In the context of UCITS, chapter 5 examines the future of financial supervision and 
compares the centralised approach with the national approach. The point is made that  
with regard to UCITS, which is a retail investment product where preferences vary 
across borders"%*, regulation should continue being a matter that is mainly decided at 
European level, while supervision should remain a national competence. This approach 
differs from that in the US where a national integrated market for collective investment 
schemes exists and where, as examined in chapter 3, after the 1938-1940 SEC Report on 
market malpractice in the field of investment management"&+, policy makers established 
the SEC as the main regulator and supervisor of the sector in terms of the ICA 1940. 
The severe malpractices in this field uncovered by the SEC justified the application of a 
federal solution for regulation and supervision of collective investment schemes to 
ensure that a common standard of investor protection would be applied across all of the 
US.  
 
Conversely, the European approach based on European regulation and national 
supervision is consistent with the needs of supervision for UCITS where differences in 
national cultural and market conditions and language barriers still prevail. Decentralised 
national supervision should therefore remain the European supervisory model for 
UCITS. This means that the call that some authors have made for centralised European 
supervision of securities business in general"&" do not appear to factor in the specific 
needs of the supervision of retail investment products and services such as UCITS. A 
‘Champions League’ model of European supervision of securities regulation would 
appear to be more appropriate in the circumstances.  
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In the final analysis, granting ESMA more discretion in the context of large cross-
border financial entities that operate in homogenous institutional markets, such as 
central counterparties (‘CCP’),"&# the client base of which are normally banks and other 
financial institutions, would appear to be an acceptable proposal on the basis of the 
assumptions of the economics of federalism as encapsulated in the principle of 
subsidiarity, as for a CCP shared supervision may be highly inefficient when compared 
to centralisation and may not be adequate to safeguard systemic stability. On the other 
hand, in the context of UCITS, which is a retail product, the national approach 
coordinated by ESMA remains the best possible alternative as it provides for proximity 
of supervision and a proper understanding of national cultural differences.  Within this 
context coordination and supervisory convergence remain fundamental criteria to 
strengthen cooperation between financial supervisors and mutual recognition between 
Member States.  
 
ESMA has been vested with various tools for the promotion of convergence and 
cooperation amongst national financial supervisors, including: [i] the power to 
investigate a breach of EU law by a national financial supervisor and demand 
compliance153; [ii] the power to resolve disagreements between national financial 
supervisors;154 [iii] the role to promote and the power to participate in colleges of 
national financial supervisors and on-site inspections;155 [iv] the role to stimulate and 
facilitate the delegation of tasks and responsibilities among national financial 
supervisors;156 [v] the power to issue Level 3 Guidance with a name and shame 
enforcement tool to discipline compliance;157 and [vi] the power to carryout peer 
reviews of supervisory practices at national level and taking different forms of 
supervisory action to ensure the rectification of any identified inconsistencies.158  
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The 2010 Omnibus Directive introduced powers for the issue of technical standards in 
relation to twenty-two articles of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. The relevant powers to 
issue technical standards will be further amplified with the adoption of the 2012 UCITS 
V Proposal. The opportunity to draft technical standards is a legislative tool that gives 
ESMA the opportunity to transform soft-law, such as CESR Level 3 Guidance, into 
hard-law technical standards, particularly, where the former are of significant 
importance in the functioning of the internal market, such as the Level 3 Guidance on 
MMFs mentioned earlier on in this chapter. Hard-law helps in overcoming issues of 
enforceability with national financial supervisors. Alternatively, to ensure compliance 
with Level 3 Guidance, ESMA could apply one of its various soft-law regulatory and 
supervisory tools for enforcement provided in terms of the ESMA Regulation. By 
applying these tools, fragmentation at Level 3 is overcome as soft-law is transformed 
into (almost) hard-law.  
 
While the limitations of CESR at Level 3 had already triggered evolutionary type 
improvements159, the establishment of ESMA symbolises the most important step taken 
by the EU in the creation of a wide-ranging pan-European supervisory framework in 
securities business to supplement the extensive EU financial regulation in this field. The 
financial crisis and the identified shortcomings in regulation and supervision were the 
main trigger for the establishment of ESMA. One may however contend that the 
resulting governance mechanism for financial regulation and supervision was the 
product of an evolutionary process rather than a spontaneous reaction to the failures 
identified as a consequence of the financial crisis. Indeed, one may argue that the 
governance of ESMA is the result of reflection on the identified weaknesses of CESR, 
particularly its failure to achieve any suitable degree of supervisory convergence at 
Level 3, which occurred a long time before the economic and social impact of the crisis 
generated the impetus for change.  
 
In the final analysis, the combination of the governance mechanism for regulation and 
supervision vested in ESMA may be used in the field of UCITS to support mutual 
recognition based on quasi-maximum harmonisation to overcome the remaining 
identified regulatory and supervisory barriers to cross-border business of UCITS.  
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4.5  Level 4: Mechanisms for Enforcement 
 
Level 4 concerns the strengthening of control, on the part of the Commission, as 
guardian of the EU Treaties, over the implementation and application of financial 
regulation by Member States through the various tools available to it for this purpose. 
The Lamfalussy Report identified lack of enforcement of the implementation by 
Member States as a particular problem for the further integration of the internal market. 
 
Enforcement at Level 4 is critical since uniform transposition, implementation and 
interpretation of harmonised regulation is essential for the proper operation of mutual 
recognition between Member States. However, the transposition of the Directives 
adopted during the FSAP phase of the Lamfalussy Process by Member States became 
one of the bottlenecks of the process."'+ This created legal uncertainty and disrupted 
cooperation arrangements between Member States. The Commission reacted to this by 
initiating infringement proceedings against non-compliant Member States. A case in 
point, is the transposition process of the MAD, where the Commission initiated fifty-
seven infringement proceedings against sixteen Member States within less than nine 
months from the deadline set for the transposition of the Directive.161 
 
The transposition of 2009 UCITS IV Directive is an example of the extent to which 
Member States continued to fail in their efforts to transpose and implement financial 
regulation within the timeframe set for such a purpose in Directives. Member States had 
to have measures in place to transpose the Directive by the 30 June 2011. Four months 
after this deadline, most Member States had not yet transposed the Directive, which 
situation continued for a number of months thereafter."'# This state of affairs produced 
legal uncertainty regarding the extent to which the benefits of the Directive, particularly 
those that emerge from the new mechanisms for consolidation of UCITS, could also be 
derived in the non-compliant Member States."'$  
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Moreover, different interpretations of the provisions of the Directive continued. It has 
been pointed out that amongst others, Member States took different approaches on 
whether a management company could delegate administrative duties to the depositary. 
The depositary has the role of monitoring the functions of the management company 
and must be independent from the management company. Therefore, the delegation of 
administrative duties to a depositary may generate conflicts of interest that could have 
detrimental effects on the investor protection safeguards in the Directive. Research on 
the implementation of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive has demonstrated that while 
Austria, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Netherlands, Sweden and UK allow the 
delegation by a management company of administrative tasks to the depositary, 
Belgium, France, Ireland and Spain do not allow such delegation to occur."'% This is not 
the only area where an uneven implementation of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive has 
been applied by the Member States."'& 
 
Notwithstanding, due to bureaucratic fatigue at the Commission"'' and its general 
reluctance to jeopardise working relations with Member States"'(, the Commission has 
not always been keen to take prompt infringement proceedings for failure by Member 
States to implement. Instead, in certain instances the Commission has demonstrated a 
preference for a more pro-active approach to better implementation based on soft-law 
mechanism such as the organisation of transposition workshops, the publication of 
question and answer guidance on the interpretation of particular provisions of Level 1 
and Level 2 legislation, and the use of transposition score boards, while leaving hard-
law measures, such infringement proceedings, to address only egregious cases of non-
compliance."') For example, with regard to the implementation of the 2009 UCITS IV 
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Directive, the Commission only commenced infringement proceedings against failing 
Member States after fifteen months from the deadline for implementation."'* Given the 
lengthy processes involved with regard to the taking of infringement proceedings, the 
Commission’s approach at Level 4 may be considered as justified, even though not 
exceptionally effective. 
 
In the final analysis, the late transposition by Member States and different 
interpretations of the requirements in the Directive, point towards the weaknesses of 
those mechanisms, which were applied as part of the implementation of the Lamfalussy 
Process for the purpose of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive and which are examined in 
detail in the next section of this Chapter. These clearly qualify as limitations inherent in 
the governance mechanism for mutual recognition.   
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
The raison d’etre of the Lamfalussy Process was that of improving the governance 
mechanism for EU financial regulation and supervision. An analysis of the literature 
regarding the material working of the Lamfalussy process, leads to the general 
conclusion that this process has, overall, generated positive outcomes.170 The 
examination of the Lamfalussy Process in the context of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive 
supports this view.  
 
The law-making process at Level 1 and 2 achieved quasi-maximum harmonisation of 
financial regulation inside an environment, which increased the levels of consultation, 
transparency, debate and the responsiveness of the law-making system to market 
developments. The efforts of CESR at Level 3 improved cooperation between national 
financial supervisors. This created the opportunity for better convergence in the 
interpretation and practical implementation of financial regulation, thereby 
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strengthening mutual trust between national financial supervisors.  
 
Overall, the Lamfalussy Process established the tools for the strengthening of mutual 
recognition between Member States and, by so doing, created the right environment for 
a broader internal market in financial services. However, the experience regarding the 
functioning of the Simple Control Mechanism Procedure for delegated acts has not 
proved to be a positive experience and should be reconsidered. The analysis also points 
to a number of limitations of the governance mechanism based on minimum 
harmonisation, which have continued to prevail in the form of inconsistent 
implementation and interpretation of EU law by Member States and the application of 
discretions such as national marketing rules. These weaken mutual recognition between 
Member States.  
 
To address some of these limitations, the Lamfalussy Report called for more use of 
Regulations for the purpose of financial regulation, which do not require transposition 
into national law and are immediately applicable across the EU.171 However, in the 
application of the Lamfalussy Process, while legislators were more inclined to use 
Regulations,172 Directives remained the predominant legal instrument173, with all Level 
1 measures and most of the Level 2 measures in the field of securities regulation being 
adopted in this legislative form.174 This is also true with regard to the legislative 
framework of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive.175 This approach reflected the agreement 
set in the Treaty of Amsterdam Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.  
 
Some eight years after the Lamfalussy Report, a recommendation in favour of 
Regulations as the legislative instrument for financial regulation, was again made in the 
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DeLarosiere Report, which also proposed the establishment of a single rulebook for 
financial regulation in order to do away with inconsistencies and eradicate regulatory 
arbitrage.176 The financial crisis created the impetus for policy-makers to push forward 
with more extensive harmonisation.  
 
It is submitted that while the use of Directives is not a weakness per se, the use of this 
legislative instrument for the purpose of harmonisation resulted in the resurfacing of a 
number of limitations that occur as a consequence of its peculiar nature. These take the 
form of: [i] legal uncertainty which is created as a consequence of the late transposition 
of Directives by the Member States; [ii] the fragmented approaches to implementation 
and interpretation during and after the transposition phase; and [iii] the opportunities to 
gold-plate EU legislation by including additional regulation at national level which, in 
turn, creates barriers to cross-border business.177 In addition, at Level 4 the Lamfalussy 
Process failed to improve Member States’ performance with regard to the transposition 
of Directives issued at Level 1 and Level 2. This increased even further the difficulties 
arising from the use of this legislative instrument.  
 
The use of Directives pays more respect to Member States’ sovereignty. However, legal 
certainty would, in theory, have been improved had the legislator used more 
Regulations as the legislative tool for the internal market. As will be contended further 
on, while Regulations tend to achieve maximum harmonisation and therefore should 
minimise the opportunities for uneven implementation by Member States, the use of 
Regulations is, however, not the universal remedy to the difficulties that emerge from 
the different implementation and interpretation of Directives at national level. In the 
final analysis, Directives remain a valid legislative instrument to cater for instances 
where the legislator wants to provide for divergences at national level stemming from 
different legal traditions. 
 
The following chapter examines the application of the quasi-maximum harmonisation 
technique (a mixture of minimum harmonisation and maximum harmonisation) to 
achieve mutual recognition. Chapter 5 also reviews the areas where a Directive and a 
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Regulation were applied at Level 2 and the resulting outcome in terms of consistency of 
implementation of EU Law. The analysis demonstrates that the use of Regulations may 
still result in an uneven implementation and interpretation of financial regulation at 
national level, particularly in instances where the outcome of such Regulation creates 
insufficient harmonisation, inadequate regulatory convergence, and limited convergence 
of supervisory practices if at all.   
 
In the final analysis, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, while quasi-maximum 
harmonisation has proved to be the optimal tool to continue developing the regulatory 
framework for UCITS, the tools for regulatory and supervisory convergence under 
CESR have proved to be insufficient and, at times, ineffective due to uneven 
implementation of Level 3 Guidance which created yet another layer of fragmentation 
in financial regulation. Nonetheless, the mechanisms for cooperation under the ESMA 
Regulation could be applied as tools for reflexive governance of financial supervision 
which, when combined with a framework for the strengthening of the governance of 
national financial supervision, could emerge as the optimal solution to resolve the 
remaining internal market issues on UCITS.   
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Chapter 5 
 
QUASI-MAXIMUM HARMONISATION OF REGULATION AND 
GOVERNANCE OF SUPERVISION: A FRAMEWORK TO 
ADDRESS THE REMAINING BARRIERS TO THE CROSS-
BORDER ACTIVITY OF UCITS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  
Chapter 5 examines the substantive regime set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive and the 
manner in which this seeks to broaden the internal market for UCITS and the hard-law 
and soft-law tools used for this purpose. It examines the manner in which the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive achieves quasi-maximum harmonisation of regulation. The chapter 
also examines the governance mechanism for supervision of UCITS.  
 
The chapter argues and demonstrates that while quasi-maximum harmonisation of 
regulation has proved to be the optimal mechanism for the development of the 
regulatory framework for UCITS, the soft-law tools applied for the purpose of the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive did not achieve an optimum level of convergence, which in terms 
of the Lamfalussy process, is an essential ingredient for the operation of mutual 
recognition. The analysis determines that a number of limitations of the governance 
mechanism and the regulatory framework under the 1985 UCITS Directive resurfaced, 
although to a lesser extent, in the implementation of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. 
These limitations appear in the different interpretations and implementation of the 
requirements of the Directive as well as in the application of national marketing rules.  
 
These limitations continue to distort the effective operation of mutual recognition in the 
field of UCITS. Notwithstanding the Lamfalussy Report’s recommendation that 
supervisory convergence is an essential element for mutual recognition, the 
implementation of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive was characterised by a complete lack 
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of convergence of supervisory practices. Furthermore, the depositary has not been 
provided with access to the internal market.  
 
Chapter 5 identifies a number of options which may be employed in overcoming each of 
these limitations, which options are based on the mechanisms devised by EU policy-
makers to address the regulatory and supervisory concerns that emerged from the 
financial crisis.  
 
The central argument of the chapter is that in order to overcome the remaining 
regulatory and supervisory barriers to cross-border business in the field of UCITS, 
mutual recognition based on quasi-maximum harmonisation would have to be 
complemented with reflexive governance of financial supervision, based on cooperation 
arrangements for cross-border UCITS structures and mutual monitoring through peer 
reviews. These mechanisms may be applied as vehicles for experimentation and mutual 
learning and as a basis to create a framework for supervisory convergence.   
 
The chapter also argues that the strengthening of mutual trust between financial 
supervisors is critical for the proper functioning of reflexive governance of financial 
supervision. The chapter makes the point that mutual trust may be strengthened if the 
autonomy of financial supervisors from political and industry influence and the 
accountability structures to democratically elected institutions and peers are guaranteed 
through a specific regulatory framework created for this purpose at EU level.  
 
Chapter 5 is divided into three additional sections. Section 5.2 examines the substantive 
regulation set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive and identifies the remaining regulatory 
and supervisory barriers that have an impact on the effective operation of the 
mechanisms set in the Directive. This section also considers the current state of affairs 
of the governance of supervision in the context of UCITS. Section 5.3 analyses and 
proposes a mechanism of reflexive governance of financial supervision as the solution 
to the remaining barriers to cross-border activity of UCITS. Section 5.4 examines the 
importance of independence and autonomy of financial supervision and accountability 
for the strengthening of mutual trust between financial supervisors and makes a set of 
proposals for this purpose. Concluding remarks are made at the end of the chapter.  
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5.2 The 2009 UCITS IV Directive: Quasi-Maximum Harmonisation of Regulation 
for a Higher Degree of Mutual Recognition 
 
The framework set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive is based on the internal market 
principle that a deep pan-European investment market can only be achieved through 
mutual recognition based on harmonised investor protection requirements. To that end, 
the regulatory framework set in 2009 UCITS IV Directive places significant emphasis 
on investor protection by implementing, inter alia, authorisation requirements for each 
of the new elements set in the Directive and tight transparency rules to benefit investors.   
 
The analysis in the chapter demonstrates that in order to limit the discrepancies in the 
application of these requirements and therefore to achieve homogeneous investor 
protection across the EU, the Level 2 measures under the 2009 UCITS IV Directive 
have generally been drafted with rigid and detail requirements to achieve quasi-
maximum harmonisation. From the analysis a number of lessons can be drawn with 
respect to the remaining regulatory and supervisory barriers to the effective cross-border 
activity of UCITS. 
 
The analysis in this section covers the new areas of substantive regulation covered by 
the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. These are: [i] the mechanisms for a more effective 
passport for UCITS, in the form of a simplified notification procedure supported by the 
KIID; and [ii] the tools for consolidation of the European funds industry, namely: the 
mechanism for mergers; the framework for the establishment of master feeder 
structures; and the management company passport. 
 
5.2.1 Simplified Notification Procedure 
 
The application of a notification procedure for passporting a financial institution from 
its home Member State to a host Member State has been a crucial tool for the 
development of the internal market. It allows financial institutions that are authorised in 
a Member State to passport into and provide their services in other Member States, 
without requiring a separate authorisation in those States.  
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As analysed in chapter 3, the 1985 UCITS Directive established a passporting 
mechanism for UCITS. It required the management company to make a notification 
directly to the host financial supervisor, which had supervisory powers over the 
passporting UCITS. The Directive stipulated that cross-border marketing of UCITS had 
to comply with national marketing rules, a field of financial regulation where no degree 
of mutual recognition exists. The host financial supervisor was allowed a period of two 
months to verify compliance with national marketing rules. This period was on a 
number of occasions extended to up to nine months inter alia on grounds that the 
information presented by the management company was incomplete or that the structure 
of the particular UCITS was not compliant with the requirements of the Directive as 
applied in the host Member State.
1
  
 
The lack of regulatory convergence with regard to the application of the 1985 UCITS 
Directive, the length of time required in order to get access to the market of the host 
Member State, the differences in the national marketing rules applicable in the host 
Member States and the application of protectionist measures by financial supervisors, 
created uncertainty and confusion on the operation of the passport.
2
  
 
Notwithstanding every effort by CESR to achieve regulatory convergence and mitigate 
any supervisory barriers to the process for cross-border passporting of UCITS, through 
the application of Level 3 Guidance
3
, the obstacles to unhindered cross-border activity 
persisted. Mutual recognition on the basis of soft-law did not work as Member States 
took an uneven or incomplete approach to its implementation and CESR did not have 
the right tools to enforce the Level 3 Guidance. This was a limitation of Level 3 
Guidance as a mechanism to strengthen mutual recognition.    
 
A more efficient governance and regulatory mechanism for passporting had to be 
developed if mutual recognition in the field of UCITS was to operate properly. The 
2009 UCITS IV Directive made an overhaul of the hard-law mechanism for the 
passporting of UCITS. The burdensome management company-to-host financial 
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supervisor registration procedure was replaced with a MiFID
4
 type process based on 
home financial supervisor-to-host financial supervisor filing of notifications. This was 
complemented by substantive requirements, which prevent a host financial supervisor 
from applying ex-ante grounds to refuse the UCITS access to its market.  
 
Under the 2009 UCITS IV Directive, as supplemented by the Level 2 Commission 
Regulation on passporting and the exchange of information,
5
 the management company 
is required to make the necessary notification to its home financial supervisor which, in 
turn, is to use a standard notification letter to notify the host financial supervisor. The 
home financial supervisor is required to notify the host financial supervisor within ten 
working days of receipt of the notification from the UCITS.
6
 The host financial 
supervisor is required to acknowledge receipt within five working days.
7
 The specific 
content and format of the notification letter is also regulated in terms of the Commission 
Regulation. To facilitate the process the Commission Regulation also stipulates that the 
notification is to be made by electronic means and through a designated e-mail address.  
 
In order to ensure an unobstructed notification process, the UCITS is allowed to 
commence activity in the host Member State as soon as it receives the notification from 
the home financial supervisor that the relevant notification has been sent to the host 
financial supervisor.
8
 Therefore, legally the UCITS is not required to await any form of 
confirmation from the UCITS host financial supervisor. This points to the policy-
makers’ intention to remove any form of supervisory barriers to access to the internal 
market. However, certain inconsistencies still prevail. In 2012 a stakeholder pointed out:  
 
… the approach taken by some countries has been that a UCITS is not permitted 
to access the market until it has been notified by the home regulator that the host 
regulator has received the complete notification package. Under Commission 
Regulation No 584/2010, the host Member State has up to five working days 
from receipt of the notification package to notify the home regulator that it has 
received the complete notification package. As a result, UCITS are having to 
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wait up to 15 working days from submission of a complete notification package 
before they can access the markets of certain Member States. This approach is 
inconsistent with the intention of the UCITS IV Directive and would benefit 
from clarification to ensure a uniform approach is adopted by all Member 
States.
9
   
 
The above is yet another example of the internal market difficulties that may emerge 
from an uneven implementation and interpretation of financial regulation, even where 
minimum harmonisation has been replaced with a framework which aims at achieving 
quasi-maximum harmonisation. This is a limitation of the regulatory mechanism for 
mutual recognition set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive.  
 
Notwithstanding the differences in the implementation of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive, 
in general, the level of harmonisation and detail achieved in regulating the passporting 
process applicable to UCITS and the use of a Regulation as the legal instrument for 
implementing measures in this field, attests to the policy-makers’ intention of 
significantly reducing the possibility of gold-plating and the various possible forms of 
administrative type obstacles that could be applied by Member States to slow down the 
passporting of UCITS.  
 
The new provisions also achieve a considerable reduction in the time-line by when the 
UCITS may start marketing within the host Member States. Overall the streamlined 
approach does not leave any discretion to the home and host financial supervisors with 
regard to the processing of a notification. Member States are only given a certain degree 
of flexibility with regard to the content and the extent of application of national 
marketing rules. In terms of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive, compliance with these rules 
may only be verified by the host financial supervisor after the UCITS has accessed its 
market.
10
 Albeit, in the event that the marketing material is non-compliant, the UCITS 
may be subject to ex-post enforcement action by the host financial supervisor. This 
generates costs, incurred to determine ex-ante whether the marketing material is 
compliant with national marketing rules.  
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The new mechanism for the passporting of UCITS, when compared to the framework in 
the 1985 UCITS Directive, reduced the administrative burden associated with the 
process for the cross-border marketing of UCITS. However, the application of national 
marketing rules by host Member States remains an obstacle to the successful operation 
of the internal market for UCITS. In 2012, a stakeholder pointed out:  
 
The UCITS IV Directive aimed at streamlining the notification process; 
however, the implementation of such ‘product passport’ is still not fully 
harmonised among the different Member States, which may add some specific 
requirements on the distribution of UCITS on their national territory. For 
example, marketing documents are currently not standardised at EU level and 
require host regulator approval. More generally, harmonising marketing rules 
would reduce legal uncertainty and in turn improve the efficient implementation 
of UCITS IV.
11
  
 
Differences in national marketing rules applicable in the host Member States and a 
heavy handed supervisory approach to the enforcement of such rules may render 
ineffective the simplified notification procedure for cross-border marketing, as obstacles 
may still arise post access to the market. This is especially relevant where Member 
States have declared their intention of prohibiting the marketing of a passporting UCITS 
if its marketing material does not fully comply with the national marketing rules.
12
  
 
To facilitate access to the national marketing rules by a passporting UCITS, Member 
States are required by the 2009 UCITS IV Directive
13
 to ensure that these rules are 
easily accessible from a distance and by electronic means. Member States are also 
required by the Directive to ensure that the information on national marketing rules is 
drafted in a language that is customary in the sphere of international finance, namely the 
English language. Yet, difficulties may still occur in finding out what are the applicable 
national marketing rules in the different Member States.  
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To verify the adequacy of implementation of the requirements of the 2009 UCITS IV 
Directive on easy access to the national marketing rules, empirical research was carried 
out for the purpose of the thesis on the web-site of the financial supervisors of the ten 
largest Member States by population. The following table summarises the result of the 
search for the phrases ‘UCITS marketing rules’ or ‘arrangements for marketing’ or 
‘UCITS passporting’ performed through the search facility of the web-site of the 
relevant financial supervisors.  
 
Table 5.1 - Easy Access to National Marketing Rules  
Financial Supervisor Marketing Rules Located - Yes/No 
Belgian FSMA
14
 No 
Dutch AFM
15
 No 
German BAFIN
16
 Yes 
French AMF
17
 No 
Italian CONSOB
18
 No 
Polish FSA
19
 No 
Portuguese CMVM
20
 No 
Romanian CNVM
21
 Yes 
Spanish CNMV
22
 No 
UK FCA
23
 Yes 
 
The research established that generally the information on the national marketing rules 
applicable to a passporting UCITS in the host Member State is not easily retrievable 
from the web-site of the relevant financial supervisor. Therefore, the implementation of 
the 2009 UCITS IV Directive does not seem to have facilitated access to the national 
marketing rules applicable in the host Member State. This is yet another example of the 
barriers to the cross-border operations of UCITS that surface from the application of 
national marketing rules. It demonstrates that even though a maximum harmonisation 
approach to regulation is applied, as in the case of the mechanism for passporting of 
UCITS and for the disclosure of national marketing rules, this could still result to be 
unproductive if the harmonised regulation is not implemented and interpreted correctly 
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by the Member States. This is another limitation of the regulatory mechanism for 
mutual recognition set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive.  
 
In the final analysis, a high degree of harmonisation has proved to be insufficient to 
eliminate the possible distortions that can arise from uneven implementation and 
interpretation of EU regulation. Soft-law mechanisms combined with mechanisms that 
guarantee proper application by financial supervisors, are an essential part of the 
formula if mutual recognition is to function properly and attain its purpose. 
 
5.2.2 Key Investor Information Document (‘KIID’) 
 
The KIID forms a significant part of the reinforced investor protection framework 
established in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. The KIID was developed on the idea that 
investor protection can be strengthened through the creation of a document which 
provides simplified and comparable information on UCITS. The development of the 
KIID forms an integral part of the Commission’s consumer empowerment policy
24
 and 
the Commission’s attempt to strengthen mutual trust between Member States in the 
field of UCITS thereby enhancing easy access to internal market.  
 
It has been established that investors suffer from considerable disadvantage, through 
sub-optimal choices resulting from inadequate transparency and comparability in 
financial products.
25
 It is therefore the Commission’s policy that financial regulation 
should create the mechanisms, which empower investors to make optimal decisions by 
being able to identify their own preferences and the available options in this regard.
26
 
The KIID is based on the investor empowerment model, as it is a tool for helping retail 
investors to reach informed investment decisions.
27
 This should, in turn, strengthen the 
internal market, as more informed investors who are in a position to compare different 
UCITS should, in theory, support stronger cross-border investment.  
 
The KIID replaced the simplified prospectus introduced by 2001 UCITS III Directive 
which was aimed at providing investors with understandable information to enable them 
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to make informed investment decisions. The simplified prospectus was however the 
victim of inconsistent implementation by Member States.
28
 In 2006 the Commission 
expressed the following concern regarding the effectiveness of the simplified 
prospectus:  
 
The simplified prospectus was intended to provide investors and intermediaries 
with basic information about the possible risks, associated charges, and expected 
outcomes of the respective product. However, it has manifestly failed. In most 
cases, the document is too long and not understood by its intended readers. It has 
been the victim of divergent implementation and gold-plating: the relevant 
Commission Recommendation has been honoured more in the breach than in the 
practice. The result is a massive paper-chase of limited value to investors and a 
considerable overhead for the fund industry.
29
 
 
The simplified prospectus had failed to achieve the purpose for which it had been 
created making it essential for the Commission to rethink the whole simplified 
disclosure procedure for UCITS.
30
 The need to establish the KIID became more 
prevalent as a consequence of the financial crisis, which revealed that sophisticated 
financial instruments had been sold to investors on the basis of documents that were not 
understood by investors.
31
 The financial crisis exposed the potential mis-selling that 
could occur where investors acquire financial products without understanding fully the 
nature of the product. This state of affairs exacerbated the necessity to require clearer, 
consistent and simplified disclosure on financial products to investors.  
 
Given the experience with the simplified prospectus, the Commission could ill afford 
getting the formula for simplified and comparable information to investors wrong for 
the second time. The KIID was the result of meticulous research and consultation with 
stakeholders carried out by the Commission and CESR on the fundamental information 
which an investor requires to make an investment decision and on the format in which 
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that information should be presented.
32
 The result being a two-page document which 
contains information that should allow an investor to understand the UCITS being 
offered.  
 
The Commission and CESR established that the information necessary for investment 
decisions includes: [i] the UCITS’ investment policy and objectives; [ii] the UCITS’ 
risk reward profile; [iii] the costs and charges incurred when investing in the UCITS; 
and [iv] its past performance. The 2009 UCITS IV Directive stipulates the detailed 
requirements on each of these elements which all together formulate the KIID. The 
sequence in which these elements should be presented is also regulated, as it was 
deemed essential for the organisation of the information to be logical and the language 
appropriate for retail investors.
33
 The sequence was established on the basis of investor 
preferences as determined by the Commission in 2009 further to a study that tested the 
contents and form of the KIID.
34
  
 
The regulatory framework for the KIID established in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive is 
supplemented by a Level 2 Commission Regulation on the KIID
35
 and six pieces of 
CESR Level 3 Guidance. The level of detail in which the regulatory framework goes 
into describing the content and the mechanics that should be applied in formulating a 
KIID is significant and seeks to ensure a uniform approach to the implementation of the 
KIID without any inconsistencies. Therefore, to address the inefficiencies of the past, 
the 2009 UCITS IV Directive replaced the regulatory framework for a simplified 
prospectus, which was based on the principle of minimum harmonisation, with a 
regulatory framework for the KIID that aims at achieving maximum harmonisation. 
This is sustained by a specific requirement that the KIID should be issued and used 
without any supplements.
36
 This supports the aim that no room should be left for 
possible gold plating by the Member States.  
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In areas such as the KIID, where maximum harmonisation has been realised through the 
application of a Regulation, mutual recognition would not, in first instance, appear to 
remain relevant to that specific area of regulation. Such a Regulation is applicable 
across the EU on the basis of a single regulatory framework. However, when considered 
within the context of the functioning of the internal market for UCITS, where minimum 
harmonisation of regulation is still common, instances of maximum harmonisation 
should be interpreted as a means to strengthen the overall mutual recognition between 
Member States. Indeed, it reinforces mutual trust between these States in areas which 
are exceptionally important for accomplishing the objectives of financial regulation, 
particularly the protection of the investors in UCITS.   
 
The rationale for selecting a Regulation as the legal instrument for the Level 2 measures 
and the objective of achieving maximum harmonisation is explained in the Commission 
Regulation:  
 
The form of a Regulation is justified as this form alone can ensure that the 
exhaustive content of the key investor information is harmonised. Furthermore, a 
key investor information document will be more efficient where requirements 
applicable to it are identical in all Member States. All stakeholders should 
benefit from a harmonised regime on the form and content of the disclosure, 
which will ensure that information about investment opportunities in the 
UCITS’ market is consistent and comparable.
37
 
 
Nonetheless, specific areas of insufficient harmonisation have been identified which 
have had an impact on the way in which the regulatory framework for the KIID has 
been applied. In 2012 a stakeholder made the following remarks on the negative 
consequences of insufficient harmonisation:  
 
Some definitions are still missing in the UCITS IV directive, which lead to its 
provisions being interpreted in different ways by the national authorities of the 
Member States. For instance, the concept of “fund of funds” is not precisely 
defined at European level and needs to be clarified in order to ensure a higher 
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level of harmonisation throughout the EU. The absence of a definition at 
European level has led to concrete issues, such as inconsistencies impacting the 
KIID. 
 
Indeed, the KIID introduced by the UCITS IV directive sets specific obligations 
(in particular relating to the disclosure of charges) for funds that invest a 
“significant” portion of their assets in underlying UCITS. This might therefore 
lead to an inconsistent disclosure in the different Member States of the 
investment policy of the fund or of the charges, as they might have a different 
understanding of what a “significant portion” is. As a consequence, investors are 
not in a position to compare the KIIDs of funds of funds domiciled in different 
Member States.
38
 
 
The views expressed by this stakeholder suggest that even though an area of financial 
regulation seeks to achieve maximum harmonisation, differences in implementation 
may still arise in Member States where the specific Regulation contains insufficient 
harmonisation of specific areas contained in the said Regulation. This results in an 
unproductive outcome in terms of achieving investor protection as it has a negative 
impact on the comparability of specific types of UCITS such as funds of funds, 
particularly where these are sold across-borders within the EU. Moreover, an uneven 
approach to the Level 3 Guidance by CESR further damages the objective of achieving 
information about investment opportunities in UCITS that is consistent and comparable.  
 
In the final analysis, deviations may compromise the effectiveness of the KIID. At the 
time when the Level 3 Guidance was issued by CESR in 2010, the Commission 
declared its intention that these should eventually be adopted in the form of technical 
standards drafted by ESMA. It is submitted that the Commission’s position 
demonstrates the extent to which internal market difficulties that may arise from uneven 
implementation, may trigger a process whereby soft-law is reconstituted into hard-law 
in order to realise the level of harmonisation necessary to achieve the investor 
protection that guarantees mutual recognition. This changes the nature of soft-law to 
almost hard-law, albeit without the official hardening having been formalised.  
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5.2.3 A Mechanism for Mergers  
 
The regulation of mergers is one of the consolidation techniques stipulated in the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive. Mergers in the funds industry are generally motivated by a desire 
to consolidate the business, achieve economies of scale and eliminate funds with poor 
performance.
39
 
 
The funds industry operates in a way wherein the average cost of a fund, such as the 
costs relating to the services provided by a management company, depositary and 
auditor, is inversely proportional to the size of the fund. The bigger the fund the lower 
the average cost of the service rendered to the fund. In 2007 the Commission expressed 
a concern that 54% of European funds managed less than !50m of assets and that the 
average European fund size was one fifth of that of an American fund.
40
 Investors in 
European funds were therefore paying more than investors in American funds to 
maintain their investment. Through consolidation, the costs of UCITS could be reduced 
by !5 to !6 billion annually.
41
  
 
The fragmentation in the UCITS industry was indicative of a possible failure of the 
internal market project to achieve an optimum level of integration in this field. The 
1985 UCITS Directive did not prevent fund mergers. However, it did not address many 
practical obstacles that needed to be tackled in order to facilitate such mergers. Under 
the 1985 UCITS Directive a merger of UCITS depended on company law, contractual 
law, trust law and tax law set in the national legislative framework of the Member 
States. Relying exclusively on national law makes cross-border fund mergers difficult at 
best and outright impossible at worst.
42
  
 
Different legal techniques exist in the EU to carry out a fund merger. As a consequence 
achieving harmonisation while at the same time catering for the different legal traditions 
of Member States presented a significant challenge for the legislator. To address this 
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challenge, the legislator applied a combination of minimum and maximum 
harmonisation provisions in order to achieve a sufficient degree of mutual recognition. 
This resulted in quasi-maximum harmonisation of regulation which allows for the 
necessary flexibility in order to respect the different legal traditions at national level.  
 
The main objective of harmonisation of regulation in the field of mergers is that of 
achieving the degree of investor protection necessary to allow uninhibited cross-border 
mergers of UCITS. The framework set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive seeks to ensure 
that the merger of UCITS does not prejudice the rights of investors, while at the same 
time allowing for the degree of flexibility with regard to merger techniques that can be 
applied at national level. In this regard, only those merger techniques which are most 
commonly applied in Member States are harmonised by the 2009 UCITS IV 
Directive.
43
   
 
To respect national differences in this field, the Directive leaves it optional for Member 
States to decide on the extent of application of the prescribed techniques. Nonetheless, 
to allow an unrestrained operation of the cross-border merger mechanism, each Member 
State is required to recognise a transfer of assets resulting from any one of the stipulated 
merger techniques.
44
 Therefore, even though the merger technique applied in the 
Member State of the merging UCITS is not recognised as such by the law of the 
Member State of the receiving UCITS, the Member State of that UCITS is still required 
to recognise the transfer of assets which occurs as a consequence of the merger.  
 
The three merger techniques which are harmonised by the 2009 UCITS IV Directive are 
the: [i] merger by absorption; [ii] merger by creation of a new fund; and [iii] merger by 
a scheme of amalgamation. The operation of mergers is subject to a number of investor 
protection measures which are built upon a combination of obligations requiring: [i] the 
merger to be authorised by the financial supervisor of the Member State of the merging 
UCITS; [ii] third party monitoring of the merger procedure; and [iii] detailed 
transparency with the financial supervisor and the investors in the UCITS. A 
combination of different degrees of harmonisation is applied to achieve the degree of 
investor protection which is necessary for mutual recognition in the field of mergers.  
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Financial regulation operates a mechanism of control which is largely based on a 
requirement for authorisation, wherein a financial supervisor verifies compliance with 
the applicable requirements before a particular activity may be carried out. The merger 
requires the approval of the financial supervisor/s of the merging UCITS and not that of 
the receiving UCITS because mergers generally have less of an impact on unit-holders 
of the receiving UCITS.
45
  However, to achieve cooperation between financial 
supervisors, which is essential for the successful operation of the consolidation 
mechanisms set in the Directive, the authorisation of the merger must be carried out in 
close collaboration with the financial supervisor of the receiving UCITS.  
 
The 2009 UCITS IV Directive lays down the process for the approval of the merger of 
UCITS. This involves the merging UCITS providing its home financial supervisor with 
various documents, in particular the endorsed copy of the draft terms of the proposed 
merger. The 2009 UCITS IV Directive stipulates the categories of information that 
should be included in the terms of the merger. In terms of the Directive, financial 
supervisors are not allowed to require additional categories of information to be 
included in the terms of the merger. Therefore, the requirements on the categories of 
information try to achieve a maximum degree of consistency on what is to be included 
in the terms of the merger. This aims at achieving uniformity in the categories of 
information irrespective of the merger technique applied. This homogeneity is important 
for investor protection and to achieve mutual recognition between Member States in this 
field.  
 
To reinforce the level of scrutiny on the merger, the 2009 UCITS IV Directive requires 
the auditors or the depositary of the UCITS to make an independent valuation report on 
the proposed merger for consideration by the financial supervisor.
46
 It is a common 
feature of financial regulation to allow for a certain degree of reliance on third parties 
for the carrying out of certain supervisory checks. A financial supervisor’s resources are 
limited and cannot allow for close supervision of all the variables which make a 
financial market. Therefore, it is sensible to draw from the work of third parties that are 
vested with quasi-supervisory duties. The final responsibility for the supervisory 
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function, however, remains that of the financial supervisor that must still undertake 
checks before granting approval.  
 
Other significant safeguards for investor protection have also been put in place. The 
delicate position of retails investors that are faced with a cross-border merger merits 
particular consideration. For retail investors, a cross-border merger is likely to create 
greater ambiguities than a domestic merger, and may render access to information more 
difficult, thereby raising the potential information asymmetries and retail investor 
disadvantage. The 2009 UCITS IV Directive contains transparency requirements which 
seek to ensure that investors are able to make an informed judgement as to the impact of 
the proposed merger on their investment. The Directive stipulates detailed requirements 
on information to be provided to the investors of the merging UCITS and those of the 
receiving UCITS.
47
  
 
Transparency with investors is an area where homogeneity and consistency are coherent 
with the objective of achieving a high degree of investor protection across the EU which 
should provide investors with the necessary comfort about their rights. For this purpose, 
even though the relevant Level 2 measures issued in this area were adopted in the form 
of a Directive, the legislator tried to achieve maximum harmonisation by prohibiting 
financial supervisors from requiring the UCITS to include information other than that 
which is stipulated in terms of the detailed requirements set in the Directive.
 48
 This 
demonstrates that even where a Directive is used as the legal instrument for 
harmonisation, maximum harmonisation may still be accomplished.  
 
The 2009 UCITS IV Directive prohibits the management company from charging the 
unit-holders for the merger. Moreover, as unit-holders might disagree with the merger, 
the 2009 UCITS IV Directive gives them the opportunity to redeem their units or to 
convert them into units of another UCITS with similar investment policies.
49
 The 
granting of this essential investor protection option could raise operational difficulties 
for the merging UCITS. Where investors are given the opportunity to redeem their 
holding, UCITS with an average performance are likely to lose approximately 25% of 
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unit-holders.
50
 This reality may distort the full potential of mergers as a tool to achieve 
consolidation. It is however necessary if the investor protection objective is to be 
respected.  
 
The framework for the merger of UCITS based on quasi-maximum harmonisation 
requirements is justified given the national differences that exist with regard to merger 
techniques set in the legislative framework of the different Member States and should 
allow for the degree of mutual recognition which is required to facilitate the application 
of cross-border mergers of UCITS. However, achieving the right balance of harmonised 
and national regulation is not the only determinant for unobstructed cross-border 
mergers of UCITS. Given the involvement of financial supervisors in different Member 
States for the execution of cross-border mergers, implementing a cross-border merger 
agenda also depends on adequate supervisory convergence.  
 
The 2009 UCITS IV Directive contains detailed provisions on cooperation amongst 
financial supervisors including provisions in the field of mergers. However, empirical 
research carried out for the purpose of the thesis suggests that the convergence of 
supervisory practices in the field of investment management in the EU, and particularly 
in the field of UCITS, remains weak.
51
 Different practices apply in Member States with 
regard to reporting requirements, as well as in the type and extent of checks that are 
carried out by financial supervisors when granting an authorisation, including 
authorisations in respect of mergers. In particular where the execution of the merger 
requires the formation of a new UCITS, since the requirements on the authorisation, 
constitution and functioning of UCITS set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive are based on 
minimum harmonisation type regulation.
52
 This may result in regulatory and 
supervisory arbitrage and could have an impact on the functioning of the framework for 
cross-border mergers.  
 
The minimal degree of harmonisation of the regulation of the authorisation, constitution 
and functioning of UCITS and the lack of supervisory convergence in the field of 
investment management are limitations of the regulatory mechanism for mutual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50
 StateStreet (n1).  
51
 ESMA, ‘Peer Review – MMF Guidelines’ 15.04.13 (ESMA/2013/476)<http://goo.gl/lSbWcl>accessed  
16.03.14.   
52
 Directive 2009/65/EC, article 5.  
! 183 
recognition under the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. They also have an impact on the other 
consolidation mechanisms set in the Directive.  
 
5.2.4 Master-Feeder Structures 
 
Fund mergers are not the only route to achieve consolidation. This is not the preferred 
choice in cases where the appeal of a UCITS to investors depends on the extent to 
which it caters for their specific needs in the Member State in which the investor is 
located. In this respect, it is argued that master-feeder structures become the most viable 
option to achieve consolidation.
53
  
 
A feeder fund invests 85% or more of the monies of investors into a master fund, which 
in turn invests its assets according to the investment objectives, polices and restrictions 
set in its prospectus. Master-feeder structures allow management companies to attain the 
economies of scale and cost efficiencies that may be derived from larger pools of assets 
through the use of a master fund. They also give management companies the 
opportunity to create dedicated feeder funds that satisfy the requirements of the 
domestic market they are meant to target.
54
  
 
The failure of the negotiations of the 1993 UCITS II proposal, which proposed the 
formation of cross-border master-feeder structures based on minimum harmonisation of 
regulation, suggested that a higher degree of harmonisation of investor protection 
regulation would be required if this consolidation mechanism was to be allowed to 
operate in the EU. As in the case of the regulation of cross-border mergers, the EU 
institutions employed the quasi-maximum harmonisation technique whereby minimum 
harmonisation was combined with maximum harmonisation in the same field of 
regulation.  
 
The aim of substantive regulation in this field continues to be that of achieving a 
sufficient degree of harmonisation of investor protection regulation which allows 
mutual recognition between the Member States. This form of regulation aims at 
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facilitating the effective operation of the internal market by ensuring a sufficient degree 
of homogeneous investor protection throughout the EU.
55
  The investor protection 
requirements follow the same pattern as those stipulated in the context of cross-border 
mergers of UCITS. These stipulate requirements on: [i] authorisation applicable to 
master-feeder structures; [ii] third party monitoring; and [iii] transparency with 
investors and the dis-application of charges. 
 
The 2009 UCITS IV Directive requires the master-feeder structure to be approved by 
the financial supervisor of the feeder UCITS. For this purpose the fund documentation, 
the agreements establishing the master-feeder structure and the information to investors 
must be submitted for the relevant financial supervisors’ consideration. In order to 
ensure proper supervisory cooperation, the 2009 UCITS IV Directive stipulates that 
where a feeder UCITS is established in a Member State other than that of the master 
UCITS, the feeder UCITS should provide its financial supervisor with an attestation 
from the financial supervisor of the master UCITS that this complies with the 
requirements of the Directive.
56
 
 
The degree of harmonisation achieved in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive with regard to 
the conditions that must be met and the documents and information that are to be 
provided to the relevant financial supervisors in the context of the approval of a master-
feeder structure is meant to be exhaustive.
57
 As in the case of the mechanism for 
mergers, although the Level 2 measures in the field of master-feeder structures were 
adopted in the form of a Directive, the relevant conditions still seek to realise maximum 
harmonisation of regulation. Therefore, in approving the structure the financial 
supervisor is only allowed to verify compliance with the requirements of the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive and is not permitted to require any additional conditions to be met 
by the UCITS.  
 
To ensure the proper functioning of the relationship between the feeder UCITS and the 
master UCITS, a formal agreement must be endorsed by the UCITS outlining the terms 
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of the relationship.
58
 The regulation of the categories of information to be included in  
the formal agreements is another example of maximum harmonisation, as the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive prohibits Member States from requiring the formal agreement to 
cover elements other than those stipulated in the Directive.
59
 However, where the feeder 
UCITS and the master UCITS have the same manager, a formal agreement is not 
required and the arrangements between these UCITS may be drawn up in internal 
conduct of business arrangements.
60
 This simplified approach to the formalisation of an 
established modus operandi is a good example of the application of the principle of 
proportionality in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. It would have been unnecessary over-
regulation had the Directive required a feeder UCITS and a master UCITS which are 
managed by the same entity to enter into a formal agreement, as this generally deals 
with matters which fall within the responsibility of the management company.  
 
To further strengthen the investor protection framework with regard to master-feeder 
structures, the 2009 UCITS IV Directive requires the establishment of an information 
sharing agreement between the depositary of the feeder UCITS and that of the master 
UCITS.
61
 This requirement applies where the feeder UCITS and the master UCITS have 
different depositaries. The same requirement also applies with regard to the auditors of 
feeder UCITS and master UCITS.
62
 The categories of information that should be 
included in the agreements are harmonised by the 2009 UCITS IV Directive.  
 
At the time when the 2009 UCITS IV Directive was adopted, harmonisation of the 
regulation of depositaries was still at a minimum level. In view of the difference in the 
approach to the regulation of depositaries at national level, a certain degree of flexibility 
is allowed in relation to the content of the agreement on exchange of information 
between depositaries. This is an example where the legislator exercised special care not 
to harmonise to the extent that the depositary could be required to carry out tasks that 
are forbidden or not provided for under the national law of their home Member State.
63
 
At the same time, however, the degree of harmonisation achieved ensures that there is a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58
 Directive 2009/65/EC, article 60(1); Directive 2010/42/EU, article 10. 
59
 Directive 2010/42/EU, recital 7.  
60
 Directive 2009/65/EC, article 60; Directive 2010/42/EU, chapter III, section I, subsection III. 
61
 Directive 2009/65/EC, article 61;Directive 2010/44/EU, Chapter III, Section 3, Sub-section 1. 
62
 Directive 2009/65/EC, article 62;Directive 2010/44/EU, Chapter III, Section 3, Sub-section 2. 
63
 Directive 2010/44/EC, recital 15.  
! 186 
proper flow of a minimum amount of information and documentation that is required by 
the feeder UCITS’ depositary so as to be in a position to fulfil its duties.
64
  
 
In order to achieve a high degree of investor protection, the 2009 UCITS IV Directive 
also contains specific requirements stipulating transparency with investors.
65
 The 
prospectus issued in relation to a feeder UCITS must contain specific reference to the 
fact that the UCITS is a feeder UCITS of a particular master UCITS. This should also 
include a description of the master UCITS and an indication of how the prospectus of 
the master UCITS may be obtained.
66
 In this way, the prospective investor in the feeder 
UCITS is informed about the nature and complexity of the investment and has the 
opportunity to obtain detailed information on the master UCITS.  
 
Asymmetric information is not the only investor protection concern that arises from 
master-feeder structures. Applying unwarranted fees to investors may become one of 
the features of these structures.
67
 In order to ensure that investors are not subject to 
unjustified charges, the 2009 UCITS IV Directive prohibits the master UCITS from 
charging feeder UCITS subscription
68
 and redemption fees.
69
 This should avoid the 
double application of fees to investors first at the level of the feeder UCITS and 
eventually at the level of the master UCITS. It also suggests the legislators’ concern 
about the use of master-feeder structures to generate unjustified income for management 
companies.  
 
One may argue that the 2009 UCITS IV Directive creates a suitable regulatory 
environment which should allow a sufficient degree of mutual recognition in the field of 
master-feeder structures.
70
 However, as in the case of the regulation of cross-border 
mergers, the effectiveness of master-feeder structures in achieving an optimal degree of 
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consolidation will depend on the extent to which financial supervisors will facilitate the 
operation of these structures on a cross-border basis through supervisory convergence.   
 
Given the extensive supervisory cooperation mechanisms, which are provided for in the 
2009 UCITS IV Directive, in particular the attestation mechanism mentioned above, 
cooperation amongst financial supervisors in this field is encouraged. However, 
different regulatory conditions and supervisory approaches exist with regard to the 
authorisation of a new UCITS and the on-going regulation and supervision of the 
constitution and functioning of the UCITS, particularly as this is an area which was not 
adjusted as part of the revision of the Directive and remains entirely based on minimum 
harmonisation of regulation.
71
  
 
Moreover, as already examined in the previous section, the on-going supervision of 
UCITS, is an area where different practices exist and where minimal convergence, if 
any, has been achieved. The relevant supervisory processes vary between financial 
supervisors to a significant extent. For instance, as part of the authorisation procedure 
some financial supervisors endorse some or all of the UCITS documentation while 
others mainly depend on ex-post supervision of documentation on a sample basis.
72
 The 
uneven approach to regulation and supervision creates opportunities for regulatory and 
supervisory arbitrage, which result in mutual distrust between financial supervisors, and 
generate uncertainty that may disrupt the formation of cross-border activity including 
the operation of cross-border master-feeder structures.  
 
5.2.5 Management Company Passport  
 
The 2001 UCITS III Directive was the first attempt to establish a mechanism for mutual 
recognition which would allow cross-border management of UCITS. However, at 
implementation stage, national financial supervisors were of the view that management 
companies should not be allowed to provide collective portfolio management on a 
cross-border basis as splitting financial supervision between the UCITS and the 
depositary on the one hand, and the management company on the other, would have 
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weakened investor protection.
73
 Financial supervisors were not yet prepared to accept 
mutual recognition with regard to the provision of collective portfolio management and 
as a consequence they collectively agreed that UCITS would only be allowed to 
designate a management company established in the same Member State and therefore 
subject to supervision by the same national financial supervisor.
74
  
 
The supervisory restriction to the provision of collective portfolio management on a 
cross-border basis went against the fundamental freedoms provided in the Treaty and 
the 2001 UCITS III Directive. Evidence on the benefits of a management company 
passport, gathered during discussions and consultations with stakeholders on the future 
of investment management in the EU, led the Commission to consider a fresh initiative 
in this field. An effective management company passport was another element of a 
package of mechanisms to be introduced in the UCITS Directive with the primary aim 
of bringing about more efficiency through consolidation.
75
  
 
The adoption of a new proposal for an effective management company passport proved 
to be a rough road to ride as not all stakeholders were in favour of this proposal. The 
industry in Luxembourg and Ireland were adamant that the best way forward for the 
UCITS Directive was that of remaining a product based legislative framework focused 
on creating an internal market for UCITS rather than extending the benefits of the 
internal market to management companies.
76
 In the context of the examination of the 
conditions for mutual recognition, it is relevant to refer to the main argument made 
against the introduction of the management company passport and the conditions that in 
the end made its adoption achievable.  
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The anti-passport movement submitted the general argument that proximity allows for 
comprehensive financial regulation and supervision and that a management company 
passport would make it more difficult for financial supervisors and the depositary to 
fulfil their monitoring duties.
77
 Fragmentation of regulation and supervision of a UCITS 
structure into different parts would have an impact on the overall robustness of the 
regulatory framework and supervisory processes of UCITS. This split could, as a 
consequence, have an impact on investor protection and result in a loss of investor 
confidence in the UCITS brand.
78
  
 
These arguments could not be ignored. Consequently, the Commission took the prudent 
approach of leaving out this key development from its 2008 Proposal for a recast 
Directive.
79
 The Commission requested CESR’s advice on the supervisory and technical 
conditions that had to be in place to allow mutual recognition to operate in the field of 
fund management i.e. the conditions that are needed to ensure that a management 
company passport is consistent with the principle that investors in funds that are 
managed on a cross-border basis should not be exposed to additional legal and 
operational risks, or lower standards of supervision than investors in domestically 
managed UCITS.
80
 CESR provided the Commission with a solution which sought to 
resolve the apparent mutual distrust between financial supervisors by proposing a clear 
separation of regulatory and supervisory responsibilities between the home and host 
Member State of the management company. CESR also recommended the 
implementation of a set of measures that would ensure that the home and host financial 
supervisors would have sufficient powers and information to discharge their duties 
effectively.
81
  
 
In order to resolve concerns about fragmented supervision, CESR’s advice went into 
great length in describing the cooperation arrangements that should be in place between 
the home and the host financial supervisor. It also recommended that these should have 
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the power and should be encouraged to conclude bilateral or multilateral cooperation 
agreements that could also include the formation of cross-border colleges of financial 
supervisors. CESR’s advice exemplifies the flexibility of existing governance 
mechanisms for financial supervision, such as the M.O.U. and the formation of colleges 
of financial supervisors and how these, together with new mechanisms such as 
delegation of supervisory tasks, may be applied in different fields of financial 
supervision in order to seek to address difficulties arising from potential mutual distrust.   
 
Nonetheless, during the discussions at CESR the financial supervisors of five Member 
States objected to the proposals as they remained of the view that applying a 
management company passport would not have permitted the financial supervisors of 
the UCITS to perform their duties effectively.
82
 The same dissenting views were also 
expressed by a number of Member States during the negotiations in Council.
83
 This 
position inter alia points towards a lack of confidence in the tools for supervisory 
cooperation and convergence as a means to overcome supervisory difficulties that arise 
from cross-border structures. 
 
At the end of the process, the management company passport was adopted on the basis 
of a regulatory framework which, by and large, reflected CESR’s advice. The EU 
institutions were cautious and did not make significant alterations to CESR’s proposal 
as these would have tilted the well-thought supervisory balance between the home and 
the host financial supervisor. This supervisory balance was deemed essential to allow 
the management company passport to work.  
 
The formula for the functioning of the management company passport was based on a 
split of the regulation and the supervision of activity of the management company 
between the home and the host Member State, sustained by detailed requirements on 
cooperation and exchange of information between the relevant financial supervisors. 
The regulatory framework contains three categories of substantive requirements which 
must be complied with by a management company: [i] authorisation requirements 
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which must be satisfied by an applicant at licensing stage
84
; [ii] on-going obligations in 
the form of organisational requirements
85
, conduct of business requirements
86
 and 
prudential requirements
87
; and [iii] rules applicable to the constitution and functioning 
of the UCITS
88
.   
 
The degree of harmonisation achieved for the purpose of the requirements applicable to 
the management company is a mixture of minimum harmonisation requirements and 
maximum harmonisation requirements, thereby achieving quasi-maximum 
harmonisation. Minimum harmonisation is the technique applied in fields such as the 
authorisation requirements, prudential requirements, the rules on reporting and the 
prospectus where the Member States are allowed to establish stricter rules than those 
stipulated in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive.
89
 On the other hand, the extent of 
harmonisation achieved particularly through Level 2
90
 measures with regard to the 
organisational and conduct of business requirements lean towards maximum 
harmonisation.  
 
The extent of harmonisation of the organisational and conduct of business requirements 
suggest that the EU institutions were more concerned about the impact of potential 
regulatory arbitrage from significant differences in these fields of regulation rather than 
in others. The high degree of harmonisation sought is also indicative of their 
significance in fostering confidence among financial supervisors and thereby allowing 
mutual recognition to work. The nature of conduct of business rules applicable to a 
management company makes proximity of supervision essential and therefore the host 
Member State is directly involved in the monitoring of their compliance. Therefore, 
since the conduct of business requirements of a host Member State would apply to a 
passporting management company, a high degree of harmonisation of this form of 
regulation was also important in order to limit duplication of the same category of 
procedures or functions by management companies, thus avoiding additional barriers to 
cross-border activity.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84
 Directive 2009/65/EC, articles 6, 7 and 8.  
85
 Directive 2009/65/EC, article 10.  
86
 Directive 2009/65/EC, article 14.  
87
 Directive 2009/65/EC, articles 7 and 12.  
88
 Directive 2009/65/EC, articles 19 (3). 
89
 Directive 2009/65/EC, recital 15. 
90
 Directive 2010/43/EU.  
! 192 
 
The conduct of business requirements are not the only rules which fall within the 
competence of the host Member State where a management company exercises the 
passport. The rules applicable to the constitution and functioning of the UCITS are also 
fields of law where the competence for regulation and supervision remains that of the 
host Member State.
91
 CESR argued that this competence should be left within the remit 
of the host Member State as the risks governing the constitution and the functioning of 
the UCITS should remain the same irrespective of whether this is managed by a 
domestic management company or a by a passporting management company.
92
  
 
Split supervision is an area which presents difficulties to the operation of the passport as 
a management company will be subject to different requirements on the constitution and 
functioning of the UCITS in each separate Member State where it passports to provide 
services to a UCITS. Moreover, within the context of strengthening the internal market, 
one may also argue that the protection of European investors would have been improved 
had CESR taken the view that the requirements on the constitution and the functioning 
of UCITS had to be harmonised across the EU.  
 
While in the context of creating an effective internal market the EU harmonisation of 
substantive law is fundamental, its long term success or failure largely depends on the 
governance mechanism for the supervision of its application in practice.93 It is evident 
that it is not possible to monitor a UCITS cross-border structure effectively unless the 
whole of its operation can be supervised in a coordinated manner. Indeed, after more 
than two years from the date of applicability of the 2009 UCITS IV Directive, there are 
relatively few examples of the use of the management company passport as inter alia 
the current fragmented supervisory framework is proving to be too difficult to operate 
effectively in practice.94  
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5.2.6 Fragmented Financial Supervision: The Heart of the Matter 
 
The supervision of a UCITS is governed by the home-host country principles. The 
home-host financial supervisors are required to interact and cooperate for the better 
supervision of the UCITS structure, which comprises a UCITS, the management 
company and the depositary.
#$
 The extent of interaction between the home-host 
financial supervisors and the possible combinations of financial supervisors from 
different Member States having a share in the supervisory arrangement for a UCITS 
structure, may vary depending on whether the structure is entirely a national structure 
where the UCITS and the management company are established in the same Member 
State or a cross-border structure where the UCITS and the management company are 
established in different Member States. In the case of the former the interaction is 
limited and mainly takes place when the UCITS makes a passporting notification to the 
home Member State, which in turn must transmit that information to the host Member 
State.
#%
   
 
Where the UCITS and the management company are established in the same Member 
State, the main point of contact for the entire UCITS structure would be the home 
financial supervisor, with the host financial supervisor responsible for compliance with 
national marketing rules and the power to take regulatory action against the passporting 
UCITS in case of infringement.
#&
  Where the UCITS and the management company are 
established in different Member States, in addition to the supervision of the UCITS 
structure by the home-host financial supervisors and the interaction among them, the 
governance mechanism for the supervision of the UCITS is stepped up by an additional 
layer of financial supervisors, namely the home-host financial supervisors of the 
management company.
#'
 When the management company passports collective portfolio 
management in a host Member State, the arrangements for its supervision are 
effectively split between the home financial supervisor and the host financial supervisor.  
 
In the field of investment management, national financial supervisors still apply purely 
national supervisory philosophies and methods for monitoring compliance with the 
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requirements applicable to UCITS and their service providers, including management 
companies. In broad terms a certain degree of linearity exists in the methods applied for 
supervision. Indeed, generally speaking, financial supervisors carry out their 
supervisory duties through a mixture of authorisation procedures and off-site and on-site 
compliance monitoring of the activity of financial institutions. Albeit, empirical 
research carried out for the purpose of the thesis has shown that the scope and frequency 
of specific methods of supervision and the extent of checks carried out vary 
significantly between different financial supervisors.
99
  
 
With regard to the methodology adopted for determining the intensity of supervision, it 
has to be pointed out that while the financial supervisor in the UK and the Netherlands 
have been applying a risk-based approach to supervision for the last decade, it is only 
recently that financial supervisors in Member States, such as Ireland, have implemented 
this methodology for the supervision of their financial industry.
100
  
 
In the field of the supervision of investment management a risk-based approach means 
that supervision focuses mainly on those entities where failure could do the greatest 
damage.
101
 However, risk based supervision is not an approach that is favoured by all 
national financial supervisors.
102
 In Member States, such as in Italy, Malta and Spain, a 
full-compliance monitoring based approach to supervision is applied irrespective of the 
type and potential impact of the failure of the particular financial institution.
103
   
 
Moreover, significant differences exist with regard to the regular reporting requirements 
applicable to UCITS and management companies and the type of checks which are 
carried out as part of the off-site review and those carried out during an on-site 
compliance inspection. With regard to the reporting requirements, an analysis of the 
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applicable regulation in different Member States indicates that in addition to the annual 
and half-yearly financial statements which a UCITS is required to submit to its national 
financial supervisor, a number of Member States require UCITS to submit quarterly, 
monthly or daily reports including reports on the portfolio of assets held by the 
UCITS.
104
  
 
Another significant difference is found in the approach to supervision in the field of 
investment management. The Anglo-Saxon approach focuses primarily on the conduct 
of business and the processes of the management company while the Continental 
approach also gives due consideration to the authorisation and supervision of the 
fund.
105
  
 
The differences in the philosophies and the methods of supervision are significant and 
may result in supervisory arbitrage particularly where a UCITS or management 
company exercises the passport.
106
 These differences may exacerbate the negative 
impact of split supervision on the functioning of the management company passport, as 
a result of which the cost of exercising the passport could prove to be more signifcant 
than the benefits given the different regimes with which a management company would 
be required to comply whenever it exercises the passport. The fact that the management 
company passport has hardly ever been exercised so far is indicative of this potential 
barrier.  
 
The combination of financial supervisors involved in the supervision of a UCITS 
structure may become significant. By way of example with regard to a UCITS cross-
border structure in its simplest form, whereby a UCITS is established in Member State 
A, has passported to market its units in Member State B and C and has engaged a 
management company in Member State D, which has in turn passported in Member 
State A in order to be in a position to provide collective portfolio management services 
to the UCITS, the financial supervisors of the four different Member States would be 
involved in the supervision of the UCITS cross-border structure. The main difference 
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between them would be the extent of supervision, with the financial supervisors in 
Member States A and D being most active in the supervisory process. 
 
Diagram 5.1 – Financial Supervisors involved in a UCITS Cross-Border Structure 
 
 
 
 
The supervision of cross-border structures suggests that a governance mechanism based 
on fragmented supervision may give rise to various difficulties. It is likely to result in 
fragmented information being provided to the different national financial supervisors 
who are involved in the arrangements for supervision of the cross-border UCITS 
structure and in different reporting formats required by each individual national 
financial supervisor. On the one hand, this increases the administrative burden on the 
UCITS cross-border structure, while on the other hand it reduces the possibility of 
timely action where serious investor protection issues or other infringements of the 
Directive arise. If the relevant national financial supervisors work without engaging in 
collegial supervision, there is the additional risk that the said structure may be subject to 
insufficient and therefore less effective supervision. Within the context of the internal 
market, an uneven and fragmented approach to supervision may generate delays and 
inefficiencies and may subtly be operated as a tool for competition between established 
financial jurisdictions. 
 
Divergent and fragmented supervision provides incentives to national financial 
supervisors to compete via lax supervisory standards and practices. Indeed, it has been 
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argued that in the largely neo-liberal world that existed prior to the financial crisis, 
Member States avoided filling in the regulatory and supervisory gaps for competition 
reasons.
()&
 This state of affairs has, by and large, remained unchanged. Today special 
attention is still exercised in order to avoid putting national industry in a less 
competitive position or out of concern that some financial institutions might decide to 
move part of their business to a less strict supervisory system.
()'
 Moreover, the plurality 
of financial supervisors operating in the Member States can paradoxically increase gaps 
in oversight, which situation makes crises prevention harder.
()#
  
 
Supervisory arbitrage undermines mutual trust between national financial supervisors 
and may threaten financial market stability.
(()
 For the internal market to operate 
properly, the host financial supervisor must be comfortable with the supervisory 
practices of the home financial supervisor. Therefore, unless Member States deal with 
financial supervision in a way that is satisfactory to their peers, when a financial crisis 
emerges, the resulting problem will become an issue of blame rather than of resolution 
at minimum cost.
(((
 It follows that while a certain degree of divergence in approach will 
always remain in view of cultural specificities, a convergent approach is necessary with 
regard to the core principles of financial supervision. 
 
In the field of UCITS, a fragmented and divergent supervisory environment does not 
allow a full cross-border UCITS structure to operate effectively as it raises significant 
concerns over coordination of financial supervision.
((*
 Such supervisory environment 
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would not give the required comfort to the Member States to accept the level of mutual 
recognition of supervisory practices which is necessary for rendering a depositary 
passport acceptable, which passport happens to be the missing link within the chain that 
would establish a full cross-border UCITS structure.  
 
The regulatory framework applicable to depositaries is in the process of being updated 
through the 2012 UCITS V Proposal
((+
, which seeks to achieve quasi-maximum 
harmonisation with regard to the eligibility criteria for depositaries, their duties and 
responsibilities and the extent of their liability towards investors, so as to ensure a 
higher degree of investor protection in the field of UCITS. Article 49 TFEU requires 
that restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the 
territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Article 56 TFEU requires that 
restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in 
respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than 
that of the person for whom the services are intended. While the existing restriction on 
the freedom to provide depositary services may be justified on the basis of lack of 
harmonisation of the regulatory framework applicable to such entities, the eventual 
implementation of the 2012 UCITS V Proposal is most likely to leave little scope for 
divergent national laws across the Member States in the field of depositary 
requirements. Therefore, on the premise that harmonisation of regulation that has the 
purpose of ensuring homogenous investor protection is a necessary condition for mutual 
recognition between Member States and thereby giving access to the internal market, 
one may argue that a depositary passport should be the resulting benefit from a process 
of harmonisation of regulation in this field. 
 
The implementation of the proposed strict liability requirements together with the 
significant onus put on depositaries with regard to their duties, are likely to result in 
considerable costs for the depositary industry.
114
 While the significant revision to the 
regulatory framework applicable to depositaries, which has largely remained unaltered 
since the 1985 UCITS Directive, is a necessary step to address the lessons of the Madoff 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113
 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2009/65/EC as regards, depositary 
functions, remuneration and sanctions’ COM(2012)350<http://goo.gl/bvWJxi>; On 25.02.14 the Greek 
Presidency reached political agreement with the European Parliament on UCITS V Directive 
<http://goo.gl/3U8vcQ>accessed 28.02.14. 
114
 Ernst&Young, ‘AIFMD: get ready for European depositary reform’ March 
2012<www.ey.com>accessed 20.12.12.  
! 199 
scandal
115
, the costs involved with regards to implementation will most likely lead to 
consolidation within the industry and a reduction in competition. In order to remain a 
viable business activity and to benefit from economies of scale, it is expected that small-
medium sized players will have to join forces or cease to provide depositary services 
altogether. As a consequence of possible consolidation, one may reasonably predict that 
only a few depositaries will remain active in Europe, namely the ten global custodian 
banks
116
 which however are not present in all Member States.  
 
Consolidation may have the unintended consequence of decreasing the depositary 
capacity in those Member States where the industry is still in its infancy. This could 
lead to monopolistic behaviour and consequently a significant increase in the direct 
expense of engaging a depositary. Therefore, consolidation may result in the creation of 
an unfair level playing field for those UCITS established in Member States with an 
undeveloped depositary industry. If consolidation and lack of competition turn out to be 
the inevitable accidental results of additional harmonised regulation, providing 
depositaries with access to the internal market through the adoption of a depositary 
passport becomes the inevitable solution to ensure a level playing field within the 
internal market.  
 
One may argue that a depositary passport could generate a certain degree of competition 
within the industry and consequently a higher degree of efficiency. It could also provide 
UCITS that are already established in jurisdictions where there is limited depositary 
capacity with a route to continue to operate in the Member States where they are 
currently established. Given the essential role of a depositary for investor protection, it 
is critical for the home financial supervisor of the UCITS to have immediate and instant 
access to the depositary.
!((&
  Particularly in order to ensure the proper performance of its 
obligations, thus guaranteeing the adequate safekeeping of the investors’ assets. 
Moreover, in times of crisis the home financial supervisor of the UCITS might even 
decide to secure the assets of the UCITS, which are held by the depositary.  
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The point has been made that a depositary passport would significantly reduce the home 
financial supervisor of the UCITS’ access to the depositary. It may also complicate the 
supervision of a cross-border UCITS structure by introducing an additional layer of 
fragmented supervision, as the home financial supervisor of the UCITS and the 
management company would want to participate in the arrangements for the supervision 
of the depositary.  Supervisory fragmentation and inefficiencies aggravate the barriers to 
the realisation of the full potential of the internal market project for UCITS. This 
sustains the position that the practical impact of harmonised regulation may not be 
effective unless there is a convergent approach to the way it is applied, supervised and 
enforced by national financial supervisors.  
 
In a recent speech, the ESMA Chairman, Dr Steven Maijoor, raised the concern that 
supervisory convergence was proving difficult to achieve and that the mechanisms to 
reach this objective should therefore be re-evaluated. He specifically stated the 
following:  
 
Why has progress been more difficult in the area of supervisory convergence? 
… while I think the governance of the ESAs works quite well for the single rule 
book and direct supervision, it is not surprising there are more tensions in the 
convergence area as it requires judging the supervisory practices of one or more 
colleagues in the Board. Hence, I think we should reconsider the organisation 
and governance of our convergence work and how we can improve the tools 
available to the ESAs in this area.
(('
 
 
The comments made by Dr Maijoor, suggest that the supervisory convergence problem 
is in the system itself. Practical experience suggests that the European Authorities, 
including ESMA, are perceived by national financial supervisors as pushing 
convergence from the top, by way of a command and control approach where practices 
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are selected and imposed by EU bureaucrats, with insufficient debate having occurred 
between national financial supervisors.
119
  
 
By way of example, in the field of CRD
120
 where a process of supervisory convergence 
is currently being steered by the EBA, no degree of proportionality has been applied in 
the drafting of the templates for reporting of financial resources, which national 
financial supervisors will be required to apply to financial institutions locally. While the 
aim of these templates is that of achieving supervisory convergence, they are creating 
tensions between the European Authorities and national financial supervisors, as they 
fail to take into account the differences that exist in local markets, particularly the size 
of the institutions that operate in the different Member States. EBA is forcing this 
framework for convergence, notwithstanding the pleas of national financial supervisors 
particularly those coming from small Member States.
(*(
    
 
It is submitted that for a soft-law mechanism to achieve an optimal degree of 
supervisory convergence and conformity by national financial supervisors, it must take 
the form of a bottom-up approach rather than the current command and control method 
coming from the top. One may venture to propose that a mechanism for reflexive 
governance of financial supervision combined with a mechanism that seeks to 
strengthen the mutual trust between national financial supervisors may prove to be the 
best possible tool for this purpose.   
 
5.3 Reflexive Governance of Financial Supervision: Addressing the Remaining 
Barriers to Cross-Border Activity of UCITS 
 
Reflexive governance is a process that promotes learning from diversity. It is 
characterised by flexibility, participation, power-sharing, de-centralisation, deliberation, 
experimentation, identification and benchmarking of best practices, knowledge-creation 
and revisability.
! (**
 The over-all focus of the process is a continuous search for better 
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approaches to address the governance problem. The constructive and valuable feature of 
a process of reflexivity in governance, is that the outcome of the learning-process bends 
back on the participants that have instigated and participated in the said process, and 
where exchanges between different participants in the process can result in innovation, 
as each participant will have to reconsider its own policies with a view of improving 
them, in the light of the successes and failures of others.
(*+
  For reflexive governance to 
work, participants must be equipped to become active in the decision-making process 
and must be supported through inter alia institutional arrangements for cooperation and 
debate.  
 
It is proposed that reflexive governance of financial supervision would build a process 
of convergence, which benefits from a certain degree of supervisory competition within 
a framework of cooperation, that creates the incentive to search for more effective ways 
of delivering financial supervision in dynamic financial markets, while simultaneously 
allowing a process of adaptation to cultural differences at the national level. It would be 
a third way between the centralisation, and therefore the full standardisation of 
European supervisory processes and procedures that is inter alia being applied in the 
fields of banking and credit ratings, and the fragmentation of supervision that currently 
exists under the UCITS Directive. Under a framework for reflexive governance of 
financial supervision, mechanisms for cooperation between national financial 
supervisors would provide the appropriate environment for experimentation and 
adaptation, thereby permitting an evolutionary process from the national to the 
European level, a process nourished by competing supervisory knowledge where the 
best practices are identified, codified and used as a standard for achieving convergence. 
 
The mechanisms for cooperation between national financial supervisors provided for in 
the ESMA Regulation
(*"
, such as the establishment of colleges of national financial 
supervisors, the delegation of supervisory powers between national financial supervisors 
and the conduct of peer reviews, have the potential of being operative structures for 
reflexive governance of financial supervision. In particular, if such mechanisms are 
applied as vehicles for the promotion of debate, mutual learning and the sharing of 
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knowledge in supervisory matters. Mutual trust between financial supervisors becomes 
an essential ingredient for an optimal process of reflexive governance of financial 
supervision. A constructive and open debate on financial supervision requires mutual 
confidence among national financial supervisors. They must feel confident that the 
processes and procedures for national supervision would be applied as tools for 
achieving the objectives of financial regulation and would not serve the interests of their 
political masters or the national industry, thereby becoming an instrument of national 
policies and agendas which may be in conflict with the primary objectives.  
 
In the context of the completion of the internal market for UCITS, reflexive governance 
of financial supervision based on these mechanisms may be applied to encourage the 
operation of an on-going learning process for the convergence of supervisory practices. 
This is required in order to overcome the weaknesses and limitations of a regulatory 
framework based on quasi-maximum harmonisation. Hence, reflexive governance 
which is generally presented as an alternative to the Community method, becomes a 
mechanism which complements the traditional mechanisms of harmonsiation of hard-
law, rather than acting as an alternative to them.  
 
This section analyses and proposes a mechanism of reflexive governance of financial 
supervision as the solution to the remaining barriers to cross-border activity of UCITS. 
Reflexive governance of financial supervision is also compared with the centralised 
option for European supervision, which is presently the preferred policy option at EU 
level. The analysis demonstrates that the nature of UCITS as a retail investment product 
makes a process of reflexive governance the superior option towards resolving the 
remaining barriers to cross-border activity of UCITS.  
 
5.3.1 National Marketing Rules  
 
A variety of solutions may be considered to address the inefficiencies that emerge from 
the application of national marketing rules. The first option would be that of 
transforming national marketing rules into European marketing rules, which would 
create a standardised approach applicable in all Member States. Therefore, establishing 
a European single rulebook for marketing at EU level in the form of a binding 
Regulation. This is a solution where no degree of mutual recognition would be required 
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as only one set of rules would apply across the EU. This hard-law approach would 
guarantee legal certainty and also improve the efficient implementation of the 2009 
UCITS IV Directive.
(*$
  
 
Nonetheless, a solution based on maximum harmonisation with regard to marketing 
rules would not respect the principle of subsidiarity. One of the objectives of national 
marketing rules is that of catering for local cultural differences, given the nature of 
UCITS as a financial product targeted to retail investors. These types of differences 
need to be appropriately addressed at the national level. For this reason, regulation of 
national marketing rules would appear to be an area where it would be more suitable to 
address the barriers to cross-border business through a soft-law mechanism based on 
cooperation between financial supervisors within the framework provided by ESMA. 
 
A process of reflexive governance of financial supervision could be initiated by national 
financial supervisors coordinated by ESMA for the purpose of analysing the current 
state of implementation and the difficulties that arise from national marketing rules. 
Thereby, a learning process in this field would be triggered, the outcome of which could 
be the identification of best practices that could eventually be crystallised in Level 3 
Guidance for convergence. The guidance would achieve a certain degree of consistency 
with regards to each category of information that may be included in national marketing 
rules, while at the same time allowing a certain degree of flexibility to cater for local 
cultural differences.  
 
To strengthen mutual trust in this field, the national financial supervisors could agree on 
a peer-review mechanism of the national marketing rules coordinated by ESMA, 
whereby the rules of each Member State would be subject to debate and scrutiny 
between ESMA and national financial supervisors. After discussion and further 
consideration on how the specific rules address the specificities of the culture of each 
particular Member State, a process of codification could be applied, which would permit 
the updating of the Level 3 Guidance to indicate where differences exist between the 
Member States, the rationale for these differences and the additional best practices 
identified as part of the review.  
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The publication of the updated Level 3 Guidance would create an incentive at national 
level to move towards the best practices identified as part of the process and would also 
grant the industry the possibility of a better and easier understanding of the national 
marketing rules which are applicable across the EU. To further facilitate access to the 
national marketing rules of each Member State, it would appear appropriate for ESMA 
to have a section of its web-site dedicated to national marketing rules with links to the 
relevant section of the financial supervisor of each Member State’s web-site, which 
contains these rules. This mechanism for transparency is already applied by ESMA with 
regard to national databases on regulated information required in terms of the TD.
(*%
 A 
specific section of ESMA’s web-site already provides a link to all the relevant 
databases.
(*&
 The application of such a transparency mechanism would guarantee easy 
access to the rules and ensure compliance with the requirements of the Directive. 
 
5.3.2 Dealing with the fragmented regulatory and supervisory framework for 
UCITS 
 
Different solutions may be elaborated to address the fragmentation of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework for UCITS and the impact this may have on the operation of the 
cross-border consolidation mechanisms established in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive. A 
revision of the Directive may be proposed with regard to the requirements on the 
authorisation, constitution and functioning of UCITS with a view to achieving a higher 
degree of harmonisation, thereby reducing the differences between the Member States. 
This is an area where a hard-law approach based on quasi-maximum harmonisation of 
regulation would be the optimal solution. It would allow the necessary flexibility to 
secure the respect of the different national legal traditions with regard to the constitution 
of the UCITS, which may be formed as companies, trusts or partnerships, depending on 
the Member States where they are established.  
 
With regard to differences in approaches to supervision two options would appear to be 
available: a centralised approach through European supervision or a mutual recognition 
approach based on a combination of supervisory convergence mechanisms. Under the 
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centralised approach the legislator would grant powers to ESMA to monitor the 
authorisation and on going supervision of the UCITS. This would do away with all the 
supervisory differences between the Member States.  
 
As examined in chapter 4, while there are no predetermined hard and fast rules as to the 
features of a financial sector that would make centralised supervision a suitable 
solution, in the EU a case in favour of more centralisation can be justified on account of 
scale and cross-border externalities arguments. Chapter 4 proposes a governance model 
for European supervision of securities regulation whereby large cross-border operators 
would be supervised by ESMA, while other operators would continue being supervised 
at national level. The point is made that the proposed model for supervision would need 
to take into account the characteristics of the market where the financial entity is 
undertaking its activity, including the degree of homogeneity and integration within 
such market, and the extent to which the protection of investors requires proximity of 
supervision.   
 
Under the proposed governance model for the supervision of securities business, the 
centralised approach does not seem to be an appropriate solution in the context of 
UCITS, because of: [i] the different legal traditions in Member States, regarding the 
constitution of UCITS; and [ii] the need for proximity of financial supervision given 
that UCITS is a retail financial product, where customary behaviours are better 
understood and therefore better supervised by national financial supervisors. Moreover, 
strict adherence to the subsidiarity principle demands that a centralised solution should 
only be applied when the common good cannot be effectively pursued at a lower level. 
 
Currently there is no degree of convergence in the supervision of UCITS. The area is 
therefore a fertile ground for experimentation and learning, and therefore an area where 
a process of reflexivity could be valuable. One may propose a soft-law approach based 
on supervisory cooperation, coordinated by ESMA, which would assess the different 
approaches to financial supervision at national level. Further to a mapping exercise of 
the different processes and procedures for supervision which apply at national level and 
the identification and codification of best practices in a European handbook for 
supervision, national financial supervisors could come to an agreement to apply the said 
handbook thus achieving similar, although not completely harmonised, approaches to 
! 207 
the supervision of UCITS. The overall European process to the supervision of UCITS 
would continue to benefit from a certain degree of national diversity to cater for the 
cultural differences at national level. It would also benefit from supervisory competition 
between national financial supervisors, as the proposed mechanism would permit the 
continued development of national financial supervisory practices that could eventually 
be a source for improvement of the European supervisory handbook.  
 
Supervisory competition that emerges from reflexive governance is noticeably different 
from supervisory competition that results in a race to the bottom whereby Member 
States that are developing their financial markets pursue lax supervision in order to 
attract new business.
(*'
 Reflexive governance of financial supervision would seek to 
direct the process of evolutionary adaptation of supervisory procedures at European 
level. As an integral part of this process, financial supervisors would be encouraged to 
compete in the establishment of principles and practices which would be recognised as 
optimal by other financial supervisors and would de facto be endorsed as precedents. It 
would allow the preservation of the autonomy and diversity of national financial 
supervision, while encouraging a process of cooperation and convergence.  Hence, 
reflexive governance of financial supervision would equate to a race to the top instead 
of a race to the bottom, which should allow the development of supervisory practices 
that can keep up with developments in financial markets and therefore would be less 
conducive to failure. 
 
To address the inefficiencies of the Level 3 mechanism in relation to uneven or non-
application by national financial supervisors, the implementation of the European 
handbook for the supervision of UCITS would have to be closely monitored through 
peer reviews coordinated by ESMA, which has the power to request financial 
supervisors to change divergent practices where these are not justified or where these do 
not sustain robust supervision.
(*#
 However, under a system of reflexive governance of 
financial supervision, peer reviews would not only be a mechanism for monitoring but 
would also become a tool for mutual learning and knowledge creation. Any identified 
differences would be considered and new best practices would be identified and 
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eventually incorporated in the European handbook. Thereby, the monitoring process 
would not only serve as an instrument for enforcement but also as a device for 
establishing another dimension to the overall debate on the governance of financial 
supervision and the best way to resolve the supervision dilemma.  
 
5.3.3 Addressing the Supervisory Concerns arising from the Management 
Company Passport and the Internal Market for Depositaries  
 
A number of different mechanisms may be applied by policy-makers to address the 
fragmentation in the financial supervision of management companies and allow the 
unobstructed operation of the passport. One of the options could be that of applying a 
centralised approach operated by ESMA. In terms of this approach, ESMA would be 
granted authorisation and supervisory powers over management companies in the EU. 
Management companies would be subject to one authorisation process and on-going 
supervision at the level of ESMA. This would give management companies immediate 
access to the internal market without requiring any form of passporting and split 
supervision.  
 
Such an approach could create difficulties given the geographical distribution of 
management companies in Member States and the need for proximity of supervision of 
areas of regulation such as the conduct of business rules applicable to these companies. 
In this context, effective supervision depends on an understanding of the local customs 
in doing business. These difficulties could be resolved through agreements between 
ESMA and national financial supervisors. The latter would act as supervisory agents for 
ESMA. This, however, could result once again in a fragmented approach to supervision 
in view of the different supervisory practices which apply at national level.  
 
For the centralised solution to operate, it would still require close intervention at 
national level and would have to be combined with a soft-law approach in the form of a 
European handbook for the supervision of management companies. On the basis that 
financial supervisors at national level are best placed to examine how the management 
company operates on a daily basis, it is doubtful whether the centralised approach for 
the supervision of management companies can be considered as appropriate and 
proportional. Moreover, given the need for proximity of supervision, under the 
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governance model for financial supervision proposed in chapter 4, it is unlikely that the 
centralised approach would satisfy the principle of subsidiarity.  
 
Respecting the high-level EU principles of proportionality and subsidiarity would 
suggest that a soft-law option devoid of the centralised approach would be the optimum 
solution for the financial supervision of management companies. The solution again lies 
in strengthening the link between financial supervisors through a process of reflexive 
governance of financial supervision. The outcome of such a process would be the 
establishment and creation of a European handbook for supervision of management 
companies which would codify the best practices in this field and would also propose 
options for the operation of a mechanism for the delegation of supervisory tasks 
between financial supervisors in this area.  
 
Hence, an approach which would be based on mutual understanding, learning and 
cooperation, which strengthens mutual trust between national financial supervisors and 
which recognises the importance of allowing a certain degree of diversity of supervisory 
practices within a framework for convergence remains an important part of the overall 
solution given the national cultural differences in this field. 
 
There is no degree of consistency in the national procedures for the supervision of 
management companies. Establishing one particular way of carrying out supervision of 
management companies to overcome fragmentation is a complex task given national 
cultural differences that exist in the retail market and the long established supervisory 
traditions in this field. The benefit of a reflexive approach over a centralised European 
approach, which imposes a method of supervision from the top, is that it would 
encourage national financial supervisors to consider and reflect upon the goals of 
financial supervision of management companies and the difficulties that arise from 
fragmented supervision and how supervisory practices which are applied at national 
level might be rethought to move away from fragmentation. By so doing, it would 
encourage national financial supervisors to make proposals for a convergent approach 
based on national best practices, to discuss those proposals with other national financial 
supervisors, to reconsider whether these are adequate and how far these need to be 
reconstructed in the light of that deliberation.  
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Through a process of mutual interdependence, learning and deliberation coordinated 
within the structures provided by ESMA, national financial supervisors would become 
the owners of the solution for supervisory cooperation and convergence. This ownership 
would encourage compliance and thereby succeed in bringing about the transformation 
of national supervisory practices and the implementation of the degree of homogeneity 
that overcomes fragmentation, while at the same time allowing for a certain degree of 
national practices to co-exist with convergence, in order to cater for cultural differences. 
Hence, the benefit of a reflexive process to financial supervision over the centralised 
approach for European supervision, is that through this process national financial 
supervisors would be encouraged to see their participation in a process for convergence 
not just as an external commitment but as a chance to learn from, and evaluate, the 
practices of other national financial supervisors. 
 
Such a soft-law approach would add certainty to the supervisory process within the EU. 
At the same time it would allow the approach to supervision to develop through a 
learning process achieved from healthy supervisory competition between Member 
States aimed at finding better ways to address the supervisory challenge. Healthy 
supervisory competition allows supervisors to learn from each other, which in turn 
benefits the EU supervisory system as a whole.    
 
It is submitted that in the context of cross-border UCITS structures, a framework for 
cooperation in the form of delegation of supervisory tasks could be of significance for 
the reduction of supervisory fragmentation, particularly in the case of split supervision 
of management companies.  This would be specifically relevant in relation to the 
conduct of on-site compliance monitoring of management companies, covering specific 
areas of regulation such as conduct of business rules where the regulatory framework of 
the host-Member State applies to a passporting manager. This means that supervisory 
tasks relating to the on-site inspection are carried out by the delegated financial 
supervisor. Its findings are reported back, discussed and analysed together with the 
delegating financial supervisor for further action.
(+)
 This mechanism, together with the 
application of a European supervisory handbook, should guarantee a certain degree of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130
 Regulation (EU) No1095/2010, recital 24 and article 28. 
! 211 
homogeneity in the practices of financial supervision thereby reducing the impact of 
fragmentation.  
 
A system for reflexive governance of financial supervision based on tools for 
supervisory cooperation, resulting in convergence, would also seem to be the optimum 
solution to resolve the depositary passport conundrum.  
 
On the assumption that the ten global custodians are the players that would exercise a 
passport to provide depositary services across the EU and which would compete on a 
cross-border level, in line with the governance model for financial supervision proposed 
in chapter 4, one could argue that centralised supervision should be applied, as shared 
supervision may be highly inefficient and may not be adequate to ensure stability. 
However, given the serious retail investor protection concerns that could arise from the 
losses suffered in case of failure of a depositary, national financial supervisors would 
want to retain supervisory control over depositary business.
131
 It is most likely that the 
supervisors of the UCITS and the management companies serviced by the depositary, 
would want to participate in the supervision of the depositary together with the 
depositary’s home financial supervisor.  
 
To resolve the possible supervisory inefficiencies that could result from fragmented 
supervision involving several supervisors, while addressing the existing desire for 
national supervision, it is submitted that a measure that should be considered is the 
setting up of colleges of supervisors coordinated by ESMA.
(+*
 This solution would 
leave supervision at the level of the home Member State, while recognising the need for 
other Member States to take a role in the supervisory process. In this regard, the college 
of supervisors would create a forum for discussion, mutual cooperation and learning 
which would in turn enhance a process of reflexivity in financial supervision that would 
contribute to the overall process of convergence.  
 
Nevertheless, for the proposed framework for reflexive governance of financial 
supervision to operate effectively, a high degree of mutual trust is required among 
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national financial supervisors. The key question remains: Why would a national 
financial supervisor trust another’s supervisory practices, unless it is comfortable with 
its standards and governance for supervision?  
 
Reflexive governance of financial supervision cannot work successfully unless a 
European mechanism for the strengthening of mutual trust between financial 
supervisors is devised and implemented. The pursuing of national agendas is the main 
source of mutual distrust between national financial supervisors. The application of a 
European framework, which guarantees the autonomy and proper accountability of 
national financial supervisors is therefore important if the existing concerns that 
national financial supervisors may be subject to political or industry capture
(++
 are to be 
addressed in practice. 
 
5.4 Strengthening the Governance of Financial Supervision 
 
The institutional framework applied for the purpose of financial supervision and the 
governance arrangements that contribute to a timely and fair decision-making process 
which aims at achieving financial stability and investor protection, are determinants of 
effective financial supervision. 
 
The institutional framework for financial supervision varies between Member States, in 
particular, the extent to which these integrate the micro-prudential supervision of 
financial sub-sectors. Empirical research on the governance of financial supervision 
concluded that the quality of the independence, accountability, transparency and 
integrity structures of a financial supervisor have a bearing on the effectiveness of 
financial supervision and the degree of financial soundness.
(+"
 It has also determined 
that an arm’s length relationship between the financial supervisor and the government 
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improves the quality of financial supervision and has a role in removing obstacles to the 
development of the financial sector.
(+$
 
 
While the institutional model for financial supervision is likely to have an effect on the 
quality and effectiveness of supervision, in itself it does not guarantee it.
(+%
 Noticeably, 
effective financial supervision is primarily a function of the internal governance 
arrangements for this purpose. Unless a financial supervisor operates within a 
framework built on high-level standards of internal governance, such as independent 
decision-making, autonomy (operational independence), accountability, fairness and 
transparency and has proper powers and competent human resources to fulfil its duties, 
it is doubtful whether effective supervision may be achieved in practice.
137
  
 
Sound governance of financial supervision is therefore critical for mutual recognition, 
which is based on mutual confidence that financial supervisors will act in a similar 
prudent manner. The capacity to act on an equal footing is an important pre-condition 
for trust between supervisors. A true level playing field depends crucially on the actual 
effective application of such powers and the manner in which they are applied. 
Concerns about the supervisory competition between Member States to attract financial 
institutions to their jurisdiction
(+'
 or a protectionist approach to guard their industry 
from cross-border competition where the financial system of the particular Member 
State is uncompetitive
139
 have led policy-makers to call for a more robust framework 
which regulates governance of European financial supervision.  
 
Within the context of the internal market, aims of a financial supervisor that go beyond 
and which may be in conflict with the objective of financial regulation, could have a 
negative impact on the operation and integrity of the internal market, since the possible 
negative effects of national policy could quickly propagate to other Member States. 
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Financial supervision that is distorted by national or personal agendas may be the cause 
of mutual distrust between financial supervisors. Mutual confidence largely depends on 
the knowledge that a financial supervisor has the necessary characteristics, including 
competence, focus and resources, that make it honest and competent to undertake its 
responsibilities.
(")
 
 
The DeLarosiere Report emphasised:  
 
The ESFS must be independent from possible political and industry influences, 
at both EU and national level. This means that supervisors should have clear 
mandates and tasks as well as sufficient resources and powers. In order to 
strengthen legitimacy and as a counterpart for independence, proper 
accountability to the political authorities at the EU and national levels should be 
ensured. In short, supervisory work must be independent from the political 
authorities, but fully accountable to them.141 
 
Notwithstanding the calls by policy-makers for mechanisms which guarantee the 
autonomy and the accountability of financial supervisors, at present, the harmonisation 
of the governance arrangements for financial supervision, is limited to the powers to 
supervise, investigate, sanction and exchange information. This harmonisation process 
was triggered inter alia by the DeLarosiere Report
("*
, although concerns on 
inconsistencies in this area had long been raised by policy-makers and financial 
supervisors.
("+
  
 
In the field of UCITS changes to the Directive to harmonise the powers to supervise, 
investigate, sanction and exchange information form part of the 2012 UCITS V 
Proposal. It is submitted that these changes will be futile unless a framework is devised 
to guarantee the autonomy and accountability of financial supervisors. These are critical 
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for the creation of a common supervisory culture and to enhance cooperation between 
financial supervisors.  A regulatory framework for this purpose would establish an 
important evolutionary enhancement to the overall governance of financial supervision 
in Member States, thereby strengthening mutual trust between financial supervisors.  
 
5.4.1 Governance Arrangements for the Independence, Autonomy and 
Accountability of Financial Supervisors 
 
The degree of independence and autonomy of a financial supervisor from government 
and the industry depends on the extent to which its internal processes are insulated from 
influences that distort its activity from achieving the objectives of regulation. Such 
negative influences may come in the form of pressures to serve political motives 
(‘political capture’) or the financial interests of private individuals or organisations 
(‘industry capture’). They may also come in the form of personal career objectives 
(‘self-interest capture’).  
 
To mitigate the influences that may arise from regulatory capture, a policy decision to 
establish an autonomous financial supervisor inevitably requires the application of a set 
of governance shields, more specifically: [i] the values that are to govern the 
supervisor’s overall activity; [ii] the constitutional arrangements for its establishment; 
and [iii] its internal organisational arrangements. A proper combination of these 
elements would generally have a bearing on the extent to which the financial supervisor 
would be in a position to shield itself from the influences that could distort the focus of 
its supervisory activity.  
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Diagram 5.2  – Influences that Distort Supervision and the Governance Shields.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The overarching values that govern the activity of a financial supervisor have an impact 
on the degree to which it will be in a position to realise the objectives of financial 
regulation. A financial supervisor whose primary aim is that of accomplishing the 
common good is generally guided by the normative values of fairness, equity, integrity 
and responsibility. On the other hand, where the executives who steer the activity of a 
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financial supervisor are guided principally by self-interest and career concerns, the 
supervisory environment could end up being characterised different forms of regulatory 
capture and conflicts of interests that generate suspect regulatory choices.
(""
  
 
Independence, that is the capability of exercising discretion in decision-making, may be 
distorted by regulatory capture where a financial supervisor feels vulnerable to political 
powers that be or those of the future. Vulnerability that results in industry capture exists 
where those responsible for financial supervision become too familiar with the financial 
industry or have career plans which go beyond working with the financial supervisor. 
Both political and industry related vulnerabilities make the officials responsible for 
steering the financial supervisor susceptible to external influence in decision making 
and undermine the de facto independence of the institution. Independence should not be 
interpreted narrowly and also extends to the supervisor’s autonomy, i.e. whether it has 
the resources to be in position to operate and function without government support or 
approval. Indeed, the point has been made that the principle: 
 
… that a regulator be “operationally independent from political interference” is 
not to be interpreted … as applying only to a minister seeking to interfere in an 
insider dealing case. When a government can demand that a regulator takes on 
additional work as specified by the Government such that resources have to be 
diverted from day to day supervision and even from enforcement the operational 
independence of the regulator is called into question.
("$
 
 
A financial supervisor should therefore have the governance arrangements in place to 
resist undertaking tasks that are unrelated to its core activity. Financial supervisors 
should not be distracted by auxiliary work, where it can find itself subjected to influence 
or criticism by third parties.  
 
It follows that unless there is: [i] a clear direction regarding the values that should be at 
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the heart of the financial supervisors’ work; [ii] procedural guarantees in terms of both 
the manner and the eagerness of decision-making; and [iii] proper accountability 
structures in place (including the possibility of judicial review as a safeguard for 
objectivity), the independence and discretion granted to financial supervisors could be 
easily abused.  
 
Therefore, it is logical that at law the independence, objectives and overarching values 
set for a financial supervisor, its decision making procedures and the accountability 
mechanisms, should be clearly stipulated in the constitutional document that establishes 
the agency, and should be the blueprint for its over-all governance. Moreover, the 
internal governance arrangements and the procedures employed for steering the 
financial supervisor should guarantee its de facto independence. Autonomous 
institutions without clear objectives and functions, sound organisational structure and 
governance are fragile and condemned to malfunction, as they will not be in a position 
to achieve the objectives they have been created to attain.
("%
  
 
Hence, if the financial supervisor is to serve as a source of commitment in decision 
making for the attainment of the objectives of financial regulation, the constitutional 
document should clearly provide for its objectives, role, competence, duties and 
discretionary powers and define its various organs together with their respective roles 
and responsibilities.  
 
The constitutional document should also empower the financial supervisor to raise its 
own income, set its own salary packages and enter into contracts without requiring 
government approval. The point has been made that monetary incentives are indeed 
crucial for a financial supervisor to be in a position to attract and retain talented 
candidates, to reward high performance and foster dedication, all of which are important 
to strengthen the effectiveness of supervision.
("&
 Indeed, the quality and robustness of 
financial supervision may be at risk where the financial supervisor’s functional 
independence is constrained. This is particularly relevant where the funding method for 
the financial supervisor does not provide sufficient financial resources to allow the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146
 A Farazmand, ‘Sound Governance in the Age of Globalization: A Conceptual Framework’ in ‘Sound 
Governance: Policy and Administrative Innovations’ (Praeger Publishers 2004) 1-24. 
147
 R Lastra, ‘The Independence of the European Systems of Central Banks’ (1992) 33(2) Harvard 
International Law Journal 486. 
! 219 
agency to meet its regulatory and operational needs on a long-term basis. This is the 
position in the US as reported by the IMF in their 2010 FSAP report.
 ("'
 Ultimately, 
budgetary freedom is a fundamental component of a financial supervisor’s autonomy 
both vis-à-vis government and with respect to the industry. 
  
To strengthen further the de facto independence of financial supervision, the 
overarching values of the financial supervisor should constitute a measure for 
determining some of the necessary characteristics and professionalism which are 
required of the members who will compose the financial supervisor’s governing body, 
the executives engaged to lead its supervisory and administrative organs and the 
officials who will be involved in financial supervision. Professional judgement, expert 
knowledge, impartiality and intellectual honesty are all essential criteria to achieve 
professional independence, competence and credibility. Ultimately, regulation and 
supervision will be more effective if the industry perceives that the financial supervisor 
is steered by officials who are professionally independent and who will deal with them 
fairly and honestly, and that decisions will be carefully considered, not arbitrarily 
imposed and that therefore they will be realistic, not doctrinaire. In this connection, it 
has been argued that:  
 
Professional independence – which contributes to the reputation and prestige of 
the institution – is also safeguarded by the establishment of a list of incompatible 
or disqualifying activities so as to prevent conflicts of interest. For instance, 
while in office [financial supervisors] should be precluded from simultaneously 
holding private-sector jobs.
("#
  
 
Therefore, in seeking to ensure that only the right people are engaged for the purpose of 
steering the financial supervisor, the constitutional document should perhaps define the 
criteria which determine the fundamental qualities of such persons. As a minimum, they 
should be characterised by integrity, competence and solvency. By reference to the EU 
regulation which grants the ECB the role of banking supervisor and specifically the 
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provisions on the appointment of the supervisory board, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the executives of a financial supervisor should be individuals of recognised standing and 
experience in financial services.
($)
 On an on-going basis, these overarching values of 
the financial supervisor would also serve as some of the measures which may be used 
for assessing the correctness in the financial supervisor’s performance, by reviewing 
whether the overarching values are reflected in the decision made by the supervisor’s 
executives or whether their choices have been inspired by less honourable objectives.   
 
Devising the governance structure of a financial supervisor requires the introduction of 
structural guarantees and institutional arrangements that seek to ensure that the financial 
supervisor pursues the objectives of financial regulation. These arrangements should be 
designed to minimize the possibility of slippage in the direction of regulatory capture. 
Different types of procedural controls may be applied in order to contain slippage and 
opportunistic behavior which may occur as a consequence of the powers and discretion 
granted to the financial supervisor. Of particular significance is the procedure for the 
selection of the officials who will steer the financial supervisor, whereby the persons to 
be selected should be required to demonstrate that they have the personality, experience, 
technical ability and leadership skills which are required to allow them to set the 
agenda, gain the respect of stakeholders and avoid being controlled by third parties 
whether political or the industry. In the end, a procedure which objectively and 
effectively tests the candidate’s experience, knowledge and ability to achieve the 
objectives of regulation, strengthens even further the professional independence of the 
financial supervisor.
($(
 
 
It has been suggested that rules of conduct that bind a financial supervisor to a specific 
course of action in making supervisory decisions may be applied as a control 
mechanism to guarantee independence in the decision making process.
($*
 However, 
such rules would significantly limit the financial supervisor’s discretion, which is 
essential for the proper conduct of its functions. A more workable proposal, which is 
applied in practice, is that of requiring supervisory decisions to be made collegially by 
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an independent college of commissioners experienced in financial supervision, having 
the role of reviewing proposed supervisory decisions and requesting justifying reasons 
for a proposed course of action, before the final supervisory decision is made and 
issued. 
 
Moreover, the risk of politically driven interventions in the day-to-day operations of the 
financial supervisor may be reduced if the institutional design of the financial supervisor 
provides for a separation of powers between those relating to policy, to be exercised by 
the main board of the organisation appointed by government, and the powers necessary 
for the conduct of day-to-day supervision, which may be allocated to a chief regulator 
appointed by the board and who is therefore completely independent from 
government.
($+
 The rationale for such separation of powers is that board members are 
generally political appointees who might not have regulatory experience, in certain 
instances former politicians including cabinet members, and as a consequence closer to 
politicians than staff members, and therefore their participation in day-to-day 
supervision increases the risk of political capture.  
 
On the other hand, a chief regulator and the other members of staff are appointed by the 
board and should in theory be less prone to this type of capture. While this is a valid 
proposal, experience with the operation of this type of governance mechanism suggests 
that senior officials within a financial supervisor could however also be subject to 
political capture, especially in circumstances where the particular official harbors higher 
career ambitions within the agency or in other government institutions. Therefore, this 
tool on its own is not enough to guarantee the independence of a chief financial 
supervisor. It follows that to avoid such form of capture a chief regulator should ideally 
be of an age that excludes this form of career aspirations. Moreover, these mechanisms 
should be supported by other governance arrangements such as by making appointments 
for a tenure that is longer than that held by legislators
($"
 or by imposing term limits.   
 
Term limits is another governance tool, which is considered effective to avoid undue 
dependence and to guarantee a certain degree of de facto independence of the appointee 
responsible for steering the financial supervisor. Without term limits a chief financial 
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supervisor in office may become too influential and authoritative in relation to 
outsiders, so that competition for the office of a chief financial supervisor could become 
distorted with tenure. Moreover, in the absence of term limits, the value of remaining in 
office may become excessively significant, which in turn could trigger a chief financial 
supervisor to focus his/her energy on ensuring re-appointment and consequently divert 
time from supervisory work. Therefore, it becomes best practice to adopt the approach 
of granting appointments only for a fixed term which is non-renewable, but sufficient to 
safeguard independence while gathering enough expertise in the job to deliver long term 
objectives. This is the approach taken with regards to the position of the Chairman of 
the ECB’s supervisory board, who is appointed for a period of five years which is non-
renewable.
($$
  
 
In the final analysis, procedural guarantees may not be effective unless the executive of 
a financial supervisor who has the power to make regulatory and supervisory decisions, 
is made accountable for any ramifications of his/her actions. Accountability is an 
obligation owed by one person (the accountable) to another (the accountee), whereby 
the accountable must explain and justify his/her actions or decisions against specified 
criteria and take responsibility for failure, possibly entailing where relevant the possible 
dismissal of the accountable.
($%
 There are different forms of accountability that may be 
applied. In the case of a financial supervisor, accountability is generally owed to the 
judiciary, whereby the courts are granted the power to review administrative actions or 
decisions by the financial supervisor, and to parliament, which allows monitoring of 
independent agencies by a democratically elected institution.
($&
   
 
Hence, accountability arrangements serve as a monitoring mechanism, which seeks to 
ensure that the financial supervisor acts diligently and fairly, does not abuse its powers 
and is not controlled by third parties, such as the industry they supervise. Accountability 
also becomes a solution to the legitimacy concerns that surface from the possibility that 
a financial supervisor having broad responsibilities and enforcement powers could 
become a law unto itself. Accountability arrangements thus serve as a support for the 
financial supervisor’s independence.   
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Financial regulation and supervision decision making is likely to draw in politically 
sensitive trade offs, such as those between economic efficiency and social well-being or 
concerning investor protection and competition. Such decisions may be regarded as 
being shifted from democratically elected institutions to non-democratically elected 
bureaucratic agencies.
($'
 In a democratic system, a social order is legitimate where the 
policy-makers are accountable to their citizens who are given the opportunity to partake 
in rule-making through representation and can express their disagreement with the 
policy-makers by voting them out of office. This infers a certain degree of equivalence 
between the policy-makers and the citizens through mechanisms of representation. 
Supervisory independence makes the democratic mechanism that allows constituents to 
make a binding decision on the performance of the ruling parties an unworkable 
mechanism for the operation of a financial supervisor. Moreover, while the political 
establishment can transfer binding powers to a financial supervisor, politicians cannot 
transfer their legitimacy. It follows that in the eyes of the general public, the financial 
supervisors might face legitimacy drawbacks.  
 
In order to achieve social legitimacy and market credibility, the discretional 
independence of a financial supervisor needs to be supported by positive performance in 
the fulfilment of its duties and mechanisms for accountability,
($#
 whereby the greater 
the discretion granted to the financial supervisor, the greater the need for adequate 
accountability.
(%)
 Ultimately, accountable independence
(%(
 provides society with a 
certain degree of assurance that financial supervision is being carried out for the right 
reasons and is not being influenced, undermined or abused by private interests.   
 
The concept of accountability entails that the actors being held accountable
 
have 
obligations to act in ways that are consistent with accepted standards of behaviour and 
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that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so.
(%*
 In this regard, judicial review of the 
financial supervisor’s decisions is crucial to control the unreasonable exercise of 
discretionary powers.
(%+
 On the other hand, with regard to accountability to government, 
in order not to jeopardise the independence of the financial supervisor, accountability 
should be established through a combination of control instruments in such a way that 
no one really controls the financial supervisor, yet the agency is under control.
(%"
 In this 
regard, transparency, which is an essential feature of good governance, becomes a 
complement to accountability.
(%$
 It has been argued that:  
 
The provision of information in the context of accountability, whether in an ex 
ante investigation or an ex post requirement of disclosure, facilitates 
transparency. On the other hand, a transparent economic and political 
environment enhances the effectiveness of accountability.
(%%
 
 
Nonetheless, the publication of information on financial supervision has to be selective 
as the actual benefit of full transparency on supervisory matters is not entirely clear.
(%&
  
This is particularly true given the potential uncertainty and instability that could be 
generated by transparency of information on serious supervisory concerns such as the 
potential failure of a financial institution.
(%'
 Moreover, confidentiality constraints exist 
with regard to supervisory matters. Indeed, it has been argued that a tension exists 
between the duty to be accountable by disclosing information and the duty to retain 
supervisory information confidential.
(%#
 In this regard, it is reasonable to suggest that 
this tension may be loosened through possible agreements between the accountable and 
the accountee on restricted access and confidentiality by the accountee, such as those 
reached between the European Parliament and the ECB within the context of the Single 
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Supervisory Mechanism (‘SSM’).
(&)
   
 
In terms of accountability to government, on the one hand the executives of a financial 
supervisor must be independent of political influence, while on the other hand they also 
need to be held accountable for their activities. Parliamentary accountability, which is a 
democratically elected institution, would appear to be the best choice for this purpose as 
clearly ministerial intervention should be avoided, as this could easily result in 
interference by the executive and political capture. Nonetheless, coordination with the 
executive is important to ensure consistent overall policy making.
(&(
 Moreover, while 
parliament should be in position to review, assess and comment on the activity of a 
financial supervisor it should not be granted powers to exercise immediate authority on 
the financial supervisor by interfering directly in its supervisory activity.
(&*
 Therefore, a 
delicate balance must be struck in the construction of this accountability mechanism. 
One may argue that the optimal solution would be to assign a parliamentary committee 
for this purpose that is provided with the required information to facilitate opinion-
formation on the performance of the financial supervisor and which takes a results 
oriented approach in assessing its functioning.
(&+
  
 
Such parliamentary committee would be responsible for assessing the performance of 
the activity of the financial supervisor and make a judgement call on whether it has 
achieved the objectives for which it was established, and more particularly the extent to 
which it has contributed towards attaining the objectives of financial regulation. The 
composition of such parliamentary committee should include representatives from all 
the spheres of the political divide, who should preferably have some form of 
understanding about nature of financial supervision. This would guarantee that no 
special allegiance with one particular party is formed and that no bias is allowed with 
regard to the assessment of the performance of the financial supervisor. 
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Assessing the performance of the activity of the financial supervisor may be a complex 
task, as thus far no real objective criteria, either quantitative or qualitative, have been 
established on what is appropriate in terms of ex-post assessment of financial 
supervision. In this regard, input or process monitoring is considered to be the optimal 
solution to assess a financial supervisor’s performance.
(&"
 One may further suggest that 
the instability within the financial system and investor losses (amongst others) may also 
be applied as possible measures of a financial supervisor’s success, although 
accountability cannot simply rely on whether or not crises are taking place.
(&$
 On the 
other hand, the identification, prevention and risk management of future potential 
financial debacles may be applied as a standard for the assessment of the performance 
of financial supervision, which may be achieved through an examination of the 
processes applied by a financial supervisor in determining where to focus its 
supervisory activity and the manner in which this contributes to a stable financial 
system.  
 
5.4.2 An EU Framework for the Strengthening of Mutual Trust between Financial 
Supervisors  
 
Unless a financial supervisor operates within a framework built on high-level standards 
of sound internal governance, such as independent decision making, accountability, 
integrity and fairness of judgement, transparency and adequacy of powers and 
resources, it is doubtful whether effective financial supervision may be achieved. In 
practice while there has been an upward trend in the implementation of sound internal 
governance arrangements for financial supervision across jurisdictions, the process has 
not been uniform and in certain cases reversals have been noted.
(&%
  
 
Several reasons explain the apparent unsystematic application of high-level standards of 
sound internal governance for financial supervision. With regard to independence, it has 
been determined that policy-makers are still rather reluctant to grant full independence 
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to financial supervisors as inter alia politicians still want a certain degree of control 
over those activities that can generate political benefits such as the licensing and de-
licensing of financial institutions.
(&&
 
 
Empirical research has shown that in certain instances the move toward a higher degree 
of independence has been held back by inter alia the introduction or, in certain cases, 
the continuation by some governments of control-arrangements, such as appointing a 
minister as head of the board, or putting a clause in the law allowing the minister to 
intervene in the financial supervisor’s operation, where necessary.
(&'
 These type of 
arrangements are often justified as accountability mechanisms. However, one may argue 
that their ultimate objective is that of controlling the financial supervisor rather than 
sustaining its independence. Evidence on this point may be derived from the IMF FSAP 
reports, which indicate that in certain instances financial supervisors were constrained 
from action or followed government agenda of the day, and therefore did not intervene 
to enquire about questionable financial practices that supported short-term national 
financial prosperity.
(&#
   
 
A case in point is Spain. An IMF assessment of Spain’s compliance with international 
standards and codes on banking and securities regulation brought to light the significant 
powers exercised by the Ministry of Economy over the regulatory and supervisory 
process.
(')
 The Ministry has a representative on the board of the Bank of Spain and the 
Spanish CNMV with voting powers. The review determined that the power to issue 
financial services licences in Spain rests with the Ministry and not with the Bank of 
Spain and the Spanish CNMV. These two financial supervisors do not have the power 
to revoke authorisations or impose sanctions for serious breaches of the regulatory 
framework. These functions are remitted to the Ministry.  
 
Another interesting example is the IMF’s assessment of the Luxembourg CSSF. The 
IMF concluded that the legal framework which establishes the Luxembourg regulator 
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does not sufficiently guarantee the full operational independence of the CSSF: the CSSF 
is placed under the direct authority of the Minister; its missions include the “orderly 
expansion” of Luxembourg’s financial center; its general policy and budget are decided 
by a board whose members are all appointed by the government upon proposals from 
supervised entities and the Minister; its executives are appointed by the government and 
can be dismissed in cases of disagreement about policy or execution of the CSSF’s 
remit; and its statute confines the executives’ role to elaborating measures and taking 
decisions required to accomplish its missions.
('(
  
 
Yet another example is France, with regards to which the IMF noted that a 
representative of the Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances is present at the meetings 
of the boards of the French AMF and ACP as well as at the meetings of their 
enforcement committees. The IMF commented that this arrangement causes concerns 
regarding the independence of the financial supervisors in France, particularly given the 
power of the Ministerial representative to ask for a second deliberation on the 
supervisory matters being discussed by the board. Moreover, the IMF also noted that the 
board of the French supervisors is also composed of a number of industry 
representatives, which on the other hand raises concerns vis-à-vis independence from 
commercial interests.
('*
 
 
However, concerns about interference in financial supervision by politicians are not 
only pertinent to Europe. In the US, agency independence from politicians is understood 
as independent of control from a single political party, but not necessarily independent 
from partisan politics.
('+
 This is different from the view of independence taken in 
Europe where agency independence would generally also refer to a certain degree of 
independence from the legislative and the executive authorities of government.
('"
 In this 
connection a concern has been expressed regarding the high degree of politicization of 
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agencies such as the SEC.
('$
 In terms of its governing law, the SEC is headed by a 
bipartisan five-member Commission, comprised of the chairman and four 
commissioners, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for 
staggered five-year terms.
('%
 By law, no more than three of the commissioners may 
belong to the same political party. In this manner independence is said to be achieved as 
the agency is not subject to the complete control of one political party.
('&
 Nonetheless, it 
has been observed that the appointed commissioners carry out their duties by applying a 
partisan approach, as the members generally embrace completely the philosophy of their 
political masters.
(''
 This has resulted in a concern that the operation of the SEC does 
not stand outside political domain and is being influenced by partisan politics.
('#
 
Ultimately, appointments that are made purely on the basis of political patronage 
undermine the purpose of independence. 
 
The involvement of political bodies in supervisory matters creates an environment, 
which is conducive to regulatory capture, with the clear risk that the financial supervisor 
may be unable to respond adequately to supervisory concerns should there be 
conflicting interests between the financial supervisor and its political master. This could 
undermine the financial supervisor’s independence. Within the European context IMF 
assessments of Member States carried out during the years 2010 to 2012 raised concerns 
on the independence of financial supervision and/or the adequacy of resources for 
supervision with regards to eight out of twelve Member States.
190
  
 
On the other hand, the point has been made that a financial supervisory arrangement 
may suffer an accountability deficit, since the possibilities of control by democratically 
elected institutions may be limited.
(#(
 A democratically elected institution which 
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operates in a complex and large public sector environment, may be acting as principal 
for a large number of agents. This widens the accountability deficit, as the attention for 
each of these agents may unsurprisingly be selective, as the time and attention at the 
disposal of the democratically elected institution would clearly be limited.
(#*
  
 
The cynical view has also been expressed that accountability deficit in financial 
supervision occurs because only some aspects of a financial supervisor’s activity may 
have a bearing on a politicians’ re-election chances in the short term. These include the 
extent to which new licenses have been issued that generate growth in a given economy 
and the degree to which financial services contribute to the general wellbeing of 
constituents. The political class will tend to focus their monitoring only on these aspects 
and will ignore the remaining activity of the financial supervisor, unless this becomes of 
political concern, such as where supervisory debacles occur.
(#+
  
 
Furthermore, the technical competence required in the field of financial supervision 
which the political class may lack, also contributes to the deepening of the 
accountability deficit as it is doubtful whether the political class would be in a position 
to assess properly the activity and performance of a financial supervisor.  
 
In an environment where there is active cross-border business, a haphazard framework 
which regulates the governance of financial supervision at national level complemented 
by the traditional vertical forms of accountability are not enough to guarantee the 
legitimacy of a financial supervisor with its peers in other Member States. It is 
submitted that in the context of the internal market, unless robust standards for internal 
governance of financial supervision and horizontal accountability mechanisms are 
applied, financial supervisors may have mutual concerns about the standards and 
competence of their peers in other Member States.  
 
Therefore, it would be optimal for mutual recognition based on a process of reflexive 
governance of financial supervision, if a European framework to regulate the standards 
of independence and accountability would be established together with standardised 
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measures of the effectiveness of a financial supervisor and established mechanisms for 
horizontal accountability. European regulation of governance of financial supervision 
thereby becomes a potent tool in the process of strengthening mutual trust between 
financial supervisors. 
 
The legal basis for such EU legislative measure which regulates the internal governance 
of a financial supervisor and which sets standards for measuring supervisory 
effectiveness may be based on Articles 114 or 115 TFEU. These regulate the adoption 
of EU laws that have the purpose of establishing and ensuring the functioning of the 
internal market.  Such measures would have the objective of achieving a certain degree 
of uniformity in the governance of national financial supervisors and strengthening the 
quality of national supervision and by so doing enhancing mutual recognition between 
Member States.  
 
Such a legislative measure would have to respect the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. The regulatory framework would not go beyond stipulating the high-
level objectives, values, constitutional arrangements and other internal organisational 
principles that ought to be respected by Member States with regard to the setting up and 
the on going functioning of financial supervisors. It should not interfere with the choice 
of an institutional model for financial supervision or the detailed governance 
arrangements relating to the operation of the financial supervisor.   
 
The proposed framework would leave day-to-day supervision to be dealt with at 
national level, while creating high-level standards regulating the governance of 
supervision. These may be complemented by joint ESMA, EBA and EIOPA Level 3 
Guidance for regulatory convergence. The latter could be another area where a process 
of reflexive governance of financial supervision could be appropriate. Discussion, 
mutual learning and the codification of best practices may be applied with a view to 
establish a number of possible options which could eventually be applied at national 
level for the implementation of the high-level standards on independence and 
accountability of financial supervision. The process could also be fruitful in creating 
guidance regarding the measures that may be applied in assessing the performance of a 
financial supervisor in the context of different types of financial systems. These would 
form the basis for horizontal accountability by way of peer reviews of national financial 
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supervisors coordinated by ESMA. This would present another opportunity for 
discussion and mutual learning on the best ways of addressing the high-principles for 
sound governance of financial supervision. The inherent outcome would be the further 
strengthening of mutual ties and respect among national financial supervisors.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5 examined the substantive regime set in the 2009 UCITS IV Directive and the 
manner in which it achieves quasi-maximum harmonisation of the new areas of 
regulation covered by the Directive. The chapter argues and illustrates that quasi-
maximum harmonisation of regulation is the optimal mechanism for the development of 
the regulatory framework for UCITS and should be applied for establishing a higher 
degree of harmonisation of the requirements on the authorisation, constitution and 
functioning of UCITS. 
 
The chapter identifies the remaining limitations of the mechanisms for mutual 
recognition under the 2009 UCITS IV Directive and contends that the solution is not in 
the application of an even higher degree of harmonisation (the single rulebook 
mechanism) but in the approach to supervision. For this purpose, the centralised 
approach for European financial supervision and the mutual recognition approach based 
on coordinated and convergent national financial supervision have been considered.  
 
The chapter argues that, in view of the nature of UCITS as a retail investment product 
that requires proximity of supervision to understand and cater for national cultural 
differences, the centralised approach would not respect the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. The solution lies in strengthening the link between financial supervisors 
through a process of reflexive governance of financial supervision combined with a 
mechanism which guarantees the independence and accountability of financial 
supervisors at the national level, thereby strengthening mutual trust among national 
financial supervisors.  
 
In the final analysis, the chapter maintains that in the context of UCITS an approach 
built on mutual recognition based on reciprocated trust, cooperation and convergent 
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supervisory practices is the optimal solution to the governance of supervision dilemma 
and for the completion of the internal market in this field.  
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Chapter 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The internal market for UCITS operates on the basis of mutual recognition, which is 
contingent on harmonised regulation. The thesis examined the conditions and 
limitations of mutual recognition and sought to identify the lacunae in the governance 
mechanism and the regulatory framework for mutual recognition in the context of the 
UCITS Directive. It also identified and examined the regulatory and supervisory 
mechanisms that may be applied to address the identified weaknesses. The usefulness of 
this approach is that it examines the different models that have been implemented, and 
new mechanisms that may be applied, with a view to resolving the governance of EU 
financial regulation and supervision dilemma, particularly within the context of the 
UCITS Directive.  
 
The thesis formulated a theoretical framework for effective mutual recognition based on 
quasi-maximum harmonisation, reflexive governance of financial supervision and a 
mechanism for the strengthening of mutual trust between national financial supervisors.  
 
Harmonised financial regulation, which seeks to achieve homogenous investor 
protection on a cross-border level, has been and still is the most important mechanism 
which is applied by policy-makers to allow mutual recognition of financial regulation of 
UCITS between Member States, thereby allowing the creation of an internal market in 
this field. The nature of UCITS as a retail investment product which may be created 
under different legal forms based on specific legal traditions in Member States, requires 
an approach to regulation that achieves a high degree of harmonised investor protection 
while allowing flexibility to address national differences.  
 
The technique for financial regulation in the field of UCITS must, as a consequence, 
create the right balance between implementing a policy designed to attain the common 
good through a high degree of harmonisation of substantive law, while making 
exceptions to address differences at national level. The picture that emerged from the 
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analysis in the thesis is one in which a model based entirely on minimum harmonisation 
causes serious limitations to mutual recognition in the form of inconsistencies in the 
application of EU regulation and the application of national discretions. Quasi-
maximum harmonisation becomes the optimal harmonisation technique for UCITS.  
 
Under the quasi-maximum harmonisation regime, maximum harmonisation is applied 
in those instances where complete homogeneity and consistency are required to achieve 
a high degree of investor protection, while leaving minimum harmonisation to those 
areas of regulation where flexibility is critical in order to respect the distinct legal 
traditions and cultural differences at national level. Within the context of the 
functioning of the internal market in a field of regulation where maximum and 
minimum harmonisation of regulation coexist, instances of maximum harmonisation 
become a mechanism for the strengthening of the overall mutual recognition between 
Member States, as it reinforces mutual trust between these States in areas which are 
exceptionally important for accomplishing the objectives of financial regulation. 
 
The analysis determined that the limitations of a model based on minimum 
harmonisation of regulation resurfaced, although to a lesser extent, even in the 
framework based on quasi-maximum harmonisation. In the circumstances, however, the 
solution does not lie in the adoption of an even higher degree of harmonisation of 
substantive regulation of UCITS (the single rulebook mechanism), but lies in the 
approach to supervision. While mutual recognition which is contingent on quasi-
maximum harmonisation of regulation is the key tool for the construction of the internal 
market in the field of UCITS, the European model for supervision becomes the critical 
ingredient to resolve the remaining barriers to cross-border business in this field. It is 
also the remedy to address the weaknesses of fragmented and inconsistent supervision 
that create opportunities for arbitrage, which damage the integrity of the internal market 
for UCITS by inter alia weakening mutual trust between financial supervisors.  
 
The competing models for financial supervision, in the form of the centralised European 
approach to supervision and mutual recognition between financial supervisors, are the 
available options for the resolution of the European financial supervision challenge. 
However, given the nature of UCITS, the mutual recognition approach based on 
reflexive governance of financial supervision comes out as the best possible alternative 
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if the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are to be respected. Reflexive 
governance of financial supervision perceives diversity in supervisory practices in 
Member States as the basis for experimentation and mutual learning which may prove 
to be critically important for the overall process of European integration. This together 
with a framework for the strengthening of mutual trust between national financial 
supervisors can form the basis for overcoming the remaining obstacles to the cross-
border activity of UCITS, including the barrier to the depositary passport which is the 
last major bastion that stands in the way of a complete internal market for UCITS. 
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Conti Vittorio, Vice Chairman – Italian Securities Commission [CONSOB]  
Hellwagner Robert, Deputy Head of Division – Prudential Supervision of Collective 
Investment Undertakings – Austrian Financial Market Authority [FMA] 
Hulst Pieter, Officer – Dutch Financial Market Authority [AFM]  
Kirppu Paula, Market Supervisor – Finland’s Financial Supervisory Authority [FIN-
FSA] 
Mercieca Karl, Ex Manager – Malta Financial Services Authority [MFSA] 
Plaze Robert, Ex Deputy Director of the Division of Investment Management of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Veraga Jorge Antonio, Deputy Director – Spanish Securities Regulator [CNMV] 
Vestergaard Jens A, Financial Inspector - Investment Management Companies and 
UCITS Division - Danish Financial Services Authority 
Wandel Esther, Policy Officer – European Commission  
 
Industry 
Agius Joseph, Head of Custody – HSBC Bank Malta plc 
Baillie Kirstene, Partner – Field Fisher Waterhouse LLP 
Barnes Ian, Executive Director – J.P. Morgan Bank Luxembourg SA 
Chetcuti Dimech Frank, Managing Partner – CDF Advocates 
De Domenico Adam, Managing Partner – Zodiac Advisory Services 
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O’Driscoll Anthony, Managing Director – Apex Funds Services Limited 
Pulpon Daniel Alonso, Managing Director – FCS Assets Management Limited 
Swan Giles, Director - ICI Global, Ex-Policy Officer at the UK Financial Services 
Authority  
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Annex 2 
 
INTRODUCTORY E-MAIL AND LIST OF QUESTIONS 
 
 
“Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I refer to our telephone conversation. Thank you for accepting to participate in a semi-
structured interview. 
 
As discussed, in terms of the research ethics regulations of the University of Sussex, I 
am required to provide all participants with information about the thesis and the 
interview. The purpose of this e-mail is to satisfy the applicable conditions in this 
regard. 
 
This document is divided into five sections as follows: Section 1 provides information 
about the thesis. Section 2 explains the manner in which the semi-structured interview 
will be carried out and how the data from the interviews will be used and stored. 
Section 3 outlines some of the questions that will be asked during the interview. Section 
4 is the consent form. 
 
I would appreciate if you could: [i] carefully consider the content of this 
document; [ii] specifically confirm that you would like to participate in the 
interview; and [iii] indicate a date that is convenient to you when the interview 
may be held.  
 
Section 1: Information about the thesis 
 
Title: The development of the EU regulatory and supervisory framework applicable to 
UCITS: A critical examination of the conditions and limitations of mutual recognition. 
 
Purpose: The purpose of the thesis is to examine how the conditions for mutual 
recognition have evolved through the different stages in the development of the EU 
framework for the regulation and supervision of financial services, with particular 
reference to the UCITS Directive. 
 
It is also the purpose of the thesis to examine how the different conditions for mutual 
recognition have contributed to the overcoming of identified regulatory and supervisory 
obstacles to cross border business of UCITS. This requires an examination of the 
historical and current regulatory and supervisory conditions that have caused and, in 
some instances, are still bringing about certain restrictions to the completion of the 
internal market for UCITS. 
 
The thesis also has the purpose of making suggestions regarding future reform to the 
EU regulatory framework and governance of supervision, which should address the 
remaining regulatory and supervisory obstacles to a complete internal market for 
UCITS. It also seeks to establish the extent to which future reform may encourage more 
widespread investment in this type of financial product across borders. 
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Section 2: Information about the semi-structured interview 
 
The purpose of the interview is that of obtaining further evidence about the remaining 
regulatory and supervisory barriers to the cross border activity of UCITS and their 
service providers and to assess the validity of proposed solutions to overcome these 
barriers. 
 
Subject to your consent, the interview will be carried out by way of a telephone call [or 
a meeting] on a date that is convenient for you. The interview should take between 
thirty minutes and an hour, during which the topics and questions outlined in section 3 
will be discussed. 
 
The information obtained during the interview will be used to support the statements 
and arguments made in the thesis. In this regard, subject to your consent, your name 
and designation will be disclosed in the thesis. 
 
During the interview you will be granted with the opportunity to consent 
separately to different components of the semi-structured questionnaire. You will 
also be granted with the opportunity to make ‘off the record’ or anonymous 
observations. Two days after the interview you will be provided with a copy of a 
transcript of the interview and asked to check and confirm its content.  
 
The information obtained during the interview will ONLY be used for the purpose of 
the thesis and relevant academic articles. It will be used for NO other purpose without 
your prior approval. It will be stored in the author’s personal computer and will not be 
disclosed to third parties. Access to the author’s personal computer is secured with a 
password, which is not available to any third parties. The content of the thesis and 
academic publications will, however, be available to the public. 
 
Please note that you have a right to withdraw from the interview at any time. Until the 
date set for the submission of the thesis, you will also have the right to withdraw the 
information provided during the interview by sending an e-mail to the following 
address cpbuttigieg@gmail.com .  
 
Section 3: Topic and Questions 
 
Topic 
 
Mutual recognition between Member States in the field of financial services was and 
still is the main tool that is applied by the EU institutions to overcome regulatory and 
supervisory barriers to the creation of an internal market for UCITS. Mutual 
recognition in the field of financial services has two dimensions: regulation and 
supervision. Mutual recognition functions on the basis of harmonisation of regulation, 
regulatory convergence and the convergence of supervisory practices. Mutual 
recognition is not the only tool for removing regulatory and supervisory barriers to 
cross-border business.  
 
The extent of mutual recognition between Member States in the field of financial 
services depends on the realisation of a certain degree of harmonisation of EU financial 
regulation, the consistent implementation of EU regulation by Member States, and the 
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convergence of supervisory practices through supervisory cooperation between 
Member State competent authorities responsible for financial supervision. 
 
The central argument of the thesis is that while a blend of European and national 
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms has been adequate for building the foundations 
of a broad internal market for UCITS, national agendas, regulatory arbitrage and 
supervisory arbitrage have made mutual recognition an ineffective tool for removing 
the remaining regulatory and supervisory barriers to the internal market for UCITS. 
 
Mutual recognition is not the only tool that may be applied for the purpose of removing 
regulatory and supervisory barriers to cross border business. The thesis contends that to 
overcome the remaining regulatory and supervisory barriers to cross-border business in 
the field of UCITS, mutual recognition should be complemented by other mechanisms, 
such the establishment of a partial single rulebook for UCITS, the adoption of a single 
supervisory manual and delegated/shared/centralised European supervision. 
 
As evidenced by the 2012 UCITS VI Consultation, the UCITS internal market project 
is far from being concluded. This document asks for stakeholders’ views on the 
operation of the UCITS with regards to the assets, which are eligible for investment by 
UCITS, the lack of an internal market passport for depositaries and the regulation of 
other aspects of the operation and investment by certain types of UCITS. It also 
consults on whether the requirements on consolidation mechanisms and the passporting 
mechanism for UCITS might require improvement. 
 
Moreover, the competition between Member States to attract the establishment of 
financial institutions to their jurisdiction for eventual cross-border marketing across the 
EU, has generated a supervisory race to the bottom. This has resulted in different 
definitions of what can be categorized as a UCITS in the EU. 
 
Supervisory arbitrage has been on the EU policy makers’ agenda. These have expressed 
the concern that fragmented national supervision was leading to supervisory arbitrage, 
and was providing incentives to national financial supervisors to compete via lax 
supervisory standards and practices to avoid putting national industry in a less 
competitive position or out of fear that some institutions would shift part of their 
business to less strict supervisory systems. 
 
Concern about competition between Member State financial supervisors and lax 
supervision and supervisory arbitrage weaken mutual trust between financial 
supervisors. This has, in turn, resulted in the implementation and application of non-
harmonised national marketing rules in a way that prohibits certain types of UCITS 
from being marketed in their jurisdiction. It has also resulted in a repeated rejection by 
Member States of proposals for the adoption of a depositary passport. This, with the 
aim of protecting their industry on the one hand, while keeping out undesired UCITS 
structures on the other. 
 
Questions 
 
The identified four major remaining regulatory and supervisory barriers that hinder the 
completion of the internal market for UCITS are: 
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[a] Inconsistent Application of the Directive: The inconsistent application of the 
requirements on the type and quantity of asset classes, which are eligible for investment 
by a UCITS. An asset may be eligible for investment by UCITS in one Member State 
but not in another Member State. 
 
[b] National Marketing Rules: In terms of the UCITS Directive Member States can 
adopt their own regulatory and advertising regimes for the marketing of a UCITS. The 
application of national marketing rules by the host Member State means that UCITS 
have to cope with various local distribution requirements if they intend marketing in 
several Member States. In certain instances national marketing rules have been/are 
applied by Member States to restrict the type of UCITS that may be marketed on their 
territory. 
 
[c] Depositary Passport: The lack of a passport that gives depositaries access to the 
internal market. Repeated attempts to introduce a depositary passport have failed in 
view of lack of harmonised regulation of depositary eligibility criteria, functions and 
standards of civil liability in case of failure and also due to the apparent significance of 
proximity of supervision. 
 
[d] A General Failure of Supervisory Convergence and home-host country supervision: 
Member State Competent Authorities still apply different approaches to the supervision 
of UCITS and their service providers. Home-host country supervision increases the 
regulatory burden on UCITS and may also result in the failure of supervision to react 
promptly in addressing supervisory concerns.  
 
The following ten questions have the purpose of serving as general guide for the 
discussion to be held during the interview. 
 
Q1. Do you generally agree with the identified list of regulatory and supervisory 
obstacles to the completion of an internal market for UCITS? Are you aware of any 
additional regulatory and supervisory barriers to the cross border activity of UCITS and 
their service providers? 
 
Q2. The inconsistent application of the Directive by Member States has resulted in 
situations where assets that are considered as eligible in one Member State are 
ineligible in others. Do you agree that this state of affairs harms mutual recognition 
between Member States? 
 
Q3. More consistency in the application of the requirements on eligible assets may be 
achieved through the application of a maximum harmonisation approach to regulation 
i.e. creating a single rulebook for UCITS eligible assets. Do you see this as a suitable 
solution to achieve a higher degree of consistency? Is this required to strengthen mutual 
recognition between Member States with regard to UCITS? 
 
Q4. Do you agree that the application of national marketing rules increases the 
regulatory and supervisory burden for UCITS, which market their units across borders? 
Do you see this as a major barrier to the cross-border activity of UCITS? 
 
Q5. Is regulatory convergence the right approach to achieve more consistency with 
regard to national marketing rules? Or is this an area where harmonisation of regulation 
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is the appropriate solution? 
 
Q6. The requirement that the depositary must be in the same Member State as that of 
the UCITS prohibits the provision of cross-border depositary services. It may be argued 
that this puts those Member States where the depositary industry is not developed at a 
disadvantage, as it would naturally give rise to inefficiencies within the local depositary 
business. This, at the detriment of the UCITS established in those Member States and 
ultimately the investors. Do you agree? 
 
Q7. Would a depositary passport generate competition and consequently a higher 
degree of efficiency within the depositary industry? 
 
Q8. The proposed UCITS V regime, together with the proposed MiFID II and CRD IV, 
create a suitable regulatory framework and the degree of harmonisation, which is 
necessary to allow the application of a depositary passport. Do you agree? In the 
negative, what additional regulation do you believe would be necessary to allow mutual 
recognition in this field? 
 
Q9. Concern about the adequacy of cross-border supervisory arrangements, has been 
one of the major stumbling blocks to an agreement for a depositary passport. It may be 
argued that existing mechanisms for supervision in different fields, such as the single 
European supervisor approach applied to credit rating agencies and the proposed 
ECB/national supervisors model for banks which is currently being debated at the level 
of Council, may be considered in order to ensure a consistent level of supervision for 
depositaries. What are your views? 
 
Q10. Since fiscal responsibility in case of the failure of a depositary lies within that 
depositary’s home Member State, supervision should also be located there. Do you 
agree with this statement? Do you see this as a major stumbling block to the 
development of a more European approach to the supervision of depositaries? 
 
Section 4: Consent 
 
Please confirm that you would like to participate in the interview. Please also confirm 
that the information provided during the interview may be used for the purpose of the 
thesis together with your name and designation.  
 
Please note that the researcher will have the final say over what is included in the thesis 
or other academic publications.”  
 
 
 
 
